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The Supreme Court of Canada is the court of final appellate jmisdiction in this 
country. Its decisions govem the day-to-day legal discourse in Canadian society. The judicial 
hc t ion  has undergone a drarnatic change since the advent of the Canadian Chmter of Righrs 
and Freedoms, and the inauguration of constitutional supremacy in a country where, prior to 
1 982, judicial deference to the concept of parliamentary supremacy was the nom. Yet, these 
two coflstitutional principles-coasfitutionai supremacy and parliamentary suprernacy-should 
not be treated as antagonistic. Rather, they are both integral to the type of criminal justice 
system evolving in Canada The task for the Supreme Court of Canada since its elevation as 
constitutional arbiter has been to h d  the balance between these two constitutional doctrines. 
It must do so within the limits prescribed by the judicial function. 
What are those limits in the context of criminal law? The definitional elements of the 
offence; the political and legal theory of classical liberalism; the Charter's constitutionai, as 
opposed to statutory, character; the primacy of either crime control or due process values in 
judicid decision-making; the fluctuating balance in the criminal process between the 
influence of constitutional supremacy and parliamentary supremacy; the flexibility of the 
foundational principles of judicial independence and judicial impartiality; and, finally, 
prevailing societal n o m .  In this thesis it has been argued that there is a reciprocd normative 
relationship between the criminal process and society . Decision-making at the Supreme Court 
of Canada filters prevailing societai n o m  to conform to constitutional values-herein lies the 
process of readjustment between the criminal law and society at large. 
To explore the lllnits of the judicial function at work, an analysis of case law 
emanating fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, pdcularly, but not exclusively, in the law of 
homicide had been undertaken. It is a premise of this work that the professional and academic 
dimensions of the criminal law cannot be imderstood in isolation of each other. Rather than 
approach the judicid function in an abstract manner, its iirnits have been reveaied and 
expiored through case law analysis. This gives the analysis imrnediacy to both academics and 
practitioners in their attempts to understand the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to 
constitutional adjudication in the field of criminal law. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The Supreme Court of Canada and the Adversarial System 
Thuty years ago Professor Paul Weiler, writing about the process of judicial decision- 
making, observed: "The philosophy of the judicial process will soon be of great practicai 
significance for the Canadian legal scene. The traditional, inarticulate, legal positivism of 
Canadian lawyers and judges is rapidly becoming outmoded ..."' How prophetic his words 
seem in post-Charte9 criminal law where the judiciary and the judicial hction, especiaiiy 
at the Supreme Court of Canada level, are the subject of unpardeled scrutiny and cnticism. 
The adversarial system of criminal justice forms the background to the Supreme Court of 
Canada's new role as Guardian of the Constitution and, like the Court itself, has been the 
subject of extensive academic comment. The focus of this thesis will be the changing nature 
of the judicial function in the context of criminal law, particuiarly at the Supreme Court of 
Canada level; however, such an analysis neceuitates a basic understanding of the adversaial 
context in which that fuaction has evolved. 
In R. v. Swaid, Lamer C.J.C. found that the Supreme Court of Canada had, in past 
'Paul Weiler "Two Models of Judiciai Decision-Making" (1968) 46 Can. Bar Rev. 
406. 
'Canadian Charter of Rights a& Freedm,,  Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedde B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1 [hereinafter the Chmter]. 
3[1991] 1 S.C.R. 933,63 C.C.C. (3d) 481,5 C.R. (4th) 253 [hereinafter Swain cited 
to C.R.]. See also R v. S-(RD.), [1997] 3 S.C.R 484. 118 C.C.C. (3d) 353,lO C.R. (5th) 1 
[hereioafter S. (RD.) cited to C.C.C.] at 364 where Justice Major in dissent-Çhief Justice 
Lamer and Justice Sopinka concurring-writes: "The bedrock of our jurisprudence is the 
adversary system. Cruninal prosecutions are less adversarial because of the Crown's duty to 
decisions, "recognized the constn~cts of the adversarial system as a bdamentd part of our 
legal system.'" He cited with approval Professor Weiler's characterization of the adversarial 
process: 
An adversary process is one which satisfies, more or less, this factual 
description: as a prelude to the dispute king solved, the interested parties 
have the opportunity of adducing evidence (or proof) and making arguments 
to a disinterested and impartial arbiter who decides the case on the basis of 
this evidence and these arguments. This is by con- with the public 
processes of decision by 'legitimated power' and 'mediation-agreement', 
where the guaranteed pnvate modes of participation are voting and negotiation 
respectively. Adjudication is distinctive because it guarantees to each of the 
parties who are af5ected the right to prepare for themselves the representations 
on the basis of which their dispute is to be resolved.' 
Botnotes omitted] 
Effective preparation for an adversarial criminal contest aiso requires that the d e s  by which 
the Court will adjudicate the dispute are ascertainable beforehand by the parties concemed. 
Chief Justice Larner concluded that '%e principles of fiindamental justice contemplate an 
accusatorial and adversarial system of crimiaal justice which is founded on respect for the 
autonomy and dignity of human beings ...'* Its foundational principle is the presurnption of 
innocence. 
At common Law, the presumption of innocence is referred to as the golden thead 
present al1 the evidence fairly. The system depends on each side's producing facts by way 
of evidence from which the court decides the issues. Our system ... does not permit a judge 
to become an independent investigator to seek out the facts." For a detailed discussion of 
R. (SB.) relative to the issue of judicial impartiality see i n f i  at 60-71. 
'SwainY supra note 3 at 280. 
~ e i l e r ,  supra note 1 at 4 12 cited in Swain, supra note 3 at 28 1. 
%wuin, supra note 3 at 28 1. 
ninning throughout the English criminal law: Woohington v. Director of Public 
Prosecutionr? In Canada, the common law presumption of innocence has been entrenched 
under S. 1 l(d) of the Charter. A  trial ought not, therefore, to be perceived as an 
exercise in establishg the accused's innocence as he or she is presumed innocent nom the 
outset. Rather, it is an adversarial contest in which the Crown seeks to prove the accused's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt To speak of detemiining the g d t  or innocence of the 
accused, therefore, is flawed when, in fact, the accused's innocence is the operating premise 
upon which the trial proceeds. 
The conceptualization of the criminal trial as an adversariai contest between the State 
and the Individual emphasizes the liberal underpinnings of the Canadian criminal justice 
system.' However, since the inception of the Charter, there has been growing discontent 
with a bipartite triai proces? Third party interests vying for legitimacy in trial proceedings 
'[l935] A.C. 462 (H.L.) at 48 1. 
'See Peter H. Russell, The Judiciary In Canada: n e  Third Branch Of Government 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 25 where the author h e s :  
Insofar as the adversary system practised in most Canadian courts puts 
a premium on the rights and responsibilities of the litigants in the process of 
judicial decision-making, it reflects a strong cornmitment to individualism. 
Such a system tends to assume that the individuals (or their professional 
representatives) whose rights are at stake should be in the best position to 
ascertain the strongest arguments with which to support their respective 
daims. At the philosophicul core of such a system is the perception that a 
person is the berner andpnrdentpreserver of individuui rights. An emphasis 
on the rights of the individual is evident in numerous other procedural 
features of ourjudicial system, nota&& the presumption of innocence and the 
requirement ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials. 
[Ernphasis added] 
See Aian Young "Adversarial Justice and the Charter of Rights: Stunting the 
Growth of the 'Living Tree"' (1997) 39 C.L.Q. 362. And see Jamie Cameron "Tradition and 
do so against a predomiuantly libeml philosophical background.'* 
It is not the purpose of this paper to resolve the tension between the concept of a 
criminal trial as a contest between the accused and the Crown, in pursuit of the truth," and 
growing demands to make room for third parties, such as victims, in the adversarial context. 
This aside, a note of caution is warranted. The inclusion of third parties in advermial 
proceedings where the accused's innocence is under attack ought to be approached with 
restraint.12 It is not the third party whose liberty is at stake and who faces criminai sanction 
Change Under the Charter: The Adversary System, Third Party Interests and The Legitimacy 
of Criminai Justice in Canada" in Jarnie Carneron, ed., The Charter 's Impact on the Criminal 
Jurtice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 2 17. 
'"Third party or victim interests are not ignored in the current criminai process. Don 
Shiarf Charter Justice In CPnadan Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Ontario: Carswell, 1996) 
[hereinafter Charrer Justice] writes (at 35): 
Legislative changes to better protect interests of victims have included rape 
shield laws, greater restitution provisions, fine surcharge pro- to support 
victim services, provisions for bans on publicity of the identity of victims, 
written victim impact statements on sentencing and victirn input into parole 
decisions. 
"See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Procedwe [Report 321 
(Ottawa: Supply and SeMces Canada, 1988) at 9-1 3. Speaking of the pursuit of tmth in the 
trial process, and the impact of criminal procedure on that pursuit, the commissioners stated 
(at 10): "The truth is one thing; the law has regard for other values as well. A whole network 
of procedural and evidentiary d e s  exists to regulate and modulate the workings of the 
criminal justice system and thus secure the end of fundamental justice. The manner Ni which 
Canadian criminal process pursues its purposes is therefore best described as a qualified 
semch for mth." The commissioners maintain (at 9) that juxtaposed to the quest for tmth 
are concerns for "human dignity (a notion which is broad enough to encompass the 
protection of society and the prese~ation of peace), and protection against the risk of 
convicting innocent persans." 
I2See Don Stuart "Charter Protection Against Law and Order, Victims' Rights 
and Equality Rhetoric" in Jamie Carneron, ed., The Chmter 's Impact on the Criminal 
Jwtice Sysrem (Toronto: Carswell. 1996) at 327. 
for wrongdoing. It is the accused. 
Often what is overlooked in the debate over the extent of third party participation in 
the actuai determination of guilt is the role of the Crown Attorney. He or she is responsible 
for the public interest in its many facets, and, in this capacity, for third party interests: 
Crown Attorneys in Nova Scotia are responsible ... for the conduct of 
prosecutions. The conduct of a prosecution involves not only the conduct of 
the trial itseif but a myriad of other activities essential to a fair prosecution. 
Crown Attorneys therefore conduct arraignments, show cause (bail) hearings, 
prelimhary inquiries, sentencings, appeals . .. disposition and review hearings 
before the Criminal Code Review Board, and fataiity inquiries. In addition, 
they provide pre-charge advice to the police and provincial govemment 
enforcement officials, participate in the formulation of policy advice on the 
criminal law, participate in management activities aimed at improving the 
delivery of prosecutorial s e ~ c e s  to our cor~ll~lunity, prepare professional 
papers, and conduct and participate in public speaking engagements. In short, 
they discharge a number of responsibilities of fundamental importance to our 
cornrnunity. 
In discharging these responsibilities, a Crown Attorney must be guided 
by the law, codes of professional ethics, and the public interest. The public 
interest involves many consideratiom. It encompasses the need to protect the 
ovenvheiming percentage of lawdbiding citizens through the conviction of 
criminals and the detemence of crime. ... 
The notion that dl accused should receive fair and equal prosecutorial 
treatment by the Crown is an aspect of the d e  of law. Canada's judicial 
system operates on an adversarial triai model. It is left up to the parties to 
fiame the issues before the court and Iead the evidence relied on in support 
of their case. The role of defence counsel in this mode[ is to do everything that 
c m  be ethically done to secure an acquittaifor an accused who has chosen 
to plead not guilty. The role of the Crown Attorney excludes uny notion of 
w inning or Zosing.I3 
[Emphasis added] 
The Crown Attorney's role "excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter 
of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal 
%blic Prosecution Senrice, Annud Report (Septeder 1,1993 to March 3 1,1997) 
(Halifax: Nova Scotia Govemment Printer, 1997) at 1 S. 
The judiciary of the Supreme Court of Canada approaches its adjudicative task in the 
context of an adversarial tradition where Iiberalism's emphasis on the individual is a primary 
influence. 
As a third party deciding a dispute about legal rights, the judge should not 
render his decision without first allowing each of the p d e s  to put forward its 
side of the case. If there is no opportunity for one or the other side to make its 
subrnissions and counter those of its adversary, or if the judge's decision is 
based on considerations exîraneous to the arguments of the parties, the 
adjudicative process will appear to be less a process for irnpartially and 
objectivety settüng disputes about legal rights than a device for imposing the 
wiU of the judge and the politicai forces with which he seems to be aligned." 
~oomotes  omitted] 
Meeting the criteria of impartiality and objectivity in post-Charter Canada is particularly 
dauuting given the stratifie& heterogeneous and multi-cultural society in which we live. Yet 
the task is not impossible. b f a r  as discretion-as distinct nom unfettered 
subjectivity-Worms subjective influences, the human dimension of the j udicial function 
becornes an invaluable tool of individualized justice? 
'4Boucher v. Her Majesîy The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16 at 24. However, this 
understanding of the C r o w  role does not aiways correspond to that of actud practice. See 
for example the dissenting reasons of McLachIin and Major JJ. in R v. Cmagh Inc., [1997l 
1 S.C.R. 537, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 481,5 C.R. (5th) 291 at 299-329 bereinafter Westray cited 
to C.R]. At 326-327 the Justices wrote: "The present case is not simply about Crown non- 
disclosure. This case is about the appeanuice of justice. ... The entire proceedings were 
tainted by prosecuton who were playing to an enraged public, and playing to win. ... To win 
is not the role of the prosecutor, to w h  at al1 costs is an f i o n t  to the Canadian justice 
system." 
15Russe11, supra note 8 at 25. 
I6See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionmy Justice (Louisiana: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1969). 
The tripartite relationship between the Charrer. the criminal law, and the judicial 
fiinction, as revealed through an anaiysis of case law issuing fiom the Supreme Court of 
Canada, shall be explored in later chapters. The prirnary focus shall be on the evolving nature 
of the judicial hction, and the consequences of that evolution for the law of homicide. In 
short, the question to be addressed is as follows: What are the operational Iimits of the judicial 
hc t ion  in pst-Charter criminal law as revealed through an analysis of case law emanating 
fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, padcularly, but not exclusively, in the area of homicide? 
This question presupposes an examination of the adjudicative fiuiction against a 
broader theoretical background. Law is neither created, hterpreted nor applied in a vacuum. 
"Legal change reflects an intemal dynamic, which, nevertheless, is affected by extenial stimuli 
and, in tum, influences the external environment."'' Likewise, the judicial function does not 
evolve in isolation fiom its broader theoretical context. In Chapter 2 that broader theoretical 
context will be explored including the implications for the judicial hction of Canada's 
political designation as a democracy; the predominantly liberal ideology infonning our 
democratic institutions and constitutional documents; the predominance of either crime 
control or due process values in the criminal process; and the human dimension of judicial 
decision-making. 
Both the law and the judicial adjudicative fiinction are perceived as king influenced 
by the external environment, but in a self-adjusting rather than a simply reactive manner." 
"Gunther Teubner "Substantive And Reflexive Elements In Modem Law" (1 983) 
17 Law & Society Rev. 239 at 239. 
laThe ensuing discussion concemhg the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
facilitating, through decision-making, a reciprocal adjustment between itself, the criminal 
8 
In tum, the social environment, itself, undergoes readjustment. Thus, one possible goal of the 
criminai justice system in a stratifie4 heterogenous and muiti-cdtuml post-Charter Canada 
is to facilitate, perhaps even coordinate, the process of muhial readjustment between the 
criminal law and society. The common ground underpinuhg Herbert Packer's two models 
of the criminal process could be seen as providing the foci of adjustment for both society and 
the legal system.I9 Limiting the criminal investigatory powers of the State, for instance, is an 
exercise in balancing the pnvacy interest of not only accused persons, but of socieîy at large, 
as against the superior resources of the govemment. Cornpliance with the Charter and 
Charter values at the executive, legislative and judicial levels of government also facilitates 
the concept of the c r i m a  justice system as an adjusting influence rather than a coercive 
law and prevailing societal or community values derives fiom Teubner's, supra note 17, 
articulation of "reflexive law" as the outcorne of evolutionary change in law and society 
The author States (at 242): 
From this juxtaposition of dflerent but overlapping approaches [to law and 
society posited by German and Amencan neo-evolutionary theones], 1 
develop a new perspective on the process of legd and social change that 
pemits me to point to a new "evolutionary" stage of Law, which 1 cal1 
"reflexive law." This stage, in which law becomes a system for the 
coordination of action within and between semi-autonomous social 
subsystems, can be seen as an emerging but as yet unrealized possibility, and 
the process of transition to a tnily "reflexive" law can be analyzed. 
Teubner ( at 270-273) sees the evolution of reflexive law in the context of "fwictionally 
differentiated societies" characterized by "specialized social subsystems". 
Similarly, the need to perceive the Supreme Court of Canada fiom a different 
perspective is a consequence of the litigious rnulti-dimensional and multi-culturai society 
which Canada has become, particularly since the Charter's inception. Homogeneity no 
longer being the reality, the Supreme Court of Canada is compelled to re-assess its 
adjudicatory role insofar as it is involved in the constitutionalization of values. 
The Suprerne Court of Canada should not be seen as an isolated entity thnistllig its 
vision of Canadian society on an unsuspecting public. Rather, it is the filterer of norms, but 
within the context of constitutional and criminal law principles. And herein lies the mb. The 
Supreme Court of Canada is not-and should not-be a resultsriented body where the facts of 
the case determine the outcorne. Rather, the focus should be on the principles of criminal 
liability? Has the presumption of innocence been respected? Has the Crown proven guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt? Has the accused's right to a fair trial been respected? Has the 
substantive criminal law been interpreted and applied in a fair manner which respects the 
principle of the nile of law?= While some may decry decisions of the Supreme Court of 
'O~ee "Theory of the Charter", in* note 64 and accompanying text. And see Peter 
Hogg and Aiiison Bushell "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures" ((1997) 
35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. 
" ~ h e  issue of criminal liability is not novel. However, exploring the theoretical 
foundations of criminal liability is a resurgent trend in criminal law theory. See George 
Fletcher "The Rise and Fall of Criminal Law Theory" (1998) 1 Buffalo Crim. L. R. 275. 
%ee Our Criminal Procedure, supra note 1 1 at 7-8 where the commissioners discuss 
the distinction between procedural and substantive law. 
Substantive law reflects the legislature's posture with regard to a 
particular social policy issue. It is substantive law which mirrors the decision 
to label certain activity as criminal. ... By contrast, procedural law provides 
the surrounding d e s  regulating the inquiry (whether at the police 
investigatory stage or a trial) into whether a violation of the substantive law 
has occurred, 
While procedural law simpliciter is unable to control the content of 
substantive legislation, constitutional law is potentialiy able to do so. Where 
the Constitution contains express provisions, as ours does, protecting 
fundamental fkeedoms or legal nghts, it may be wielded in such a manner as 
to prevent an invasion of the liberty of the individual by govemment or its 
agencies. This hold true regardless of whether the violation of the right or 
fieedom has been accommodated by either the substantive or procedural law. 
10 
Canada, the grim reality is this: by conceclhg rights to the most despicable offenders accused 
of the most heinous crimes, only then will rights be secured for di. Undoubtedly, there is a 
tension between the confidence of the majority in the criminal justice system and the 
individual rights of the accused. But the balance must not be decided in the capricious court 
of public opinion. It must be decided k u g h  the ongoing assessrnent of basic criminal law 
principles and values necessitated by the Charter's mandate that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land. Respect for the rule of law, in turn, minimizes the risk of convicting 
the innocent and acquithg the puilty. 
It is a working premise of this work that the theoretical h e w o r k  introduced in 
Chapter 2 cannot be appreciated divorced fkom the actuai practice of criminal law, hence the 
subject matter of Chapter 3-the law of homicide? The language and practice of the trial and 
[Footnotes ornittedl [Emphasis added] 
%ee Nicola Lacey "Philosophy, History and Criminal Law Theory" (1 998) 1 Buffalo 
L. Rev. 275. The author (at 303-304) suggests an interpretive approach to crimllial law 
theory: 
An excellent illustration of the complex relationship between the 
normative and other aspects of legal theory may be drawn fiom Jules 
Coleman's work of tort theory. Coleman introduces Risks and Wrongs by 
announcing that "[tlhis book is a book about liberai political, moral and legal 
theory." This immediately suggests that his enterprise is normative-part of 
liberal political philosophy. But over the next few pages it becomes clear that 
this is far fiom king the case: 
We cm distinguish among at least two ways of approaching 
this sort of explanatory inquiry. The fïrst kind of explanatory 
approach adopts what 1 will cal1 a 'Yop-down" strategy. In 
top-dom explamtions, the theorist begins with what she 
takes to be the set of n o m  that would gain out reflective 
acceptance, at least among those practitioners who adopt the 
intemal point of view. Then she looks at the body of law she 
seeks to understand and tries to reconstruct it piausibly as 
exempiifying those n o m .  In contrast to the topdown 
appellate courtrooms is determineci, in large measure, by the S u p m e  Court of Canada. The 
governing politicai, moral and legal values and assumptions implicit in those judgmentsy in 
tum, influence day-to-day legai discourse. As well, those values and assumptions fuel 
academic reaction to the Supreme Court of Canada's stewardship of the criminai justice 
approach, one can work fiom the middle up. In midme-level 
theory, the theorist immerses herse f i i n  the practice ifseIfand 
aFkr if it c m  be usefil& organized in ways that reject a 
cornmitment to one or more plausible principles. mis 
opproach seekr to identia the principles that m e  condakztes 
and those aspects of the practice that reflect them. 
For Coleman, then, the differentiation between normative and anaiytic 
projects is muddied because both middle-leveI theory and top-down theory 
are conceived as part of an essentially explanatory project. What Coleman is 
expressing here is what Ishall term an interpretive conception; the idea that 
explanatory projects around law are always going to be informed by the 
values which are immanent within a particuIar set of legal institutions and 
practices. [Emphasis added] Footnotes ornittedl 
Building on this interpretive conception, Professor Lacey States (at 309): 
Moreover, I would argue that theorists of criminai law-whether 
lawyers or philosophers-who seek to develop theories which answer to the 
contours of achial practices of criminal law are, inevitably even if implicitly, 
engaged in the sort of interpretive enterprise which I have already suggested 
is the best way of understanding Coleman's concept of middle-level theory. 
The idea of linking theory to practice-albeit not in a purely interpretive style-and developing 
a position on p ~ c i p l e s  derived fiom the analysis is central to this paper. 
2 4 ~ e e  Fletcher, supra note 2 1 at 293-294 where the author underscores the importance 
of moral and political philosophy for an understanding of the principles of criminal liability: 
Skepticism both about the distinction between acts and omissions and about 
the distinction between attempts and completed crimes derives fiom the same 
root misconception. Both are premised on a dubious moral theo~y that makes 
bad intentions to be the core of immoral conduct This view of morality 
would be iafluential ody if theorists c o d t t e d  the additional rnistake of 
failing to integrate political theory into their views of just punishment. 
It should be clear, 1 think, that the fuhw of criminal theory rests on 
an adequate appreciation of both moral and political philosophy. It is &er 
al1 the state that seeks to inflict punishment. Without a view about the proper 
relationship of the state to its citkens, mord theones about crime and 
punishment can lead us astray. 
12 
systern. For example, the IndividuaUState divide, ceneal to traditional liberal ideology, is 
explored in Hunter v. Southm Inc.? a non-homicide case which later influenced the 1997 
decisions in Feeney 26 and ~tiIIrnan7 two murder conviction appeais to the Supreme Court 
of Canada These cases generated a wealth of academic response, sent a message to policing 
authorities that, as agents of the State, they wili be bound by strict guidelines before infihging 
the accused's privacy interest, and prompted legislative reaction h m  Parliament, itself. Thus, 
by examining legai theory in the context of adversarial criminal practice, the various State and 
private players can appreciate better their respective positions vis-a-vis the criminal law. 
Disparate views at least would have in common an identifiable starting point-the bipartite 
adversarial criminal trial and the prevailing law as articulated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
Chapter 3 examines the judicial fiinction in action in the law of homicide. The tension 
between constitutional supremacy and parliamentary supremacy, as operative principles in our 
liberal democracy, is the focal point of the analysis. The shift fkom judicial deference to 
legislative bodies in favour of judicial activism under the Charter, and the implications for 
the criminal justice system, will be explored in both Chapters 3 and 4. 
This is not a treatise on the criminal law nor on the law of homicide. It is a focussed 
attempt to bring order to the chaos of academic and public criticism of the Supreme Court of 
13 
Canadat8 by highlighting what may be perceived as the major forces governing their decision- 
making process. The Chmter has thnist the Supreme Court of Canada into "un-Chmtered" 
waters. In efféct, not ody must the Chwter be intmduced to the criminal law, but dso the 
crimllial law must be introduced to the Charter. 
28This is not to Say that the Supreme Court of Canada was immune h m  criticism 
prior to 1982. See, for example, Paul Weiler, In The Las Resort (Toronto: Carswell, 1974) 
[hereinafter Last Resort]. At 235 he writes: 
Underlying this litany of cornplaints is one basic theme: our Supreme 
Court is unduly onented to the task of adjudicating the concrete dispute 
before it and, as a resuit, it exhibits much too nanow a conception of legal 
reasoning to do justice to the important legal policies it is setting for the 
Canadian polity. These are the hdamental attitudes which must be changed 
if we are to secure a better quality of judging fiom the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
Chapter 2 
The Supreme Court of Canada: 
Exploring the Operationai Limits of Judicial Activity 
The Supreme Court of Canada operates within a Liberal democracy. Of principal 
importance to the judicial fûnction is the relationship between elected legislative bodies and 
the courts. The lMiits of the judicial bct ion ui criminal law must be understood in that 
context with its attendant ideological underpinnings. 
The principle of parliamentary supremacy derives from the preamble to the 
Comtitution Act, 1867 and connotes a constitutional legai system in which Parliament, 
through its criminal law power, is subject to the Courts ody insofar as it exceeds its 
jurisdiction under the federal division of power~.*~ Judicial deference to legislative 
pronouncements had been the nom in Canada prior to the advent of the Charter despite the 
operation of the Canadian Bill of R i g h ~ s , ~ ~  a piece of federal legislation enacted in 1960. 
Perhaps the most notable exception was the case of R. v. Drybone~.~' In deciding that federal 
legislation making it an offence for an hdian to be intoxicated off a reserve violated the 
29See Douglas A. Schmeiser 'The Case Against Entrenchment of a Canadian Bi11 of 
Rights" ( 1  973) 1 Dal. L.J. 15 at 15-1 8. 
"S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter the Bill of Rights]. 
"(1969), [1970] S.C.R 282, 10 C.R.N.S. 334, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 355 Dereinder 
Drybones cited to C.R.N.S.]. The accused, a First Nations man living in the Northwest 
Temtories, was convicted of being intoxicated off a reserve, a crime specific to native 
peoples under then existing federal legislation. 
equality provision of the Bill of R i g h J 2  Ritchie J. for a majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the Bill of Rights was more than a canon for the construction of federal 
statutes. It was, (and continues to be), "a statutory declaration of the fiindamental human 
nghts and fieedoms which it recognizes ..."." Substantive review of legislation became a 
rec 15ogoized possibility, particularly with Chief Justice Laskin's later characterization of the 
Bill of Righls as a quasi-constitutional document?" Referring to the Drybones case, one 
author noted: 
Suddenly everything seemed changed when the Supreme Court 
decided Drybones in late 1969. Here the Court was directly confionted with 
the issue of the precise legal impact of a Bill of Rights ... The judges seized 
the opportunity to came out a visible and full fledged judicial role as the 
protector of our civil liberties aga% Parliamentary intrusi~n.'~ 
"Section 1 (b) states: 
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed 
and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national 
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fiindamental 
fieedoms, namely , 
a.. 
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the 
protection of the law; 
33Drybones, supra note 3 1 at 343. 
34See R. v. Hogan (1 974), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574,18 C.C.C. (2d) 65,26 C.R.N.S. 207 
[hereinafter cited to S.C.R.] where Laskin, C.J.C., speahg in dissent, wrote (at 597): "The 
Canadian Bill of Rights is a haK=way house between a purely common law regirne and a 
constihitionai one; it may aptly be described as a quasi-constitutional instrument. It does not 
embody any sanctions for the enforcement of its terms, but it must be the fiuiction of the 
Courts to provide them in the light of the judicial review of the impact of that enactment. 
The Drybones case has established what the impact is, and 1 have no reason to depart f b m  
the position there taken." The Supreme Court of Canada's continuing conservatism in its 
adjudicative hc t ion  under the Bill of Righrs often lefi Laskin C.J. in dissent. 
"Lmt Resort, supra note 28 at 195. 
Yet, this initial promise did not mature, and the Supreme Court of Canada retreated fiom its 
activist stance.36 
Constitutional developments in 1982 changed this perspective. Whereas the Bill of 
Rights had been a federal statute applicable only to federal legi~lation,'~ the Charter had 
constitutional status. Professor Hogg, writing of the shift h m  a statutory to a coIiSfitutiona1 
guarantee of fùndarnental rights and freedoms observes: "The restraint that led the Courts to 
defer to the legislative choices that were presented for judicial review under the Bill of Rights 
has not continued under the Charter. The Courts have assumed that the constitutional status 
of the Charter resolves their former uncertainty as to the legitimacy ofjudicial review.'"' The 
source ofthat uncertainty derived, in part, fiom Canada's political institutions and culture, and 
is equally as topical in current academic commentary on the Supreme Court of Canada's 
application of the Charter in a stratifie4 multi-cultural Liberal democracy. The old analysis 
still has some relevance, especially the ongoing tension between the principle of parliamentq 
supremacy and the role of an appointed court in Canadian democracy: 
%ee Charter Jurtice, supra note 10 at 426 where Stuart, referring to Drybones as a 
"landmark decision" writes: "However, Drybones was subsequently distinguished by the 
Court in two controversial decisioas. ... Canada (A.G.) v. Lave11 (1974) ... [and] BIiss v. 
Canada (A. G.) (1 979) ..."[F ootnotes omitted]. See also Peter Hogg, ComtitutionaI Law of 
Canada, 4th ed. (Ontario: Carswell, 1 997) (Loose-le@ at 32- 1 1 where the author observes: 
"In the 22 years that elapsed between the Bill's enactment in 1960 and the Charter's adoption 
in 1982, the Drybones case was the only one in which the Suprerne Court of Canada held a 
statute to be inoperative for breach of the Bill." pootnotes omitted]. 
37~lthough S. 2 of the Bill of Rights implies that it is applicable to "every law in 
Canada", that phrase is qualified under S. S(2) to refer to federal legislation, des ,  orders, and 
regdations only. 
"~ogg,  supra note 36 at 32- 1 1. 
Before considering Drybones we mtïst eramine the Cmadian setting 
in which it appems. We know that provincial and f e d d  legislative 
jurisdiction is delineated in ss. 91 and 92 of the British North America Act; 
that there is no Bill of Rights entrenched in ou .  constitution, as  in the United 
States, and if it were entrenched in our constitution, considering our many 
problems conceming amendment of out constitution, it is easy to foresee grave 
problems arising should we ever wish to amend it, as, for example, to conform 
to the needs of a changed and changing society; that our Govemment operates 
on the basis that the elected majority will d e ,  and the Govemment is 
representative and responsible; Parliament is supreme, hence any federal 
enactment, including the Canadian Bill of Rights, can be abrogated or 
amended (and we do not have a division of the legidative, executive, and 
judiciai branches, nor do we have a system of checks-and balances [sic], as in 
the United States); and the Supreme Court of Canada is itself a creature of 
statute; and we live in a pluralistic federal community, in which Quebec does 
have its own unique problems." 
[Emphasis added] 
Despite the aclcnowledged difficulties of achieving, let alone amending, a constitutional bill 
of rights, that feat was accomplished in 1 982. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Canada found 
its judicial review role expanded by a legal rights document that enlarged upon its review 
fmction of both the positive and the cornmon law. 
The principle of constitutional supremacy, inaugurated under s.52 of the Constitution 
Acr, 1982, has left the Supreme Court of Canada in an awkward position: it must now balance 
the competing principles of parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy in the 
decision-making process. It will be argued that the CO-existence of these two p ~ c i p l e s  is
a constitutional reality albeit not aiways an easy one?' The Court is trying to reconcile the 
two constitutional doctrines by articulating appropriate principles of constitutionai 
'Qugh W. Silvennan ''Aunotation: Dry bones: Are they aiive?" (1 970) 10 C.R.N.S. 
356 at 357-358. 
"('Exploration of the impact of parliamentary and constitutional supremacy in the law 
of homicide will be undertaken in Chapter 3. 
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adjudication that demarcate the Court's review h c t i o n  as distinct fiom Parliament's criminal 
law policy-making responsibility. The post-Chter ideological mix impacting on the judicial 
function to be explored in this chapter wili f o m  a background to the subsequent analysis of 
the law of homicide. That analysis will, in tum, pivot around judicial efforts to reconcile the 
Supreme Coiirt of Canada's status in a legal system where a deep-rooted tradition of 
parliamentary democracy offers no quarter to the new-born principle of constitutional 
supremacy . 
1. The Supreme Court of Canada 
The Supreme Court of Canada exercises "exclusive ultimate appellate civil and 
criminal jurisdiction within and for Canada, and the judgment of the Court is, in al1 cases, 
h a l  and conclusive."' Such was not always the case. Until 1949, the Supreme Court 
exercised an intemediate appellate jurisdiction only. It was overshadowed by the Judicial 
Cornmittee of the Privy Council in England which continued to wield nnal appellate 
jurisdiction over the Dominion. Although the British North America Act, 1867 " provided, 
under S. 10 1, that a general court of appeal coufd be created in Canada, the ongoing British 
41Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, S. 52. Notice that the section number 
according the Supreme Court of Canada final and exclusive appellate jurisdiction in Canada 
ais0 is the same numbering given to the constitutional supremacy clause under the Charrer. 
"30 & 3 1 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) renarned the Constitution Act, 1867 by the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canclda Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1. For purposes of 
clarity, references to the B.N.A. Act, 1867 prior to the year 1982 will not reflect the name 
change. 
influence margblized the Court's relevance and stature? The Supreme Court's s u b s e ~ e n t  
position to British legal institutions parallelled the status of the Dominion vis-a-vis its 
colonial master? 
The push for independence fiom British legal institutions initidy was not unanhous. 
The relationship between this continuing appeal procedure [to the 
Judicial Cornmittee of the Rivy Council] and the "general court of appeal for 
Canada" contemplated by S. 101 of the 1867 constitution was a matter of 
controversy. Some wanted the new Caniirfim appeal court to be a tribunal of 
last resort; others sought that Privy Coiincil appeals should be preserved, both 
as an alternative to any new court and as a tribunal for reviewing its decisions. 
An early intimation of this division of opinion came in 1870 when, in the 
House of Commons debate on a subsequently withdrawn Supreme Court bill, 
a member of parliament asked whether the new court would supplant the Privy 
Council, provoking a vigorously negative response from Sir John A. 
MacDonald? 
Footnotes omitted] 
4 3 ~ e e  Dale Gibson "Development of Federal Legal and Judiciai Institutions in 
Canada" (1996) 23 Man. L. J. 450 at 486 where the author &tes: "It was a forgone 
conclusion that the Court's prestige would be undermined by the possibility that cost- 
conscious litigantscouid leapfrog it entirely by the per sultum procedure for appeal directly 
fiom provincial courts to London's Privy Council. The Privy Council M e r  eroded 
confidence in the Court by overruiing it in numerous early decisions ..." See also Bora 
Laskin "The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians" (1 95 1) 29 Can. 
Bar Rev. 1038 at 1038- 1040. At 1040 Professor Laskin (as he then was) wrote: How far the 
intermediate position of the Court tended to its obscur@ is difficult to estimate. 1 do not refer 
to any obscuriîy in a professional legal sense. The Court made itself felt whenever the 
opportunity offered. But it is clear that the Court has not hitherto been regarded by the public 
at large as a potent element in Canadian self-government. Perhaps this is a role which a 
national tribunal can essay only if it has ultimate judicial authority." See also Peter Russell 
"The Political Role Of The Supreme Court of Canada In Its First Century" (1975) 53 Can. 
Bar Rev. 576. 
" ~ e e  Laskin, supra note 43 at 1 O38 where the author states: "It was a [constitutional] 
system under which Canadian judicial dependence on Imperid authority was of a piece with 
Canadian subservience in both legislative and executive areas of govemment." 
4SGibson, supra note 43 at 480. 
Efforts to make the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions 'W and conclusive" under its 
founding legislation proved unsuccessful and prerogative appeals to London continued." 
However, in the field of criminal law-an exclusive federal jurisdiction under S. 9 1 (27) of the 
B.N.A. Act, 1867-a movement was doot to assert exclusive appellate jurisdiction for the 
fledgling national court 
In 1887 criminal appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were 
abolished under Canadian legislation.'" Apparently, the legislative initiative was prompted by 
Louis Riel's appeal of his treason conviction to the Pnvy C~unc i l .~  Like Riel's appeal, the 
new initiative did not survive the scruthy of the Pnvy Council, and this attempt to restrict 
British influence, at least in respect of criminal appeals, was crushed by the Privy Council's 
1926 d i n g  in Nudun v. The King49 The Privy Council held that the Dominion legislation was 
invalid because it purported to restrict prerogative appeals to the Crown and was, thereby, 
&lbid at 481-482 where Gibson writes: "There has always been some sentiment, 
strongest in Quebec, that Pnvy Council appeals should be abolished for al1 types of litigation. 
This had been the goal of the ineffectual restriction included in the 1875 statute establishüig 
the Supreme Court of Canada, and sporadic agitation to replace it with a workable measure 
continued over the years." See also Barry L. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution And The 
Couris, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butierworths, 1988) at 26 where he writes: "p]uring the 75 years 
after the creation of the Supreme Court, parliament] passed a number of measures with the 
purpose of making its judgments W." 
"See An Act to amend the lm respecting Procedure in Criminal Cases, S.C. 1886- 
87, c. 50, am. 1888-89, c. 43, S. 1. 
" ~ e e  Strayer, supra note 46 at 26, n109. Gibson, supra note 43 at 480-48 1 concurs 
but adds: "It was just as probable, however, that the change was a personal project of 
minister ofjustice J.S. Thompson, who introduced the measures in parliament." pootnotes 
omitted] . 
"[1926] A.C. 482, [1926] 2 D.L.R. 177,45 C.C.C. 221 (J.C.P.C.). 
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beyond the Dominion's jrnisdiction to enact. Further, the legislation confiicted with two 
imperial statutes thereby violating the Colonial Luws Validiity Act. l86'i." The result in 
Nadan was a key factor leading to the imperid conference of 1926 and the resdting Balfour 
Declaration "which acknowledged that the senior British colonies were independent in fact, 
if not ui law, and that steps would soon be taken to make the law correspond to reality."5' 
M e r  a five-year interval, the Statute of Weshinister, 193 1" was enacted by the Imperial 
Parliament Canada gained forma1 independence fkom Great Britain and the Colonial Laws 
Validiity Act, 1865 no longer was applicable to the D~rninion.~ Imperial statutes, once a tool 
of control and domination by the Irnperial Parliament, now were applicable only at the 
Dominion' s express request and consent." 
Seizing upon this new era of independence, the 1888 initiative in respect of criminal 
appeals was resurrected, and, in 1933, a provision was added to the Criminal codeSS 
*"28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.). See Hogg, note 36 at 3-3 to 3-5. 
SIGibson, supra note 43 at 48 1. See also Hogg, supra note 36 at 3-4 to 3-5. 
"22 Geo. V, c. 4 (Imp.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendk II, No. 27. 
"See Laskin, supra note 43 at 1069. But see Bnan Slattery "The Independence of 
Canada" (l983), 5 S.C.L.R. 369 at 391. 
%Sec Slattery, supra note 53 at 384 where the author discusses the impact of irnperial 
statutes on colonies: "To understand the process by which a colony becomes independent, 
it is necessary to examine more closely a basic principle of British colonial law ... The d e  
States that the Imperial Parliament may legislate for British colonies overseas in any matters 
whatsoever; such legislation is not only binding in the colonies but possesses ovemding 
force there, so as to nullify any existing or future local laws that conflict with it." 
'9n Act to amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 1932-33, c. 53, S. 17. 
abolishing criminal appeds h m  all courts to the Privy C ~ u n c i l . ~ ~  The legislative initiative 
was upheld by the Privy Council two years later in British Cool Corporation v. The ~ i n g . ' ~  
Ultimately, al1 civil and criminal appeals becarne the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of Ca~ada?~  
Thus, with the 1949 amendments to the Sqreme Court Act (192 7) 59 the Court entered 
adulthood, 18 years after Canada had gained formai independence from Great Britain under 
the Statute of Westminister, 193 31. As the court of final appellate jurisdiction in this country, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has been striving, ever since, to carve a niche for itself in the 
Canadian political and legal landscape. Moreover, it is apparent b m  the foregokg brief 
historical description, that criminal law has been a signifcant arena for this struggle since the 
early days of Codederation. 
1 do not intend to delve M e r  into the history of the Supreme Court of  anad da.^" 
%Sec Strayer, supra note 46 at 27. 
n[1935] A.C. 500, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 401,64 C.C.C. 145 (J.C.P.C.). 
" S ~ ~ A - G .  Ont. v.A.G. Cm,  [1947]A.C.127,[1947] 1 Al1E.R. 137,[1947] 1 D.L.R. 
801. 
s 9 ~ n  Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, S.C. 1949 (2d session), c. 37, S. 3. That 
section stated, in part: 
3. Section fifty-four of the said Act is repeded and the following substituted 
therefor : 
"54. (1) The Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise exclusive ultimate 
appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within and for Can and the judgment 
of the Court shaII, in al1 cases be ilml and conclusive. 
po ld  in original] 
-or a detailed history of the Supreme Court of Canada's roots in English legal 
institutions and principles, see W. R. Lederman "The Independence of the Judiciary" (1 956) 
34 Can. Bar Rev. 769. And see Martin L Friedland, A Place Apmt: JudiciaZ Independence 
and Accouniobility in Cam& (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1996). For a general 
SuEcient for the purposes of this work is a rudimentary understanding of the Court's 
evolving statu since its creation by federal statute in 1 875? Such understanding facilitates, 
fiom this writer's perspective, an appreciation of the maelstrom surroundhg the Court today, 
a consequence of its having gone from a position of relative obscur@ to one of unprecedented 
visibility since the Charier 's inception? 
11. Constitutional Supremacy in a Parüamentary Democracy 
The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that Canada is to have a 
history see, Gibson, supra note 43; Laskin, supra note 43; Bora Laskin "The Supreme Court 
of Canada: The First One Hundred Years, A Capsule Wtutional History" (1975) 53 Can. 
Bar Rev. 459; J-C. McRuer ''The Supreme Court As A National Institution" (1 980) 1 
S.C.L.R. 467; and Hogg, supra note 36 at c. 8. 
%uprerne and Erchequer Coutts Act, 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 1 1. 
" ~ e e  Brian Dickson "The Role and Function of Judges" (1980) 4 L. Soc. Gaz 138 
at 172-73 where Justice Dickson (as he then was) writes: "Throughout its first century in 
history the Supreme Court did not command public attention: its judges were not well-known 
public figures; media coverage was meagre and often inaccurate. But this has changed ..." 
See also Russell, supra note 8 at 335 where the author States: 
The powerful role the Supreme Court is now assuming in Canadian 
government is one for which neither the Court nor the public have had much 
preparation. For most of its history the Supreme Court of Canada was a 
subordinate, secondary institution. ... The Court's long penod of 
underdevelopment tells us something both about the slowness of Canada to 
mature as a nation and the slowness of the judiciary to acquire the stahis of 
a separate branch of govemment in Canada 
See dso Claire Beckton and A. Wayne MacKay, Research Coordinators, The Courts and the 
Charter (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 38 where they write: "Ody in recent 
years has the practical impact and the policy-mfig role of the Supreme Court of Canada 
corne to the attention of the Canadian public .... It is this document [the Chorrer] which 
greatly extends the policy b c t i o n  of the Supreme Court of Canada and accentuates the 
growing public presence of the Court." And see Peter McCormick and Ian Greene T h e  
Supreme Court of Canada" in R-S. Blair and T.T. MacLeod eds., The Canadan Political 
Tradition: Basic Readings, 2d ed. (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1993) at 506-507. 
"Cotlstitution sunilar in Principle to that of the United K.ingd~rn.'*~ One such principle is 
that of parliamentary supremacy, a principle which stands in uneasy juxtaposition to that of 
constitutional supremacy heralded uuder S. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? The heated 
63See Refirence re Remuneration ofJudges ofthe Provincial Court of Prince E k d  
Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R 3, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 193 [hereinafter the 
Provincial Court Judges Case cited to C.C.C.] where Lamer C. J.C.(at 23 7-244) elaborates 
the importance of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 in giving legai effect to 
unwritten n o m ,  such as the principle of judicial independence, which complement the 
written constitution itself. 
"See Christopher P. Manfiedi, Judciial Power And The Chmrer (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1993) at 14 where the author states: "As a whole, section 24 of the 
Charter and section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 push Canada f.urther away fiom the 
tradition ofparliamentary supremacy inherited fkom Britain toward a regime of constitutional 
supremacy enforced by judicial review." He elaborates this statement M e r  at 36-39 where 
the author discusses the paradox of liberai constitutionalism noting (at 37): "Counter 
majoritarianism and judicial finality are the very reasons why judicial review continues to 
be controversial in liberal democracies." But see Bnan Slattery "A Theory Of The Charter" 
(1 987) 25 Osgoode Hall L. J. 70 1 [hereinafter "Theory of the Charter"]. This author argues 
that a "Coordinate Model" of the Charter-as opposed to a "Judicial Model" which assigns 
a central role to the courts-is the prefened approach. Slattery states (at 7 1 3): 
The Coordinate Model holds that the duty to observe Charter 
standards &ects every aspect of the process by which laws are enacted and 
implemented, including the formation of the initial policy, the drafting of the 
detailed provisions of a bill, the debates in the legislature and legislative 
cornmittees, the voting of individuai members of the legislature, the cirafting 
of statutory orders and reguiations, and the exercise of any powers conferred 
by the statute or its regulations. In principle, every person or body involved 
in this process has the responsibility to advert to Charter standards in making 
decisions that fall within that person's cornpetence. ... mhere is more than 
one way to Mplement Charter standards; it would be wrong to assume that 
the judicial mode is the only one or the best. 
And see Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63 at 236 where Chief Justice Lamer for 
the majority &tes: "[Tlhe constitutional history of Canada can be understood, in part, as a 
process of evolution 'which nias] culminated in the supremacy of a definitive written 
constitution'." However, he stipulates (at 243) that "the express provisions of the 
Constitution should be understood as elaborations of the underlying, unwritten and 
organizing principles found in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. Even though S. 
1 1 (d) is found in the newer part of our Constitution, the Chmer, it can be understood in this 
way, since the Constitution is to be read as a unined whole ..." And see Russell, supra note 
debate surromding judicial adjudication under the Chcuter, and the rise of the Comt's star at 
the alleged expense of elected representatives, ignores or trivializes the legislative ovemde 
provisions of the ~onsti tut ion.~~ This despite the existence of a comparable precedent in the 
Bill of ~ights." Specifically, S. 33(1) of the Charter provides : 
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case rnay be, that the Act or a provision 
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or 
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
8 at 364 where the author asserts that "[a] more enduring and benign constraint on the Court 
is the ambivalence of Canadians about judicial power. ... Notions of parliamentary 
supremacy d l  dance in our heads." 
" ~ e e  'Theory of the Charter", supra note 64 at 702 where the author writes: 
The Charter is stdchgly different fiom the American Bill of Rights. 
.,. The most notable difference is that section 33 of the Charter allows 
legislatures to enact ''notwithstanding clauses" that shield statutes fiom 
judicial scrutiny for confonnity with many Charter provisions. One would 
have thought that this provision would figure prominentiy in any debate about 
the relative roles of legislatures and courts under the Chmer. But curiously 
this has not been the case. Section 33 is usually ignored or treated as an 
embarrassment. 
But see Russell, supra note 8 at 364 where the author asserts that s.33, '%y relieving judges 
of the burden of f d t y ,  may encourage some to be bolder thm they might otherwise have 
been. But in the long tem, for citizens as for judges, it should serve as a reminder of the 
limited nature of the judicial mandate." And see Patrick Healy "hother Round On 
Intoxication" (1995) 33 C.R. (4th) 269 at 274-275 where the author, writing in response to 
the Daviault decision, stated: ''Until Parliament acts, the law is that stated in Daviault. ... The 
difficuity with any direct challenge to the correctness of the court's conclusion is that it 
would have to be justifiable under s.1 or an exercise of parliamentary supremacy through 
reliance on S. 33 of the Charter." 
66Section 2 of the Bill of Righfs states: "Every law of Canada shall, unless it is 
expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate 
notwithstmding the C d a n  Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, 
abridge or a g e  or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment of infigement of any of the 
rights or fkedoms herein recognized and declared ..." See supra note 37 for clarification of 
the phrase "every law of Canada". 
The 'hotwithstandingyy legislation remains operable for five yerirs and may be renewed every 
five years thereafter. 
Clearly, S. 33 is a powerful anirmation of parliamentary primacy in this legal era of 
constitutional supremacy.6' Professor Peter Hogg writes: 
Section 33 of the Charter ... enables the Parliament or a Legislatue to 
"override" most of the provisions of the Charter. This is accomplished by 
including in a statute an express declaration that the statute is to operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in s.2 or ss.7 to 1 5 of the Charter. Once 
this declaration is included, the statute will operate free of the invaiidating 
effect of the Charter provisions specifïed in the declaration. In this way, the 
Parliament or a Legislature, provided it is wilhg to include the express 
declaration required by the ovemde provision, is able to enact a law that 
abridges rights guaranteed by S. 2 or ss. 7 to 15 of the Charter. The override 
provision thw preserves parliamerrt~mpremacy over much of the charter. 
[Emphasis added] pootnotes omitted] 
While Professor Hogg speaks of"par1iamentary supremacy", arguably the term ''parliamentary 
primacy" reflects more accurately the political context in which the ovemde provision 
"See Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712,54 D.L.R. (4th) 577,90 N.R. 84 
[hereinafkr Ford cited to S.C.R.] where the Supreme Court of Canada (at 740-74 1) held that 
S. 33 does not mandate substantive review of legislative policy in exercising the ovemde; 
rather, it is restricted to matters of fom. For a case commentary on Ford and the S. 33 
ovemde see A. Wayne Mackay and Diane Pothier "Developments In Constitutional Law: 
The 1988-89 Term (1990) 1 S.C.L.R. ( 2 4  81 at 172. The authors note that "[wlhile we do 
not object to the result in this case, it is not clear why the Court feit compelled to give such 
a broad scope to legislative action under section 33 of the Charter. It does not appear to be 
consistent with the Court's fkquently declared liberal approach to enhance the rights and 
freedoms in the Charter."[Footnotes omined]. They conclude (at 173) that %e Court has 
make a significant value choit-ne which asserts the importance of legislative supremacy 
even in the context of the Charter." See also Brian Dickson "Keynote Address" in Frank E. 
McArdle, ed., The Cambridge Lectures 1985 (Montreal: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1987) 
[hereinafter "Keynote Address] at 4 where then Chief Justice Dickson stated: "Thus, in 
Canada, legislative supremacy is subordinate to Constitutional supremacy, except to the 
limited extent that it is presewed by s.33 of the Chmter, the so-called 'non obstante' or 
'opting out' clause." 
''Hogg, supra note 36 at 12-4 to 12-5. 
operates: the political consequences of invoking S. 33, more so than constitutional theoretical 
principles, will determine that Section's efficacy in a given situation." 
At this juncture of the discussion it is important to qualfi the phrase ''parliamentary 
supremacy". Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson aptly explains the limited scope of the 
concept of parliamentary supremacy in the Canadian context: 
Padiamentary supremacy has never been absolute in Canada The principle 
of unlimited parliamentary sovereignty is unique to the British Constitution, 
ultimately derived from the English common law which attaches only to the 
Parliament at Westminister, the "Mother of dl Parliaments". Other legislative 
bodies established in what was once British temtory derived their powers and 
authority, not from the common law, but rather fiom the English parliament 
and specific statutory grants made in the exercise of unlimited legislative 
cornpetence. These derivative parliaments had no inherent powers of their 
own; such powers as they might validly exercise were always to be found 
within the four corners of the constitutive British legislation which gave them 
Iife. 
In the case of Canada, the basic constitutive instrument is the 
Constitution Act, 1867." 
The divisions of powers under ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 limited the 
sovereignty of the feded and provincial levels of government by restricting each to their 
"See Michael Wttington and Richard Van Loon, Cunudian Government and 
Politicsr Imtitutionî andProcesses (Toronto: McGraw-Hi11 Ryerson, 1996) at 15 1 where the 
authors state: 
The immmity fiom the Charter provisions that is given to a law by a 
'notwithstanding' clause has a five-year 'sunset,' but may be renewed for 
further five-year periods. Its effect is to allow govemments to override key 
sections of the Charter at will, but to force the politicians who wish to do so 
to 'own up' to what they are doing by having to publicly 'redo the diay deed' 
every five years. 
While accepting that the supremacy of Parliament has been limited by the Charter despite 
ss. 1 and 33, the authors write (at 152): "But Parliament and the legislatures are stiil the only 
institutions with the authority to define the changing values and noms of o u .  society over 
time." 
'()"Keynote Adciress", supra note 67 at 3-4. 
respective fields of legislative cornpetence." Additiody, since the advent of the Charter, 
these jurisdictional Limitations on legislative sovereignty have been complemented by 
"substantive  restriction^".^ 
The supremacy of constitutionally entrenched restrictions on legislative and 
government action, and the dictates of the principle of Rule of Law, explicitly 
recognkd in the preamble to the Comtitation Act. 1982, necessarily combine 
to limit the supremacy of Parliament and the provincial legislatures. 
Legislative or other govermental action not in conformity with this supreme 
law must be struck down, no matter how wise or how desirable it may be. 
Outside this realm of restricted activity, however, Parliament and the 
legislature remain supreme and any laws not inconsistent with the Constitution 
must be upheld by the judiciary no matter how unwise or ili-considered one 
might deem them to ben  
[Emphasis in original] 
Despite its limited nature, the concept of parliamentary supremacy remains strong in the 
Canadian psyche. 
Perhaps the true bastion of parliamentary supremacy lies under Charter section 1-the 
"reasonable limits" provision." If one accepts that al1 players in the process of making and 
"See Charter J m c e ,  supra note 10 at 3 where the author writes: 
It is quite clear that none of these rights are absolute. Part of the 
political compromise that made possible the entrenchment of a Charter was 
the recognition that Parliament or a provincial legislature could expressly 
declare a law to operate notwittistanding the Charter. Furrhermore, and fm 
more signijicant in the context of criminal lm, where no legrslature has 
resorted to the notwithstanding clause, is the so-called "Guarantee of Rights 
and Freedoms " in clause I of the Churter. The heading of "guaranteey' is a 
misnomer because the section is designed to allow courts to recognize limits 
on rights and fieedoms. 
[Emphasis added] Footnotes ornittedl 
implementing Iaws-Parüament, the provincial legislatures, and the courts-have an equal 
responsibility to incorporate Charter values into their respective tasks, then a Limitation on 
a given Charter nght may be viewed as a considered decision by the enacting legislative 
body.75 Sopinka J. in R. v. ~aba'~ demonstrates this perspective in undertaking a S. 1 analysis 
See also "Theory of the Charter", supra note 64 at 703. 
"See "Theory of the Charter", supra note 64 at 71 5-71 6 where he maintains: 
The same constitutional duties that bind a govemment in its 
legislative fiinctions also affect its stnctly executive activities, in the exmise 
of prerogative and statutory powers and generally in the administration of the 
law. The implication is that governmental officiais and administrative boards 
genedly are obligated to observe applicable Charter standards in carrying 
out their legai functions. Poo tnotes 
ornittedl 
See also "Keynote Address", supra note 67 at 8 where the author States: 
The law-making component of the legal community, the legislators, 
have, of course, a critical role to play in Charter matters and in ensuring the 
evolution and attainment of social justice in our country. ... Effective efforts 
by legislators to bring their legislation into line with the Charter is certauily 
preferable to the process of challenging the constitutionality of legislation 
before the courts. 
It must always be remembered that it is the responsibility of al1 organs 
of govemment to ensure that the guanintees of the Charter are made manifest 
in Canadian society. Protection of the principles of fieedom, democracy and 
social justice which form the foudation of the Charter is not solely reposed 
in the judiciary, but is, rather, the duty of al1 facets of the Canadian 
Government The courts and the legislatures are both concerned with 
upholding the constitution and shaping a better society for al1 Canadians. To 
adopt Professor Lederman's words in a recent address to the Academy of 
Hurnanities and Social Sciences: 
. . . independent courts and democratic legislatures have been, 
are, and will be partners and not rivals as primary decision- 
makers in a very complex total process, with heavy demands 
being made on both institutions. 
"[1994] 3 S.C.R. 965,94 C.C.C. (3d) 385,34 C.R. (4th) 360 [hereinafter Loba cited 
to C.R.]. Sopinka J.'s analysis of section 1 issues had the unanimous support of the Court, 
including Chief Justice Lamer. 
of S. 394(1)(b) of the Criminul Code, " the provision in dispute. He begins with an overview 
of the test to be applied in the S. 1 analysis: 
In the context of this background, 1 tum to the question whether S. 394(1)(b) 
cm be upheld under S. 1 of the Charrer. The test for determinhg whether this 
is the case was set out in R v. Oaks, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at pp. 138-39. 
Taking into account the modification suggested by the Chief Justice in his 
reasons in Dugenais v. Canadian Broadcating Corp. ... released concurrently 
herewith ... the test can be stated as follows: 
(1) In order to be sufnciently important to warrant oveniding 
a constitutionally protected right or fieedom the impugned 
provision must relate to concems which are pressing and 
substantial in a free aad democratic society; 
(2) The means chosen to achieve the legislative objective must 
pass a three-part proportionality test which requires that they 
(a) be rationally connected to the objective, (b) impair the nght 
or fkedom in question as Little as possible and (c) have 
deleterious effects which are proportional to both their 
salubrious effects and the importance of the objective which 
has been identified as being of "SUfficient importance".78 
Having articulated the S. 1 test, Justice Sopinka, in discussing the minimal impairment portion 
of the three-part proportionality test, put the necessity for deference to legislative efforts at 
realinng an objective in the context of constitutional principles which are the domain of the 
The legislature is entitled to some deference in choosing the means of 
attaining a given objective. As Lamer C. J-C. stated in R. v. ChauZk, [ 1 9901 3 
"R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 mereinafter the Criminal Code]. Section 394(1)(b) States: 
Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
term exceeding five years who 
m.. 
(b) sells of purchases any rock, mineral or other substance that contains 
precious metals or unsmelted, untreated, unmanufachued or partly smelted, 
paaly treated or partly rnanufactured precious metals, unless he establishes 
that he is the owner or agent of the owner or is acting under lawful authority; 
78Laba, supra, note 76 at 390. 
S.C.R. 1303, at p. 1341, "Parliament is not required to search out and adopt 
the absolutely least intrusive means of aaaining its objective" (emphasis in 
original). However. it is also important to remember that this is not o case in 
which the IegisIature has attempted to strike a balunce between the interests 
of competing individuals or groups. Rather ir is a case in which the 
government (as opposed to other individuals or groups) c m  be characterized 
as the singular antugonist of an individual aîternpting to assert a Iegal right 
[the right to be presurned innocent] which is fundmental to our system of 
criminal justice. As the majority wrote in Imin Toy Ltd. c. Quebec 
(Procureur generd) ... in such circumîtances the courts me in as good a 
position as the legislature to assess whether the leest drastic means of 
achieving the governmental pwpose have been chosen, especiaily given the 
inherently legal nature of the rights in question and the courts' accumulated 
experience in dealing with such matters." 
mphasis  added] 
Parliament's right to pwsue its objectives, therefore, does not preclude "second ordeFm 
scnitiny of the meam employed to realize those objectives. The means must be measured 
against constitutional, not political, standards. The goal of the Supreme Court in a S. I anaiy sis 
is not to tnimp Parliament, but to give legislative initiatives-especially those compromising 
core legal principles of the criminal justice system such as the presumption of 
innocence-sober second thought8' in a non-partisan venue. a 
"sec 'Theory of the Charter", note 64 at 707 where Slattery uses the term "second 
order function" in descnbing the review function under the Charter: "The Charter also 
authorizes and binds certain bodies to review the acts of others for confonnity with Charter 
rights where the latter are bound in a first order way to take account of the Charter in acting." 
[Emphasis in original]. In reference to the '%nt order fiuiction", the author writes (at 708): 
"The Charter imposes first-order duties on three sorts of governmentai bodies: the executive, 
the legislature, and the courts. Each of these branches of government has the constitutionai 
duty to comply with the Charter, regardless of whether any other body can enforce this 
obligation." 
"~horrer Justce, supra note 10 at 345 observes: 
One can only h o p  that the Supreme Court [in Loba] has at 1 s t  settled on a 
tougher approach to section one justification in the context of criminal law. 
This by-no-means-exhaustive discussion of ss. 1 and 33 of the Charter highlights that, 
as Canadians, we have inherited h m  Britain a political and legal tradition rooted in 
democratic and liberal principles, a tradition cornplemented by the 1982 constitutional 
 initiative^.^ Just as Canada c m o t  escape its British heritage, so too, the judiciary of the 
Supreme Court of Canada cannot escape the impact of the liberal democratic tradition upon 
their firnction. I cannot improve upon the words of then Justice Brian Dickson in this regard: 
The Court's task brings with it the great responsibility of applying and 
developing the laws of Canacia. The role of the judiciary and the attitudes 
fowmdr decision-makng held by ourjudges have been shrrped by the political 
philosophV and legal tradition unique to Canaah ... 
1 refer to proximate legal traditions to emphasize the point that judicial 
attitude is shaped by the institutions and experience unique to each system of 
law, whether it be Amencan, English or Canadian. But in any IegaZ order 
founded upon the cornmon law, afundumental philosophic issue sutjkees to 
Hopefully, the court will in future be consistent in its Laba view that reverse 
onuses cannot be saved without consideration of the alternatives. If  so the 
Court wiU have embarked on a new course much more protective of the 
presumption of innocence and for [sic] less receptive to arguments of law 
enforcement expediency. 
As will be discussed later in this work, Law enforcement or crime control values, and due 
process values, impact upon the decision-making process in the criminal law-particularly, 
for our purposes, the law of homicide. 
82The principles of judicial independence and judicial impartiality act to neutralize 
the partisan nature of legislative debates which inform the content of the Iaw. For a 
discussion of these two vital principles see infia at 49-72. 
"See Lamer J. in Refrence Re M. KA. (B.C.). infla note 107 at 305 where, after 
refening to ss. 1 and 33 as "intemal checks and balances", he stated: 
The overriding and legitimate concern that courts ought not to 
question the wisdom of enactrnents, and the presumption that the Iegislator 
could not have intended same, have to some extent distorted the discussion 
surrounding the meaning of "principles of fundamental justice": This has Ied 
to the spectre of a judicial "super-legislature" without a fidi consideration of 
the process of constitutional adjudication and the sipnincance of ss. 1,33 and 
52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
require our sctutiny and careful rejlection. The dilemma-that o/mapping the 
bounds of judiciol actlvitpis worthy of the attentim of judges, students-or- 
l m ,  a d  the public alike. 
The challenge is to leam the limits of the judicial fa& In relating this 
theme to the Supreme Court of Canada, if is whe to recall thut we speak of a 
young court. Through the Court's history, British traditions served it well. 
We will continue to benefit fiom that influence, but henceforth Canado will 
chart ifs own course, cognùant of its mangolà roles in the development of a 
distinct& Canadiun jurisprudence." 
Emphasis added] 
To appreciate the impact of liberal democratic principles on the evolving role of the Supreme 
Court of Canada judiciary, it is necessary to clan@ what may be perceived to be the key 
principles involved. 
III. Liberaiism, Democracy and the Role of the Supreme Court of Canada 
Sections 3 to 5 of the Charter are entitled "Democratic Right~".'~ These provide that 
every citizen of Canada has the right to vote and to be qualified for membership in either the 
House of Commons or a legislative assembly; that, absent special circumstances such as real 
or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, there must be an election, at a maximum, five 
years after the legislaûve body in question was elected to power; and that Parliament and each 
Iegislature must have an annual siaing. Canada, as a democracy, thus gives constitutionai 
si@ficance to the right to vote; and to the p ~ c i p l e  that the elected representatives of the 
"Dickson, supra note 62 at 176-177. 
*.nie Charter speaks of rights and fkeedoms. The difference between the two has 
been articulated by Whittington and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 172: "[R]ights], in the purest 
sense of the term, are created through the enactment of positive laws, while liberties [or 
fkeedoms] are the residual area of fkedom lei? to the individual after the totaiity of the 
positive law is subtracted fiom it." [Emphasis in original]. The authors, referring to Walter 
Tarnopolsky, acknowledge that fundamental fiwdorns rnay be augmented by the positive 
Iaw. 
people should be accountable to the citizenry through elections and annuai legislative sittings. 
For the purposes of this paper, "democracy" is viewed as follows: 
Popalar sovereignty Canadian political values are traditionally broadly 
described as democratic. Democracy may be viewed as a set of ultimate 
values, but we prefer to view it primarily as a set of operational procedures f ~ r  
realinng certain broad societd goals. Stated as a theoretical abstraction, the 
democratic aim or the ultimate democratic value is the common good or the 
common interest. Democracy, as a means of reaiizing the common good, is 
a system of govemment designed to refiect the will of the people as a whole 
rather than the will of any one individual, speciai interest, or elite. The 
limitations of demorracy, as stated in such ethereai t e m  as these, follow fiom 
the fact that there is likely to be impeAect w e m e n t  as to what the common 
good is. In many cases the common good will codict  directly with the 
particular short-run demands put forward by individuals and groups within the 
society. Therefore. democracy is perhaps best viewed as a fonn of 
government that attempts to maximize or optimize the common good by 
establishing operational tules thor will satisfl the needr of as many people as 
possible. This attempt is expressed in the principle of popular control or 
popular sovereignty? 
[Boldface in origina. [Emphasis added] 
Thus, democracy is perceived as a structurai means of legitimiPng popular sovereignty 
through the vote, through widespread eligibility for political office, and through mandatory 
elections and legislative sittings." The fundamental democratic fieedoms enurnerated under 
86~hittington and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 97-98. This is the same definition of 
democracy used by the authos in the last edition of their text entitled The Canodian Political 
System: Environment, Structure undProcess, 4th ed. (Canada: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1 987) 
at 110. 
n ~ t  is not my intention to elaborate the workings of Canadian federalism beyond 
noting that there are three branches of governrnent: the executive, the legislative and the 
judicial. (Readers interested in the impact of federdisrn on judicial review should read W.R 
Lederman "Unity And Diversity In Canadian Federalism: Ideals And Methods Of 
Moderation" (1975) 53 Caa Bar Rev. 597; and refer to Hogg, supra note 36). Pnor to the 
enactment of the Charter, judicial review focused on the division of powers delineated in 
the British North America Act, 1867. H.S. Fairley "Developments In Constitutional Law: The 
1983-84 Terrn" (1985) 7 S.C.L.R. 63 at 120, n3 18 argues that "[tlhe essential difference 
between individual rights review necessitateci by the Charter and division of powers review 
S. 2 of the Charter-&dom of religion, fitedom of expression, fieedom of the press, fieedom 
of conscience, and M o m  of association-"are instrumental in realizing the basic democratic 
values of popular sovereignty and political equality ..."88 
Infushg this democratic fom of government with additional values is the ideology 
of liberalism: 
Classical liberalism includes a cornmitment to individualism and to 
individual liberties, a closely related commitment to the principles of 
individual private property and individual property rights, and a comrnitment 
to economic t k e  enterprise and capitalism .... [Tlhe protection of rights of the 
individual fiom unrea~onable intederence by the government is still an 
important cornersforte of our constitutional practice. 89 
[Boldface in original][Emphasis added] 
Not ail academics accept liberalism's predomiaance gracefully. According to one author: 
The classical liberal state is constructed as fundamentaily antagonistic 
is that the former entails judiciai nullification of majontarian outcornes in an absolute sense 
whereas the latter merely zones the democratic process of decision to one level of 
govemment or another." But see Manfkedi, supra note 64 at 3 1 where he writes: 
[Jludiciai review becarne, for politicai as well as legal reasons, a principal 
rnechanism for mediating federal-provincial disputes. ... Indeed, the division 
of powea has also served to provide judiciai protection for individuai 
liberties. ... In general, the impact of legislation on civil liberties was of only 
secondary importance in determinhg its constitutionality; enactment of 
restrictive legislation by the proper level of govement was the threshold 
issue. ... Consequently, ... judicial review of the division of powers provided 
limited protection for liberties not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution 
Act, 1867. @?ootnotes omitted] 
Thus, while division of powers judicial review had a secondary impact on civil liberties, that 
impact was not inconsequential. 
88Whittington and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 173. The authors appear to treat ss. 
2-5 of the Charter as democratic fkedoms, derived fiom our common constitutional heritage 
with Britain, broken d o m  into substantive democratic fieedoms (S. 2 of the Charter) and 
political rights (ss. 3-5 of the Charter). 
to individual interests. As representative of the aii-powemil collectivity, the 
state always operates in potentially hostile opposition to individual interests. 
This coercive capacity of the state must be kept in check-one checking 
mechanism king judicial review. Moreover, since the state rather than private 
power is conceived as the major threat to individual liberty, state powers of 
economic regdation should be lhited to establishing the preconditions of a 
cornpetitive marketplace. State interference in the outcome of pnvate market 
ordering is presumptively illegitimate. The antagonism between individual 
and state, representative of classical liberalism, is reinforced by other 
structural oppositions, such as those between fieedom and restraint, and the 
public and private spheres?" 
gO~oel Bakan et al. "Developments In Constitutional Law: The 1993-94 Term" (1 995) 
6 S.C.L.R. (2d) 67 at 69. The authors criticize the tenets of classical liberalism as king 
incoherent, particularly (at 7 1) that tenet which presumes a publiclpnvate divide: 
Judicial assertion of rights as a means of preventing -te interference with 
individual choice is, nom a classical liberai perspective, a positive event. 
However, when relied upon to re-order the private sphere, rights, as 
statements of public n o m  and values, threaten the very individual fieedom 
mandating their constitutional protection in the first place, no less than 
government intrusion into the same sphere. 
See also Hester Lessard et. al. "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95 Terni" 
(1996) 7 S.C.L.R.. (2d) 8 1 at 144. The authors note: "As the previous sections of this essay 
have emphasized, the cases this Term on the nature of equality and liberty rights and of the 
bdamental freedoms in the Charter, represent a remarkable and disturbing shift into the 
political vocabulary associated with classical liberalism." And see also Allan C. Hutchinson 
and Andrew Petter "Private Rights/Publîc Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988) 
38 U.T.L.J. 278. Again, these authors (at 296-97), while recognizhg the bbplatform of liberal 
legalism on which the Charter is builty' are not enthusiastic about the future and recommend 
an abandonment of "liberal individualism" in favour of a 'bore open-ended form of social 
democracy ". 
Manfiedi, supra note 64 at 10 observes that Patrick Monahan, Andrew Petter, Allan 
Hutchinson and Michael Mandel are representative of one field of thought conceming the 
impact of judicial review on constitutional rights. He contends, that from the perspective of 
these writers, "the predominantly individudistic nature of liberal democratic 'rights' as well 
as the cornervative chanicter of judges, means that judicial enforcement of the Charter will 
inevitably condtute a serious impediment to progressive social change." Basically, this 
perspective holds that an emphasis on individualisrn in judicial review thwarts the progress 
of social justice. At the other end of the continuum are those writers such as David Beatty 
and Dale Gibson whose perspective "celebrates rights-based judicial review and is 
profoundly sceptical about the capacity of popularly controiled institutions and decision- 
making processes to produce just and progressive policy outcomes." In a nutshell, this 
perspective holds that judicial review of individual and group rights-based claims is the best 
37 
Liberalism, in this instance, is portrayed as a '%ce-off' between individuai interests and the 
pursuit of State initiatives with the State assuming the wgative persona of a Leviathan. 
Stuart I. Whitley puts the case for liberalism vis-a-vis the criminal law in more 
positive terms?' He traces the history of constitutional theory in Canada fkom the Magna 
Carta to the Charter,= examines S. 7 of the Charter in light of Canada's histoncal ties to 
British legal and politicai traditionsg3, and concludes that the themes running through the 
criminal law "dl may be gathered under the generai rubnc of 'individual fieedom', [and] 
operate to prevent the state fkom oppression through the expedient of the criminal law.'" 
However, the writer cautions that "the purpose of the law is to serve the society h m  which 
it s p ~ g s "  and that "[ilt does that in the administration of criminal justice by the resolution 
of cod ic t  between the state's interest in crime suppression and the individual's right to 
vehicle for social progress. M d e d i  concludes (at 10-1 1) that the perspective by authors 
such as Beatty and Gibson poses the greatest threat to liberal constitutional democracy. 
"[T]he attempt to correct policy erroa of democratic institutions through litigation and 
adjudication risks undermining the capacity for self-government on which liberal democracy 
uitimately depends." 
9'Criminol Jurlce And The Constitution (Canada: Carswell, 1989). See also 
Whittington and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 99- 106. After canvassing (at 100-1 O 1) " The 
Pervasiveness of Liberal Valuesy', "The Persistence of Liberai Myths", and the "Legitimation 
of Liberal Values", the authors conclude (at 10 1): "mhere is a set of political values that we 
cal1 liberal, and those values are so deep-rooted in our political culture that they colour the 
thinking of even explicitly anti-liberal cntics of our system. We are concluding. then, that 
ours is a basically a liberal society whose liberal values have been diluted (or polluted) ..." 
[emphasis in original]. 
gLWhitley, supra note 9 1 at 29-35. 
procedural and substantive fairnes~.'*~ It is here where the principle of collectivism or 
community ri&@, manifested in State policies and actions aimed at crime suppression, 
95h5id at 357. See also Dale Gibson, The Lmv of the C h e r :  General Principles 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at iü-iv where he States: 
My points of view on particuiar questions are informed by certain 
basic attitudes about the Charter and its proper place in Canadian society. 
The most hdamental of these is my belief that the new opportunities the 
Charter has created for the protection of Canadians' rights and liberties are 
gend ly  beneficial, and should accordingiy be maximized by generous d e r  
than narrowly techniai interpretation.. .. 
What is required for satisfactory implementation of Charter 
protections is a partnership between judges and politicians in which the latter 
act as initiators and leaders, and the judges nonnally remain in the 
background. Judges should be vigilant to ensure that basic constitutional 
rights are respecte4 but should not otherwise intedere with the democratic 
process. 
See also The Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: Information 
Canada, 1976) at 1 where the commissioners write: "Coping with crime is a two-sided 
problem for a just society. Crime uncoped with is unjust: to the victim, to potentid victims 
and to all of us. Crime wrongly coped with is also unjust: criminal law-the state against the 
individual-is always on the cutting edge of the abuse of power. Between these two extremes 
justice must keep a balance." 
%Sec Whittington and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 99 where the principle of 
collectivism is explored in greater detail. BasicalIy, the comrnunalist or collectivist aspect 
of Canadian liberalism, which recognizes the reality and validity of group rights, moderates 
our basic liberal values wherein the individual is the repository of legal rights and fieedoms. 
The cornmunalist or collectivist p ~ c i p l e  fin& expression in the Charter which 
constitutionally recogoizes the special status of the French and Aboriginal cornmunities in 
Canada. 
The equality provisions under S. 15 also facilitate the concept of communal interests 
as does the "reasonable limits" qualifier under S. 1 which necessitates a balancing of interests 
in order to determine if an impugned action, piece of legislation, or cornmon law principle, 
although in violation of a Charter provision, is, nevertheless, a reasonable limit. Closely 
aligned to the idea of communalism is that of liberal pluralism. The authors state (at 99) 
''that the Canadian political culture can be broadly described as 'liberal-pluralist'." They 
explain (at 105) that "pluralism is rooted in liberal individualism. ... Individuals belong to 
as many groups as they choose, and multiple, overlapping memberships tend to be the d e  
rather than the exception. Individuals also have legitimate rights of their own, separate fkom 
their gmup identities." Thus, individuals may confkont the law on either an individual or a 
group bais. 
collide with individuai interests in Liberty and autooomy. The justices of the Suprerne Court 
of Canada are positioned as final arbiters of the proper balance between the two." In the law 
of homicide, for example, the application of such liberal tenets a s  the autonomy of the 
individual and the individual's right to be free from unwarraoted state intrusion have 
influenced the Supreme Court of Canada's adjudicative fûnction to an unprecedented level. 
That influence, in tum, has sparked an ideological controversy encompassing the concepts 
of subjective and objective standards of fault, criminal responsibility, moral 
blameworthiness, stigma and pend consequences?' 
Infonning this ideological dispute is, again, traditional liberal philosophy in which 
individual autonomy is prioritized as is the concomitant p ~ c i p l e  of fieedom from state 
interference with the liberty and privacy of the person through the politics of a privatelpublic 
divide? Much of the judicial discord at the Supreme Court of Canada level on hornicide- 
"See Russell, supra note 8 at 5 who maintains that it is ''the coercive element in 
judicial decision-making-the judge's ties to the coercive powers of the state-that imbues 
adjudication with a political character ..." He reiterates this point at 6-7: 
[Clourts will determine whether the evidence adduced about a person's 
behaviour meets the legal standard of tortious negligence or criminal liability. 
These disputes go beyond the private to the public realm, for what is at issue 
is whether or how the law, as society's system of binding niles, is to be 
applied. Here again we see the inherently political dimension of 
adjudication-its comection tu the law, its application of the noms of the 
political community which are backed by the coercive powers of the state. 
98 This controversy and its defining concepts is not peculiar to the law of homicide. 
The offence of sexual assault, for instance, also raises paralle1 concerns. See Douglas 
Alderson "R. v. O'Connor and Bill C-46: Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right" (1997) 39 
C.L.Q. 18 1. However, this thesis will focus primarily on the law of homicide. 
%ee Fairley, supra note 87 at 1 19 who writes: "The two Charter cases fding within 
the 1983-84 Term indicate unreserved acceptance by the Supreme Court of its duty to 
Widicate constitutionally protected individual rights." The cases refmed to were the first 
related issues also can be Linked to the Chmter and the new era of constitutional supremacy. 
As Chief Justice Lamer stated in R v. Vuiilancourt '" concerning the offence of constructive 
murder: 
Pnor to the enactment of the Charter, Parliament had full legislative 
power with respect to the T h e  Crimirial Law"(Constitution Act, 1867, S. 
9 1 (27)), includïng the determination of the essential elements of any given 
crime. It could prohibit any act and impose any perd consequences for 
infiinging the prohibition, provided only that the prohibition served "a public 
purpose which can support it as being in relation to criminal law": Re$ re S. 
5(a) of the Dairy Indust. Act ... Once the legislation was found to have met 
this test, the courts had very Little power to review the substance of the 
legislation. For example, in R v. S d t  Ste. Marie (City), ... Dickson J. (a 
he then w e )  held that, when an offence was criminai in the hue sense. there 
was a presumprion that the prosecution must prove the mens rea However, 
it was always open to Parliament expressly to reiieve the prosecution of its 
obligation to prove any part of the mens rea, as it is said to have done in S. 
2 13 of the Criminal Code with respect to the foreseeabiiity of the death of the 
victim. It is thus ciear that, prior to the enactment of the Charter, the vaiidity 
of S. 213 could not have been successfuZly challenged loi 
[Emphasis added] 
Charter decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada: L m  Society of Upper 
Conda v. SknpinRer, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 9 D.L.R.(4th) 161, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 481 
[hereinafter Skupinker] ; and A. Q. Quebec v. Quebec Ass 'n of Protestant School Boardr, 
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 66,lO D.L.R. (4th) Z l , 9  C.R.R. 133. But see Hutchinson and Petter, supra 
note 90 at 283-284. The authors acknowledge (at p. 283) that "[tlhe Charter is at root a 
liberal document. Its enactment was a constitutional aiErmation of liberal faith." However, 
in their critique of a liberal interpretation of the Charter, they conclude at 295: 
Liberalism is a failure; it cannot pass conceptual, social, legal, or political 
muster. A continued reliance on its inteilectual assurnptions and ideological 
prescriptions is iodefensible. The challenge is to replace it with a substantive 
vision of social justice that is capable of responding to the vast inequalities 
of economic and political power that iiberaiism and its disciples permit ... and 
condone. Footnotes omitted] 
'*[1987] 2 S.C.R. 036, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118, 60 C.R. (3d) 289 [hereinafter 
Vaillancourt cited to CR.] . 
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Justice Lamer's comments comprehend the new role for the Supreme Court of Canadato2 
emerging as Charter litigation matures with a corresponding dilution of the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy. Whereas there had been a pre-Chmler deference to the legislature 
in matkm of statutory interpretation, as for example, in presuming, rather than requiring, 
that the Crown had to prove the mens rea of an offence beyond a reasonable doubt, '" the 
Supreme Court of Canada in VaiIIancourt elevated that very presurnption to a constitutional 
imperative. The essential elernents of ail offences now included 'hot only those set out by 
the legislature in the provision creating the offence but also those required by S. 7 of the 
Charter."'w 
'"1n the pre-Charter case of R v. Fanant, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 124,4 C.C.C. (3d) 3 54, 
32 C.R. (3d) 289 [hereinafter F m a n t  cited to C.R.] Dickson Je, for the majonty, descnbed 
(at 291) the Court's position vis-a-vis the legislature: "It might be observed in passing that 
the constructive murder d e  has been the subject of protracted criticisrn ... The d e  may 
seem hmh but it is not the function of this court to consider the policy of Iegislation validly 
enacted. So long as the section continues in our Criminal Code it must be given effect in 
accordance with its tems." As to the Court's pst-Charter statu see Bruce P. Archibaid 
"The Constitutionalkation of the General Part of Criminal Law" (1988) 67 Cm. Bar Rev. 
403 at 419, n87 where he states: "WhiIe one might not wish to suggest that the Supreme 
Court of Canada respond to issues in a 'political' fashion, it is clear that the Charter has 
thnist the court into a new law making role and a new relationsbip with the legislature. ..." 
But see Fairley supra note 87 at 1 19-1 20 where the author predicts a grim future for the new 
era of judicid review. "[Audicial review which challenges the merits of majorirarian 
outcornes with the potentiai to finally ovemile them suggests a dimension to the role of the 
Court far difXerent nom that of neutrai umpire in a federal state." @!ootnotes omitted] 
Io3See R v Sudt Sle. Mmie, [1978] 2 S.C.R1299,40 C.C.C. (2d) 353,3 C.R. (3d) 
30 [hereinafter SàuZf Ste. Mmie cited to C.R..]. 
IM VailZancourt. supra note 100 at 326. 
tn Hunter v. Southam ~nc.,'O~ Justice Dickson writing for a d o u s  court which 
included Lamer J., discussed the d e  of the court in the postCharter era: 
The task of expowding a constitution is cruciaily different fkom that of 
coastniing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is 
easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted 
with an eye to the fùture. Itsfinction is to provide a continuingfiamework 
for the legitimate exercise of governmentalpower 4 when joined by a Bill 
or a Charter of rights, for the unremittingprotection ofindividual rights and 
liberfies. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repeaied or amended. 
It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over tirne to meet 
new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its fiamers. 
ïkjudiciary is the guardian o f h e  Constitution a d  murt, in interpreting its 
provisions, bear these considerations in mind'M 
[Emphasis added] 
Justice Lamer echoes this perspective in Reference re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act 
(B. C.) 'O7 where he states that the principles of fundamental justice under S. 7 of the Charter 
"do not lie in the reaim of general public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary 
as guardian of the justice ~ystem."'~' He then goes on to quote with approval the words of 
Estey J. in Skapinker that "[wlith the Constitution Act. 1982 cornes a new dimension, a new 
yardsJck of reconciiiation between the individual and the community and their respective 
rights, a dimension which, like the balance of the Constitution, remains to be interpreted and 
applied by the C~ur t . " ' ~  Whether or not the Supreme Court of Canada has used the Churter 
'"[l984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 1 1 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 [ h e r e s e r  Hunter 
v. Southam cited to C.C.C.]. Chief Justice Laskin did not take part in this judgment. 
107[1985] 2S.C.R. 486,48 C.R. (3d) 289,23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 [hereinafter Reference 
Re kt KA. (23.C.) cited to C.R.]. 
as a "yardstick of reconciliationy' between the individual and society in the law of homicide 
is, as the ensuing case law analysis in Chapter 3 will reveal, open to debate. 
It is within this burgeoning political and legal philosophical context that the Supreme 
Court of Canada must now operate. "O What does it mean to be the "guardian of the 
Constitution" in this new legal and political era of constitutional supremacy? Arguably, that 
the Supreme Court of Canada has a coxnmiûnent to fiuidamental legal principles, including 
those basic to the criminal law. Such a cornmitment must not be blindly subverted to popular 
opinion. To develop this theme an d y s i s  will be undertaken in Chapter 3 of the decision- 
making of Chief Justices Bnan Dickson and Antonio Lamer bearing on the law of homicide 
"'Chief Justice Laskin laid the groundwork in his eloquent dissenting and concurring 
judgments wherein he expounded the impact of the Bill of Rights for, inter aliu, Canadian 
criminal law. See, for example, Miller and Cockriell v. The Queen (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 
680, 38 C.R.N.S. 139, 3 1 C.C.C. (2d) 177 [hereinafter cited to C.R.N.S.] where Laskin 
C.J.C. gave a concuning judgment holding that the death penalty for accused persons 
convicted of killing a policeman or prison guard did not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment con- to the Bill oflighrs. In so doing he stated (at 153): "[qhe legislation 
of Parliament falls to be tested as to its operative effect by what the Canadian Bill of Rights 
prescribes; othenvise, the Canadian Bill of Rights becomes merely an interpretation statute, 
yielding to a contrary intention in legislation measured against it." He held (at 156) it to be 
the duty of the Court 'hot to whittle down the protections of the Canadian Bill of Rights by 
a narrow construction of what is a quasi-constitutionai document." The limited application 
of the death penalty to homicides involving policemen and prison guards was key to Laskin 
C.J.C.'s decision. Capital punishment had been abolished in Canada that same 
year-197Gby the Criminal Law Amendments Act (No. 2). 1976, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 105. 
Laskin C. J-C. ' s activist approach to the judicial fiuiction has not met with unquaîified 
approval. See Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Leg~dization of Politics in 
Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989). He considered (at 20) Laskin's assent to the 
Chief Justiceship as "a very important step in the legaiization of politics." Especially so in 
the post-Charter context. He contends (at 71) that the "Charter of Rights in its substitution 
of judicial for representative forums and of abstract/principle for concretelpolicy foms of 
argument for the resolution of political contmversy, represents a fhdamental change in the 
structure of Canadian political life, a 'legalization of politics'." 
under the Charter. '" The controversy engulfing the Iaw of homicide, today, c m  be traced 
to the respective interpretations of the scope of the adjudicative fimctionll* espoused, in part, 
by these Justices and the reaction to their interpretations both inside and outside the Court. 
This discussion of democracy and liberalism in the Canadian judicial context is not 
intended to be exhaustive; rather, it is meant to give the reader a means to evaluate not only 
decisions emanating fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, but also the commentaries of 
academic authors writing in response to those decisions. Not al1 academic authors advocate 
deference to the office of the judiciary and decisions emanating therefiom. Professor Peter 
Russell writes of ''radical realists" who perceive of the judiciary as a group of political actors 
"'1 am constructing my analysis around the decision-making of the Chief Justices 
because of their leadership role on the Bench. The Canadian Institute For The 
Administration of Justice, Compendium of information On The Siutus And Role OfThe Chief 
J h c e  in Canada (Montreal, 1987). writing of the office of the Chief Justice in general, 
stated (at 207-208): 
The influence of a Chief Justice on the way cases are decided can be 
enormous. First of dl,  a Chief Justice will often be involved in very 
important cases or those involving a high degree of public interest. Secondly, 
because the Chief Justice is often more widely know, his decisions may 
receive more attention than those decided by ordinary judges. Thircily, 
because of the respect for and the ability of the Chief Justices, their decisions 
will tend to be followed and relied upon by judges and lawyers as authorities 
in later cases. 
The Chief Justice of Canada bears the additional distinction of being the highest judicial 
officer in Canada. As well, the Chief Justice chairs the Canadiau Judicial Council which was 
established in 197 1 tu investigate cornplaints against the judiciary of the supenor courts. For 
m e r  discussion on, and statistical malysis of, the role of the Chief Justice, and his 
influence on the law and the Court, itself, see Peter McCormick "Assessing Leadership on 
the Supreme Court of Canada: Towards a Typology of Chief Justice Perfomüuice" (1993) 
4 S.C.L.R. (2d) 409; and see Friedland, supra note 60 at 225-23 1. 
1'2Russell, supra note 8 at 40 contends that adjudication is the essence of the judicial 
fiinction: "Adjudication is the h c t i o n  of settling disputes about legal rights and duties. It 
is a political activity insofar as  it is authoritative and backed by the power of the state." 
perpetrating their subjective values and agendas on the larger unsuspecthg community: 
From this perspective the distinctive aspects of judicial institutions and the 
judiciai process-the concem for the independence and impartidity of the 
judge, the procedural requirement of giving each side a fair hearing, and the 
provision of reasons explaining a decision in t e m  of legai d e s  and 
principleeare presumably nothing more than a cunning camoufiage behind 
which judges are fke to hdulge their own political fan~ies."~ 
This thesis is not premised on such a radical realist approach. Rsither, the ceneality of the 
principles of judicial independence and impartiality to the judiciai fùnction will be argued. 
W .  The Criminal Process and the Adjudicative Fnnction 
The individual encounters the intrusive power of the State when he or she cornes into 
conflict with the criminal law.'14 More so when the crime alleged is a culpable homicide. 
Liberalism champions the fkedom of the individual but only to the point where his or her 
actions h m  others."' While the term "hami" is capable of and has been given wider 
'131bid at 16-17. See also Richard Devlin "We Can't Go On Together with 
Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Raciaiized Perspective in R v. R.D.S." (1 995) Dai. L.J. 
408 at 434-438 where the author discusses the formalist and realist view of the judicial role. 
The author, himself, is a realist who argues that the fomalist conception of impdality, and 
the fomalist approach to race, are nonfunctional in Canada's multi-cdhiral and diverse 
society . 
ll4See R. v. Paré. [1987l2 S.C.R. 61 8,38 C.C.C. (3d) 97'60 C.R. (3d) 346 at 368 
[hereinafier Puré cited to C.R.] where Wilson J. for a unanimous court (Uicluding Dickson 
C.J.C.) writes: "Criminal law remains, however, the most dramatic and important incursion 
that the state makes into individual liberty." 
lSSee John Stuart Mill, Wtilitarianism, Liberty, Representutive Government (London: 
J.M. Dent & Sons, 19 1 0). Mill writes (at 73): '"'mhat the sole end for which mankind are 
wamuited, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any rnember of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others." 
meaning beyond physical harm,"6 the harm to the victim consequent upon a homicide is the 
uitimate phpical M e a t h .  The issue of criminal nsponsibility, absent proof of mental 
incapacity,"' involves an analysis of both the mens rea and actus reus of the offence in 
question."* ~ervading this inquiry are values particular to the criminal process. These 
values in h m  encapsulate society's normative perspective on different types of criminal 
tKha~iour,"~ specifically, for the purposes of this project, behaviour adjudged to be culpable 
homicide. 
Herbert Packer identifies two rnodels of the criminal process: Crime Control and 
Due ~rocess.'~' The former, he maintains, is characterized by the "presumption of guilt" 
"%ee R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R 452,70 C.C.C. ( 3 4  l29,l l  C.R. (4th) 137 where 
the Supreme Court of Canada did a h m  analysis under S. 1 of the Charter and concluded 
that social h m  was a valid consideration in evaluating legislation. At issue in Butler was 
the obscenity definition under S. 163(8) of the Code. 
"'Sec S. 16 of the Criminal Code (Defence of Mental Disorder). 
"8niat analysis, relative to the law of homicide, will be undertaken in Chapter 3. 
IL9see Our Criminal Law, supra note 95 at 5 where it is stated: 
Criminal law, then has to do with values. Naturally, for crime itself, is 
nothing more nor less than conduct senously contrary to our values. Crimes 
are acts not only punishable by law but also merithg punishment. As 
Fitzjarnes Stephen said, the ordinary citizen views crime as an act "forbidden 
by law and revolting to the moral sentiments of society". Crimes are not just 
forbidden, they are also wrong. [Emphasis in 
original] 
And further (at 16): "In tnith, the cnminal law is fiuidamentally a moral system. It may be 
crude, it may have faults ... but basically it is a system of applied morality and justice. It 
serves to underline those values necessary, or else important, to society. When acts occur 
that seriously transgress essential values ... society must speak out and reafEm those values. 
This is the true role of criminai law." [Emphasis in the original]. 
'"~he Limits ojlhe Crimiml Sanction (California: Stanford University Press, 1968) 
at 149-173. 
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with a focus on the efficient suppression of crime, the latter by the "presumption of 
innocence" with a focus on the protection of the individual who fin& himself in conflict with 
the state. The author recognizes that the criminal process has a direct impact on the 
substantive criminal law. What conduct will activate the intrusive power of the State? To 
what extent does the answer to this question reflect the type of criminal process in operation? 
To d y z e  these issues Packer constructed the two models under discussion. These models 
stand at either end of a continuum suggesting that no given society's criminal process is 
either one or the other, but an amalgam of both. 
That a given society's criminal process may embody elements of both the Crime 
Control and Due Process Models is a result of the "common ground" or shared assurnptions 
upon which those models rest.'*' Packer identifies four such assumptions comprising the 
cornmon ground. First, criminal conduct must be defined, it must be ascertainable to society; 
the degree of specificity in defining criminal law will reflect not only policy considerations 
but also the values held by decision-makers. Second, the legislature defines what is criminal 
conduct for the purposes of prosecution, and al1 players in the criminal process must, as an 
operathg premise, defer to the legislature's jurisdiction. Third, the State does not have 
unlimited authonty to Uiterfere with the privacy and security of the individual under the guise 
of law enforcement, particularly at the investigatory stage. Fourth, an accused is, if he so 
chooses, an active participant in the criminal adversarial process; he is entitled to challenge 
the charges levied against him at triai before an independent tribunai. 
12' fiid. at 154-1 58. While Packer is ao American author, much of this 'ccommon 
ground" is found in constitutional form in sections 7 through 14 of the Charter in Canada. 
Stuart Whitley, referring to Packer's two models of the cruninal process, writes: 
Packer proposed that the criminal justice system is a balance between 
two cornpethg value systems or models. These are what he tenned the "due 
process" and the ''crime control" models. The latter is principally aimed at 
the detention [sic] and repmsion of crime, the implicit guilt of the arrested, 
a high conviction rate, and support for police action. The ''due process" 
model accepts the concept of individual guilt as the foundation of criminal 
law, but demands that that conclusion be reached by explicit procedural 
safeguards. Implicit in this view is the notion that the protection of the 
individual is paramount to the interests of the commmity. 
It is certain that the advent of the Charter has explicitly imported the 
"due process" model into the Canadian constitution. ln 
vootnotes ornittedl 
The impact of liberal values on the two rnodels, therefore, is rneasured against the process 
for determining individuai criminal responsibility.lu The greater the emphasis on crime 
suppression and social control, the less sympathetic the judiciary will be to allegations of 
state contravention of individual nghts and fieedoms. Altematively, a judge may emphasize 
one aspect of individualism-that of choiceto the accused's detriment, suggesting that in a 
society where criminal conduct is cleariy defined and therefore knowable to the accused, the 
choice to indulge in that conduct 
individual liberty and autonomy . 124 
cannot be tnmped by liberalism's charnpionship of 
DifEerent emphases foster disparate results. Yet, it is the 
'*Supra, note 9 1 at 30. See also Manfiedi, supra note 64 at 104- 105. 
'*In Laba, supra note 76 at 369, Chief Justice Lamer, who was instrumentai in 
overhauling the murder provisions of the Criminal Code, stated: "My analysis will be 
grounded in the following premise: when the constitutionality of a law is challenged in the 
context of criminal proceedings there are effectively two proceedings-the proceedings 
directed at a detennination of cdpability and the proceedings directed at a detennination of 
constitutionality. They will usually proceed together but rnay, on occasion, proceed 
separately ." 
'24See, for example, R v. Martinem, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, 79 C.R. (3d) 129, 58 
C.C.C. (3d) 353 bereinafter Mmtineau cited to C.R.], a case concerning the constructive 
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dynamics of codicting perspectives that detemiines ultimately the characterization of our 
criminal process as one favouring either crime control or due process values. 
It is perhaps clear to the reader at this junction that the "common grouad'' bridging 
the gap between the two criminal process models, in fact, embodies key liberai principles. 
How far will the Court deviate nom a narrow or broad Iegislative definition of criminal 
conduct? How much deference must be paid to legislative declarations that a particular 
action is criminal? What is the relationship between law enforcement activities vis-a-vis the 
security and pnvacy of the individual? What are the parameters of the adversarial struggle 
in which the accused is pitted against the State? These questions are rooted in the common 
assumptions, and the response of the Supreme Court of Canada to these questions in the 
criminai iaw context, influences both the substance and the impact ofjudicial activism in the 
law of homicide. 
The responses generated by the Court to the cases argued before it are not expounded 
in a vacuum. Judging is a human endeavour and the law has developed principles, most 
notably those of judicial independence and judicial impartiality, to couterbalance the 
subjective dimension of the judicial process. 
V. Subjectivity and the Judiciai Process 
Legal scholars have identified the tension that runs through the judicial adjudicatory 
murder provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, S. 213. Both the majority 
reasons of Chief Justice Lamer and the dissentkg judgment of Justice L'Heureux-Dubé 
reflect liberal influences, but the different emphases account for the disparate result. 
Martineau will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
function. 1B Wolfgang Friedman, '" for instance, posits that whether one is taking of courts 
acting under the umbrella of a constitution, or acting within a legal system where a written 
constitution is not part of the legal landscape, the problems associated with the judicial 
impact on the development of the legal system are the same: 
There always wiil be dynamic and static periods, periods in which the urge 
for social reform predominates over the desire for stability and certainty, and 
other periods when extraordinary legislative activity and the restlessness of 
society produce a judicial reaction, and added emphasis on legal stability. 
There will always be the conflicts of judicial temperaments as well as the 
inevitable divergences in applying any ideais and principles to a given fact 
situation. Such tensions are of the essence of law in a fiee society. ... 127 
[Footnotes omined] 
"sec Benjamin N. Cardozo, n e  Nature OfThe Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 192 1). He wrote (at 12-1 3): 
There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to cal1 it 
philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and 
action. Judges c a ~ o t  escape that current any more than other mortals. Al1 
their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been 
tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; 
and the resultant is an outlook on Me, a conception of social needs, ... which, 
when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine were choice shall fall. In 
this mental background every problem h d s  its setting. We may try to see 
things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with 
any eyes except our own. To that test they are ail brought-a form of pleading 
or an act of parliament, the wrongs of paupers or the rights of princes, a 
village ordinance or a nation's charter. 
[Footnotes omitted] 
Having acknowledged the quintessentially human dimension of judicial decision-making, 
Judge Cardom makes no attempt at apology; rather, he proceeds to articulate his conception 
of the judicial process through reference to four rnethodologies: (i)philosophy or reasoning 
by analogy; (ii)evoIution or reasoning by historical analysis; (iii)tradition or reasoning 
influenced by comrnunity customs; (iv)sociology or reasoning influenced by contemporary 
values of justice, morality and social welfàre. 
126Legal nieoty, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). 
Friedman's comments express clearly the reality that competing judicial emphases on either 
socid justice,'28 stabdity and certainty, or individuai rights colour the tenor and effect of 
judicial decision-making. Further, these competing emphases influence the values which 
penneate the judge's approach to a given fact situation. When trial and appellate judges 
tackle the question of balancing societal and individuai interests in a period of either change 
or stability, the tirne-honoured plinciples ofjudicial independence and impariiality, recently 
accorded constitutionai ~tahis , '~  deliver the exercise fiom disrepute. 
Accepting the subjective aspect of judicial decision-making does not discredit the 
process. The comments of Professor W.R. Ledeman, for instance, concerning the impact 
of judicial subjectivity on a division of powers review are equally applicable to individual 
rights review under the C h t e r :  
D]t is necessary that impartial superior courts should act as umpires of the 
essential guide-lines for the respective federal and provincial responsibilities 
given by the federal constitution. Of course the value assumptions of the 
judges will enter into their decisions. ... Inevitably widely prevailing beliefs 
in the country about these issues will be influentid and presumably the 
judges should strive to implement such beliefs. Inevitably there will be some 
tendency for them to identify their own convictions as those which generally 
prevail or which at les t  are the right ones. ... In the making of these very 
dzflcult decirions of relative values, policy decisions ifone prefers that word. 
al1 that can rightly be demanded ofjudges is straight thinking, industry, good 
fith, a d  a capacity to discount their own prejudices with due humility. No 
doubt it is also fair to ask that they be men or women of high projëssional 
attainment, and that they be somavhat representative in their thinking of the 
i28Davis, supra note 16 at 6 describes social justice as ''justice for segments of the 
population* as distinguished îrom justice for individual parties." 
'29See Tle Provincial Court Judges Cuse, s u p  note 63. 
better stan&& ojtheir rimes ami theirfelow citizenr."O 
[Emphasis added] 
The goal is not to undennine the judicial process but to relativize the inescapable 
subjectivity of that process. Unharnessed subjectivity is to be eschewed. 
Professor Peter Russell offers a similar perspective in discussing the adjudicative 
function and its relation to the principles of judiciai independence and impartiality: 
Adjudicaton settling disputes as third parties are expected to decide disputes 
fairly and without partiality to either of the disputing parties. Thus they 
should be independent and not controlled by private parties or the 
'30Supra, note 87 at 619-620. On the positive impact, upon fundamental civil 
Iiberties, of division of powers review during the 1950's see Dale Gibson, "-And One Step 
Backward: The Supreme Court And Condtutiond Law In The Sixties" (1 975) 53 Cm. Bar 
Rev. 621 at 621-22. 
Gibson did not like the approach of the Court during the next 
decade-the19601s-because of its failure to give explanatory reasons for decision beyond the 
formally legal ones, an apparently deliberate atternpt to defuse criticism of subjective bias 
in decision-making. He observed (at 639) that "if the court fails to disclose its true 
assessment, and instead offers empty exercises in forma1 logic, it becomes extremely dificuit 
for those who differ with its views to engage in intelligent criticism." He added: "Without 
such fimk and Uiformed criticism, the ability of the Supreme Court to continue making wise 
decisions is dangerously weakened." The author then asserted the following (at 639-40): 
[Clounsel who appear before the court are at a great disadvantage if the 
outcome of their cases is in any way dependent upon policy factors which 
they are prevented fiom dealing with openiy in argument because of the 
court's refisal to acknowledge their significance. It is one of the touchstones 
of democracy that satisfactory progress requires the uninhibited clash of 
competing ideas. This is as true in the judicial arena as in al1 others. 
My research to date has revealed no dearth of academic comment and criticism on the 
operations of the Supreme Court of Canada and its decisions since the advent of the Charter. 
Whether this is a resuit of a better or poorer quality of decision-making is debatable: the 
activism of the post-Charter era on both the judicial and academic fronts awaits the judgment 
of posterity. 
However, the articuiation of philosophicd considerations in judicial decisions, e.g., 
that crime suppression is panunount in an individual-rights constitutional analysis, is not to 
be confused with superfiuous judicial pronouncements on the subject matter of the litigation. 
The latter are intolerable especially where thcy touch on matters, such as witness credibility, 
essential to a judicial determination of the issue in dispute. 
govemment. But as social scientists we are sceptical of the possibility of 
complete or absolute independence and impartiality. This scepticism may be 
well founded, but it does not justify dismisshg the ideals of independence 
and impartiality as irrelevant to a proper understanding of the judicial 
process. The challenge to politicai scientists is to ascertain the degree to 
which these ideals c m  and must be realized if a society's judicid system is 
to perform its essential adjudicative fiui~tion.'~' 
A comparable challenge faces the legal professional and academic communities. 
Independence and impartidity are Ideals to be sought, not goals to be ridicuied. As Martin 
Friedland states: "Independent and impartial adjudication is essential to a fke and dernomtic 
society."13* He argues that "[tlhe judiciary plays a major role in Canadian society in 
resolving disputes and, particularly, under the Charter, in developing the law. ... Society 
therefore has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the judiciary collectively and individually 
acts wisely, properly, and 
e fficiently-as well as impartially . "'33 
A- Judicial Independence 
The concept of judiciai independence was explored in the Provincial Court Judges 
Case. 134 Chief Justice Lamer for the majonty stated: 
Valenté was the first decision in which this Court gave meaning to S. 1 I(d)'s 
guarantee of judicial independence and impartiality . In that judgment, this 
Court held that S. 11 (4 encompussed a guarantee, inter a h ,  of financial 
security for the courts and tribunals which corne within the scope of that 
provision. . .. It held that for individual judges to be independent, their salaries 
131Supra note 8 at 40. 
'32Supra note 60 at 1. 
'331bid at 2. 
'%pra, note 63. 
must be secured by law, and not be subject to arbitrary interference by the 
executive. 13' 
IErnphasis added] 
Individual financial independence, the subject of the Vulenté decision, was subsequently 
augmented by the Court's consideration of "the content of the collective or institutional 
dimension of financial security for judges of provincial However, relative to the 
guarantee of judicial independence under S. 1 I(d) of the Charter, the Chief Justice clarified 
that the principle goes beyond financial independence to embrace '?he independence of the 
judiciary £tom the other branches of govemment, and bodies which c m  exercise pressure on 
the judiciary through power conferred on them by the state."13' 
Lamer C.J.C. discussed the comtitutioml basis for the principle of judicial 
independence, and linked that principle to the concept of judicial impartiality: 
[qhe  purpose of the constitutional guarantee of hancial insecurity-found 
in S. l I (d) of the Charter, and also in the preamble to and S. 100 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867-is not to benefit the members of the courts which 
corne within the scope of those provisions. The benefit that the members of 
those courts denve is purely secondary. Financial security must be 
tmderstood as merely an aspect ofjudicial independence, which in tum is not 
an end in itself. Judicid independence is valued because it serves important 
socielol goals-it is a meam to secure those goals. 
One of these goals is the maintenance of public confdence in the 
irnpartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the eflectiveness of the 
court system. Independence contributes to the perception that justice will be 
done in individual cases. Another social goal served by judicial independence 
is the maintenance of the d e  of law, one aspect of which is the constitutional 
principle that the exercise of al1 public power must h d  its ultimate source in 
13S&5id at 207. 
%id at 207. Emphasis in original. 
'3'lbid at 245. 
a legal de.138 
[Emphasis added] 
Rooting the concept of judicial independence in both the Charter and the preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867 enabled Chief Justice Lamer to circurnvent the limitation set out in 
s.1 l(d) of the Chmter-that it appiies only to persons accused of 0ffen~es.I~~ "Judicial 
independence" he stated, " is an unwritten nom, recognized and aamied by the preamble 
to the Constitution Act, 1867. In fact, it is in that preamble, which serves as the w d  
entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution, that the true source of our cornmitment to this 
foundational principle is located."" 
Twelve years earlier, the Canadian Bar Association felt both compelled and uniquely 
positioned to explore the concept ofjudicial independence in Canadian law because "lawyers 
have a special relationship to the judges since both are vital elements in Canada's justice 
~ystem."'~' The Special Committee on the Independence of the Judiciary in Canada argued 
that judicial independence, as a component of legal dispute resolution, required "(a) the judge 
be not associated in any way, even in appearance, solely with either of the parties to the 
dispute;142 [and] @) the judge not have any association or interest beyond the specific dispute 
before him which might cause him to be, or appear to be, biased in favour of one side or the 
14'Canadian ~ a r  Association, The Independence of the Judiciary in Canada (Ontario: 
Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985) at 4. 
'''This dimension of judicid independence identified by the Special Committee is 
akin to the idea of judicial impartiality to be discussed in the next section of this work. 
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other."'" Here, the symbolic importance of judicial independence was highlighted, for 
"[o]nly if these conditions are satisfied, if the judge is compietely independent, wiff the 
contestmirs hnve the realîty and the semblance of a f a i r  trial?" 
This is particularly hue of the criminal triai given that S. I l(d) of the Charter 
-tees persons charged with an offence "a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal." One cannot have a fair trial without at least the perception of judicial 
independence. Chief Justice Lamer in Provincial Court Judges Case observed that in 
addition to the objective aspects of judicial independence, %e court or tribunal [must] be 
reasonably perceived as indq~endent"'~' for "the guarantee of judicial independence has the 
goal not only of easuring justice is done in iodividual cases, but also of ensuring public 
confidence in the justice system."lM Absent that public confidence, the correlation between 
the criminal law, as a symbolic reflection of community values, and the prevailing social 
reality would be strallied if non-existent. 
B. Judicial Impartiaiity 
Not al1 academic authors accept that the foundationai p ~ c i p l e s  of impartiaiity and 
judicial independence form the backbone of the judicial fiution. Professor Richard Devlin, 
for example, argues that judicial independence historically has been treated as the desired 
"end" to which other principles informing fair decision-making, such as impartiality, are 
- - 
'"Supra note 1 4 1 at 7-8. 
'Ulbid at 8. Emphasis added. 
'4'Supra note 63 at 245. Emphasis in original. 
%id 
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sub~rdinate.'~' Devlin argues that in effect, the weaknesses in these supporthg principles 
are camouflaged by the sweeping importance accorded the principle of judicial 
independence. He posits that the concept of impartiality shouid be revamped, that the 
judiciary ought to "corne cleanY'about heir hitherto uaspoken operating a~sumptions."~ It
is preferable, he argues, for a judge to articulate what he or she thinks rather than have the 
'iinspoken" decide the issues before him or her and form the true basis of otherwise carefiilly 
scnpted written decisions. While Professor Devlin's three conceptions of impartiality are 
thought-pro~oking,'~~ the difficulty is that instead of operating fiom one concept of 
be grappling with 
point of reference 
impartiality-"Themis b1Wolded"-practitioners and academics would 
multiple variations on the theme. In effect, there would be no common 
147bcJudging and Diveaity: Justice or Just Us?' (1996) 20 Prov. Judges J. 4 at 6-7. 
'48ibid at 19. See also Martha Minnow "Stripped Down Like A Runner Or Enriched 
By Experience: Bias And Impartiality Of Judges And Jurors" (1991 -92) 33 William And 
Mary L.R. 120 1 at 12 13 where the author writes: "The problem of bias for juries and for 
judges arises not only when they are too close to or too far fiom those they judge but also 
when they fail to identw an entrenched and biased assumption about whose perspective is 
the nom." Further (at 1 2 1 7) she States: 
None of us can know anyihing except by building upon, challenging, 
responding to what we already have known, what we see fiom where we 
stand. But we can insist on seeing what we are used to seeing, or else we can 
try to see something new and fiesh. The latter is the open mind we hope for 
fiom those who judge, but not the mind as a sieve without pior reference 
points and commitments. We want judges and juries to be objective about 
the facts and the questions of guilt and innocence but committed to building 
upon what they already know about the world, human beings, and each 
person's own implication in the lives of others. Pretending not to know nsks 
leavhg unexamined the very assumptions that deserve reconsideration. 
Unlike Devlin, it may be that while Minnow encourages personal examination of the 
unspoken assumptions deriving fiom one's life experiences, their elucidation in the trial 
process is not a pre-requisite for justice. 
'49Supra note 147 at 8-20. 
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upon which to base critique and analysis. As it is, al1 litigants and their legal representatives 
theoreticaily have a level playing field. Nor should academics cry foui, for, in reality, issues 
such as race, colour, gender, previous criminal record, and kquency of the offence in the 
community, ought to be foremost in the mind of any defence or crown counsel in preparing 
his or her case and in anticipating the trial judge's "Unspoken operathg assumpti~ns."'~~ 
Supreme Court of Canada justices al1 have a practical legal background idomiing the 
subjective dimension of their adjudicative h ~ t i o n . ' ~ '  It is this legal practising background, 
cornplemented by academic contributions to the ongoing legal dialogue, that delivers judicial 
subjectivity fkom dishonour; that tempers the impact of discretionary justice; and that 
informs the concept of judicial impartîality. 
Although advocating "judicial opemess and cando~r" , '~  Professor Devlin, himself, 
reveals the tautological nature of acadernic arguments decrying subjectivity as the poison in 
the judicial process. The author articulates thRe questions'53 that a judge might ask himseif 
15qt is common practice to make idormal inquiries of the local Bar if appearing 
before a judge whose adjudicative style is unlaiown to the litigator. Such inquiries are 
supplemented by an unofficial "grapevine" about the sitting judges and justices. 
'"See R v. S. (R D.), supra note 3, where Cory J. observes (at 393): "It is obvious 
that good judges will have a wealth of personal and professional experience, that they will 
apply with sensitivity and compassion to the cases that they must hear." 
lSzSupra note 147 at 1 9. 
Is3lbid at 18- 19. The three questions are: (1) "How am 1 to judge adother?" (2) 
"Would 1 reach a different decision if the parties in question were white or people of 
colour?"; and (3) ''If I were the person appearing before the judge, do 1 think that suffcient 
reasons have been given to satisfy me that 1 have been treated in a fair mariner, even if 1 have 
not won my point?". 
or herself in pursuit of the situationalist approachlY to the concept of impartiality. He then 
concludes his discussion as follows: 
Rather, they [the thRe questions] can be understood as regdative 
mechanisrns through which we can monitor some of our own taken for 
granted assumptions. Moreover, a situationalist approach is not a panacea. 
It dues no# mean that we will always be beyond reproach. but if we me 
mistaken then others c m  demonstrate to us uur weaknesses and we c m  l e m  
fiom o w  rnistahs. In short, the development of a pluralistically sensitive 
conception of impartiality cannot corne prepackaged: it can oniy be achieved 
by trial and error. "' 
[Emphasis added] 
Who are these "others" who will demonstrate to the judiciary their weaknesses? 1s this not 
merely substituthg one form of subjectivity-that ofthe unidentined monitors-for the alleged 
subjectivity of the judiciary?'" Professor Devlin's analysis also fails to situate properly the 
"'fiid. at 14-20. This approach, favoured by the author, is described as follows at 
The act of judging, within this situationalist conception, is an inescapably 
social act. Situationaiism emphasizes that everyone who is involved in the 
legal process-both those who judge and those who are judged-are deeply 
af5ected by their experiential contexts. Specifically, it suggests that cultural 
forces are always crucial variables and that judging can only aspire to 
impartiality if it is sensitive to social phenornena such as racialization. 
IS6nie same observation applies to Jennifer Nedelsky's article entitled "Embodied 
Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 91. Relying on the work of 
neurologist Antonio Damasio who explores the impact of the affective upon effective 
reasoning, the author writes (at 105- 106): 
If reason and judgment are impaired without the the aid of somatic 
markers, how does one generate the appropriate &ect? The problem, as 
Young notes, is that once affect is perceived as distinct fkom an interfering 
with reason, there is no room for reflecting on affect, for evaluating it, for 
educating it; feelings are simply the raw data of nature to be controlled by 
reason. There are, however, parts of the Western intellechial tradition that do 
not fd prey to that error. Atistotle, for example, discussed the need to 
educate affect in order to develop character. In the Arisfotelion qproach, we 
concept of discretion as a controlled exercise of subjectivity relative to individualized 
justice. 15' 
The Supreme Court of Canada recently canvassed the issues of bias and judicial 
impartiality in R. v. S. (R.D.).''~ The dissenting rasons of Major J. (C.J.C. Lamer and 
should l e m  what things it is appropriate tu be pleased by, and displeased 
by. And ifwe do not-ifthe good does not please us-no amount of du@ can 
generate good moral character. 
The idea that goodjudgment requires lemning appropriate Meetive 
responses h a  interesting impIications for the education of lawyers and 
judges. For example, it may be through great literature that jwists can best 
be exposed to individual characters who exemplifi and thus teach the virtues 
necessary for the profession: integrity, decency, compassion and wisdom. 
Similmly, the project of educating lawyers and judges in issues of race and 
gender may be best understood not simply as a process of imparting 
informution, but as an attempt to shzp Mecrive response. 
pmphasis added] [Footnotes omitted] 
Who, in a diverse muticuitural Canada, defines what is "good"? Who defines the 
"appropriate affective responses" that good judgment requires? For instance, does a feminist 
ideology defme the parameters of gooâness, and, if so, which branch of feminism? 
Altematively, since the Charter is at root a liberal document, should liberal values be central 
to the inquiry? 
Is7See Davis, supra note 16 at 17 where he writes: ''Rules without discretion cannot 
Mly take into account the need for tailoring results to unique facts and circumstances of 
particuiar cases. The justification for discretion is often the need for individualized justice. 
This is so in the judicial process as well as in the administrative process." A trial judge uses 
his discretion, for example, in deterrnining the question of witness credibility, in d i n g  on 
legal arguments raised during the course of the trial, and in sentencing a convicted accused. 
In these instances, the facts of the particuiar case and the generally applicable law WU be 
detenninative of the discretionary decision but against the backdrop of general criminal law 
principles. Thus, in sentencing an accused, the trial judge will consider appellate direction 
on the appropriate range of sentence; in deciding a legal argument, he or she will apply the 
relevant law to the facts in issue. See also R.J. Deslisle, Evidence: Principles cmdProblems 
4th ed. (Ontario: Carswetl, 1996) at 18-22. 
15' Supra note 3. The case focussed on a summary conviction trial involving an 
accused black youth and the anesthg police officer. During the course of her oral judgment, 
Judge Sparks made what could be considered improper and speculative remarks about white 
police officers in their encouuters with "non-white" groups. 
S o p W  J. conciimng), and his articulation of the justiciable issue, are preferable to those 
of the majority: 
This appeal should not be decided on questions of racism but instead 
on how courts should decide cases. In spite of the submission of the 
uppeilant und intemeners on his behalf; the case is primari& about the 
conduct ofthe trial. A fair trial is one that is based on the luw, the outcome 
of which is determined by the evidence, fiee of bias, real or upprehended 
Did the triai judge here reach her decision on the evidence presented at the 
trial or did she rely on something else? ... 
The trial judge stated that 'police officers have been known to 
[mislead the court] in the past" and that "police officers do overreact, 
particularly when they 're dealing with non-white groups" and went on to Say 
"[tlhat, to me, indicates a state of mind nght there that is questionable." She 
in effect was saying, "sometimes police lie and overreact in dealing with non- 
whites, therefore 1 have a suspicion that this police officer may have Lied and 
overreacted in dealing with this non-white accused." This was stereotyping 
ail police officea as lias and racists, and applied this stereotype to the police 
officer in the present case. The trial judge might be perceived as assigning 
less weight to the police oflcer 's evidence because he is testifiing in the 
prosecution of an acwed who is of a diflerent race. Whether racism exists 
in our society is not the issue. The issue is whether there was evidence before 
the court upon which to base a fmding that this [emphasis in original] 
particular police officer's actions were motivated by racism. There was no 
evidence of this presented at trial.'" 
[Emphasis added] 
Framing the issue in reference to the presence or absence of supporthg evidence is a 
"9~upru note 3 at 361-362. Cory J. (at 402 ) also addressed the issue of whether 
there was evidence before the Court linking the police officers's actions to racist motivations. 
He concluded that no such evidence existed. Contrarily, Justices L'Heureux-Dube and 
McLachlin found (at 375) that there was evidence of a " 'racially motivated overreactiony7 
by the police officer in that he put both the accused and his hand-cuffed cousin in choke 
holds "purportedly to secure them." R J. Deslisle "Annotationy' (1997) 10 CR. (5th) 7 at 
10 is somewhat dubious about the connection: "L'Heureux-Dubé J. fin& that the fact that 
both boys were placed in choke-holds is evidence that his ovemeaction was racially 
motivated. The link in left unexplained. ... Of what relevance is the 'overreaction' to the 
issue of racism?" 
necessary first step to M e r  analy~is.'~" Absent an evidentiary basis for her comments, a 
judge in the position of the trial judge in S. (RD.) ought to exercise caution in voicing 
apparently gratuitous staternents about a wit~ess.'~' To do othewise sabotages the 
'"See Wendy Baker "Women's Diversity: Legal Practice And Legal Education-A 
View From The Bench" (1996) 45 U.N.B. L.J. 199 at 206 where the author states: 
While 1 am an enthusiastic proponent of judicial education, 
particuiarly education which includes a focus on "social context", I cannot 
ernphasize too strongly that judicial sensitivity and W h g  cannot 
compensate for a failure by counsel to properly analyze, plead and prove 
matters conceming gender or racial equality or culnual diversity arising in a 
lawsuit. Judges m o t  substitute "judicial notice" for evidence or 
compensate, to any signincant extent, for a failure by counsel to identie the 
issues and present the appropriate facts and law. [Emphasis added] 
Madam Justice Baker concludes (at 208): 
Judges must continue to educate thernselves to increase their 
awareness of and sensitivity to women's diversity and the context in which 
decision-making occurs in the society that is Canada today. Law schools m d  
continuing legal educators mut  prepare students and lawyers to identzfi, 
anal'e, research, plead andprove the fucts and l m  necessas, to permit 
courts to reach fuir andjust decisiom in the context ofo diverse society. 
[Emphasis added] 
1 concur in this approach to the issues of diversity and equality and to the deterrnination of 
related issues at trial based on the evidence adduced. 
See also Beverly Mclachlin "Judicial Neutraiity and Equality" (Address to the 
Rendering Justice Conference, Hull, Quebec, November 17-1 9,1995) at 24 where she writes: 
My own view is that the fact that a judge or decision maker has expressed 
particular points of view on a subject should not in the normal case disqualify 
her. The reasonable onlooker would recognize, as Dickson C.J.C. did, that 
judges necessarily corne to the bench or the case with views ... some of which 
may touch the case at hand. The reasonable onlooker would also recognize 
that judges and a@udicators by their profession und outh assume the 
obligation of setting their personal views aride and rendering a verdict on 
the law and the evidence. [Emphasis added] 
16'When trial counsel engage in any type of speculative submissions to the Court, they 
are quickly put in their place by a vigilant trial judge! The issue of gratuitous judicial 
statements in the triai context was addressed by J.O. Wilson, A Book for Jwlges (Canada: 
Minister of Supply and Services, 1980) at 112. The author cites Chief Justice Culliton on 
this topic to the effect that "comments of a general nature which [are] related to the issue 
before him, mut] are not necessary to its determination" are best left unsaid, for "[s]uch 
appeanuice of faimess in the triai process. 
Justice Major determined that since there was no evidentiary foundation for the 
judge's remarks, their propriety was indefensible: 
The life experience of this trial judge, as with al1 trial judges, is an 
important iogredient in the ability to understand huma0 behaviour, to weigh 
the evidence, and to determine credibility. It helps in making a myriad of 
decisions arising during the course of most trials. It ir of no value, however, 
in reaching conclusions for which there is no evidence. The fact that on 
some other occasions police officers have lied or overreacted is irrelevant. 
Life eqverience is nota substitutefor evidence. There was no evidence before 
the trial judge IO support the conclusions she reached 
.... 
Judges, as arbiters of tnith, cannot judge credibility based on 
irrelevant witness characteristics. Al1 witnesses must be placed on equal 
footing before the court.'62 
[Emphasis added] 
Justice Major concluded that "we are concemed with both the faimess and the appearance 
of faVness of the trial, and the absence of evidence to support the judgment is an irreparable 
defect."Ig Nor was the situation salvageable by speculating on what the judge might have 
comments u d l y  do no more that reflect the opinion of the judge." See also David M. 
Paciocco cbJudicial Notice in Criminal Cases: Potentid and Pidalls" (1998) 40 C.L.Q. 35 
[hereinafler "Judicial Notice"] at 66 where the author, referring to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal decision in R (D.S.), notes: 
The problem is, how does one get from the general information that there is 
systemic racism in a police force to the conclusion that this particular officer 
on this particdar day overreacted because of the race of the accused? Those 
observations, however correct, are d inked  by evidence to the facts and are 
therefore gratuitous. ... Without being arbitrary, there is simply no way to get 
fkom the generai proposition that there are racist police officers, to the 
specific conclusion that this officer was a racist 
'62S~pra note 3 at 364,365. 
meant.'" Had there been an evidentiary b i s  for the comments and their relevancy in the 
first place, nich a speculative exercise would not be necessary. Applying the test for hd ing  
a reasonable apprehension of bias as articulateci in, inter alia, Cornmittee for Justice and 
Liberty v. National Energy Board'", Major J. concluded that the trial judge's comments 
gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
Fundameataily, what the dissenting justices did in S. (RD.) was staa with basic 
principles. Was there evidence, on the record, to support the disputed comments of the trial 
judge? That preliminary question ought to be the focus of any inqujr into gratuitous judicial 
comments that impact, or appear to impact, on the impartiai adjudication of a case. '" A trial 
is not about the race, gender, religion or other personal characteristics of the accused. It is 
about the proof (or lack thereof) of an allegation of wrong-doing by the accused, "a public 
demonstration to denounce the crime and re-affirm the values it [the crime] infrh~ged."'~' 
If the accused's personal characteristics are pertinent to the question of guilt or innocence, 
then evidence on that point should be led through skilful cross-examination of Crown 
1651nfia note 172 and accompanying text. And see S. (R.D.), supra note 3 at 363. 
166For an excellent discussion of the importance of an evidentiary basis for judicial 
reasoning see "Judicial Notice", supra note 16 1. Paciocco discusses (at 65-67) the S. @.De) 
decisions at both the trial and Nova Scotia Court of Appeal levels, concluding at 67: "As this 
case demonstrates, taking judicial notice of matters not in evidence presents the risk of 
creating a perception of bias. ... The lesson in this for trial judges is clear. When facts that 
are not proved in evidence mggest themselves, they should not be relief [sic] on or even 
referred to unless they are necessary to the decision and are of unquestionable relevance." 
[Footnotes omitted] . 
1670ur Criminal L m ,  mpra note 95 at 23. 
witnesses, through defence evidence, or both. Divorcing the individual accused's cultural, 
ethnic, sexuai andor gender background fiom evidentiary collstraints threatens the trial 
process a s  the issue of guiit or innocence for the aileged wrongdoing is subverted to issues 
of race, gender, sex and ethnicity where their relevancy to an issue before the Court has not 
been established. 
The law governing reasonable apprehension ofbias applied by Major J. in dissent was 
that articulated in the judgment of Justice Cory (Iacobucci J. con~urring).'~~ Major J. reached 
a different conclusion based on his application of the test to the facts in S. (RD.). According 
to Cory J., "bias denotes astate of mind that is in some way predisposed to a particuiar result, 
or that is closed with regard to particular issues."169 His Lordship notes that irnpartiality, on 
the other han& goes beyond the fact that a decision-maker has certain beliefs, opinions or 
even bisses.'" "It must be dernonstrated that those beliefs, opinions or biases prevent the 
juror (or, 1 wouid add, any other decision-maker) fiom setting aside any preconceptions and 
coming to a decision on the basis of the evidence ..."'7' Having clarifed the concepts of bias 
and impartiality, and the potentially negative impact of the former upon the latter, Cory J. 
elaborates the test for fhding a reasonable apprehension of bias: 
I6'Supra note 3 at 366. 
1691bid at 3 88. See dso Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63 at 245 where 
Lamer C.J.C. discusses the Merence between independence and impartiality. "hpartiality 
was defined by LeDain J. in Valente'] as 'a state ofmind or attitude of the tribunal in relation 
to the issues and the parties in a particular case. ... (emphasis added). Independence, by 
contrast, focussed on the stufus of the court of tribunai." pmphasis in original]. 
1 7 0 ~ p r u  note 3 at 389. 
When it is alleged that a decision-maker is not impartial, the test that 
must be applied is whether the particular conduct gives nse to a reasonable 
of bias. ... It has long been held that actual bias need not be established This 
is so because it is usuaüy impossible to detemllne whether the decision- 
maker approached the matter with a truiy biased state of mind ... 
It was in this context that Lord Hewart C.J. articulated the famous 
maxim: "[iP is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" ... 
The manner in which the test for bias should be applied was set out 
with great cl* by de Grandpré J. in his dissenthg reasons in Cornmittee 
for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (IVutionaI Energy Board), [I 9781 1 S.C.R. 
369 at p. 394 ... : 
... the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by 
reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to 
the question and obtaining thereon the required information. 
... [The] test is "what would an informed person, viewing the 
matter realistically and practicdy-and having thought the 
matter through-conclude." 
This test has been adopted and applied for the past two decades. It contains 
a two-fold objective element: the person considering the alleged bias must be 
reasonable, and the apprehension of bias itself must also be reasonable in the 
circumstances of the case. ... Further the reasonable person must be an 
infomed person, with knowledge of al1 the relevant circumstances, including 
%e traditions of integrity and impartiality that fom a part of the background 
and apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties the judges 
swear to uphold" ... To that 1 would add that the reasonable person should 
also be taken to be aware of the social reality that forms the background to a 
particular case, such as societal awareness and acknowledgement of the 
prevalence of racism or gender bias in a particular ~ommunity. '~ 
[Emphasis in original] 
The onus of proof is high-that of real liJselihood or probability of b i s  as opposed to mere 
s ~ s ~ i c i o n ~ ~ ~ - f o r ,  a finding of real or perceived bias is one that "calls into question not simply 
the personal integr@ of the judge, but the ïntegrity of the entire administration ofju~tice."~'~ 
Cory J. emphasizes that % M e r  a reasonable apprehension of bias arises will depend 
e n h l y  on the facts of the case" and that "dl  judges are subject to the same bdamental 
duties to be and to appear to be impartial."'75 in addition, "it is vitai to bear in mind that the 
test for reasonable apprehension of bias applies equally to al1 judges, regardless of their 
background, gender, race, ethnic origin, or any other characteristi~."~'~ 
In applying the test for reasonable apprehension of bias to the facts in the case, Cory 
J. concluded that no reasonable apprehension ofbias occurred. He achowledged, like Major 
I., that "there was no evidence before Judge Sparks that would suggesi that anti-Black bias 
iafluenced this pcrrticulm police officer 's reactiom." In However, he held that the judge was 
in fact responding to the Crown Attorney's closing submission urging the Court to accept the 
evidence of the police officer over that of the young person, R.D.S. 
While both Major J. and Cory I. expressly dissociate themselves Corn the reasons of 
Justices L'Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin,"' they are, at least, in agreement as to the test for 
reasonable apprehension of biadn This common ground aside, their Ladyships discuss the 
"%id at 402. Emphasis in original. 
'" See Bruce Archibdd "The Lessons of the Sphinx: Avoiding Apprehensions of 
Judicial Bias in a Multi-culturai Society" (1997) 10 C.R. (5th) 54 at 55-56 observes that al1 
judges agreed that the test for reasonable apprehension of bias was that articulated by de 
Grandpré J. in Cornmittee for Jusfice and Liberw and that there exists a presumption of 
judicial integrity. Archibald goes on to state (at 56) that while the application of the test for 
bias appears contentious, "it is the 'treatment of social context' which became the most 
significant point of contention among the justices." Deslisle, supra note 159, also 
'Yailacy of judicial ne~trality"'~, the impossibility of objectivity"' but concede the 
desirability of impartiality. la However, their view of impartiality necessitates a b'conscious, 
contextual inqujr"."' This concept of impartiality compels the judge to put hirnself or 
herself in the shoes of the accused and attempt to see the situation which gave rise to the 
criminal charge from the accused's perspective. The workability of that exercise is doubtful 
in that no one tnily can get into the mind of another, particularly when the judge and the 
accused are meeting for the first t h e  at trial.Iu Further, L' Heureux-Dubé's deference to 
expert witnesses in establishing case context is problematic in that justice potentially 
commented on the points of agreement in the three separate decisions. He writes (at 7): "It 
is tme that the court, by a six-three majority, voted to restore the acquittais registered by the 
trial judge, but a five-four majority referred to her rem& as 'unfortunate', 'troubiing', 
'womsome', and 'unnecessary' per Cory and Iacobucci JJ., and 'stereotypical reasoning', 
and %relevant', per Major and Sopinka JJ. and Lamer C.J.C." 
'80Supra note 3 at 3 69. 
%id But see McLachiin, supra note 160 at 34 where she states: 
The end resuit of these practices-the putting aside of personai views, 
the preserving of an open mind, the mental act of placing oneself in the 
position of each of the parties, and finally, the use of reason to draw 
inferences nom carefully considered facts imtead of stereotypical 
assumptions-might be called the art of judging. .. It is much more than 
according apro fonna hearing, much more than amiving at a conclusion that 
makes us cornfortable. It is a professional process which has been used by 
the most respected judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers for centuries 
to attain the degree of objectivity requiredfor good judging. 
It appears as if Justice McLachlin concedes the possibility of objectivity in this article, 
contrary to her position in S. (R. D.) . 
Insupra note 3 at 369. 
'%s presupposes that the accused has not appeared before the judge on previous 
charges. 
becomes a battie of the experts rather than a reasoned consideration of the evidence by the 
hier of fact An expert opinion is, in f a  just that-an opinion open to refbtation by 
someone else in the field. Today's social context built on the opinion of Expert X may be 
discarded tomorrow in favour of another m ~ d e l . ' ~  
Whïie d l  the justices in S. (RD.) agreed that social context had some relevance, they 
were not unmimous as to the degree of relevance nor the manner in which social context 
would be brought to the court's attention. This is problematic, especially for the effective 
exercise of judicial discretion relative to the admissibility of social context evidence. If, as 
Justices L'Heurewc-Dubé and McLachlin argue, a judge can take his or her Iife experience 
into account in the course of r e n d e ~ g  a decision, independent of evidence on the issue to 
which that life experience relates, to ensure trial fairness, that judge should hear only cases 
involving persow of a similar background to him- or herself. In effect, segregated justice 
would become mandatory in order to ensure that those of a similar race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and ethnic background benefited from the presiding judge's empathy. Hopefully, 
the criminaI justice system in not heading in that direction. "Themis-blindfolded" may not 
be a perfect model of impartiality as a response to the increasingly diverse nature of our 
society, but it at least ensures a common point of departure for the adversarial process. The 
'"Sec, for example, Robert P. Mosteller "Syndromes And Politics In Criminal Trials 
And Evidence Law" (1996) 46 Duke L. J. 461. He States (at 46 1-462): 
The perceived misuse of syndrome evidence is a major focus of criticism of 
American criminal trials. 'Trash' syndromes, such as the 'Urban Survival 
Syndrome,' ... attract national attention. Other syndromes, such as Battered 
Child Syndrome, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, and 
Battered Woman Syndrome, are more widely accepted. Even for this latter 
group, however, the scientifîc validity and dimensions of their legitimate use 
remain unclear and controversial. m t n o t e s  omitted] 
prenimption of impartiality is not carved in stone; it can be rebutted through evidence, a 
process open to al1 who h d  themselves in a court of law. 
This andysis of the S. (3. D-) case hopefully enlightens debate on the principle of 
judicial impartiality in the decision-making process. But perhaps the singuiar most 
important affimiation of judicial impartiaiity as a principle of pervasive influence upon the 
issue of subjectivity is the statement of Lord Hewart in Rex v. Sussex Justices: "Pt] is of 
hdamental importance that justice should not ody be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be d ~ n e . " ' ~  The debate over subjectivity and the feasibility of 
impartiality in the decision-making process shouid not focus on whether it is established, 
as irrefhtable fact, that judicial impartiality operates at the subjective level of each judge. 
Instead, energies wodd be better directed to an examination of whether justice has been seen 
to be done. Justice Major in R (SB.) captures the essence of such an examination when he 
States: 
Canadian courts have, in recent years, criticized the stereotyping of 
people into what is said to be predictable behaviour patterns. ... Our 
jurisprudence prohibits tying credibility to something as irrelevant as gender, 
occupation or perceived group predisposition. 
Simîlarly, we have eliminated the requirement for corroboration of the 
complainant's evidence. ... The elimination of corroboration shows the 
present evolution away fiom stereotyping vanous classes of witnesses as 
inherently unreliable. 
It can hardly be seen as progress to stereotype police officer witnesses 
as Iikely to lie when dealing with non-whites. This wodd r e m  us to a time 
in the history of the Canadian justice system that many thought had passed. 
El9241 1 K.B. 256 at 259. Quoted in Wilson, supra note 161 at 3. The author, 
who compiled the text at the request of the Canadian Iudicial Council, notes: "This 
pronouncement, so simply stated, so profound in its sagacity c m  never, how often repeated, 
become a cliche. ... Justice, of course, cornes nrst but the appearance of justice is also of 
major importance." 
This reasoning, with respect to police officers, is no more legitimate than 
stereotyping of women, children or minorities.'" 
Clearly, stereotypical reasoning violates the principle of impartiality and the appearance of 
justice suffers. Why should any witness waik away fiom a criminal courtroom labeiled a 
racist or a liar in the absence of supporthg evidence? The sad fact that such may have been 
done in the past as a result of a person's race, colour or gender is no justification for a 
recurrence in today's colirtrooms. Cornmon sense dictates that if impartiality, at a minimum, 
does not appem to have been exercised, then the M e r  question of irnpartiality as a fact 
is pointless. In the fuial anaiysis, judicial impartiality and independence are unwritten 
constitutional noms. They are integral to the "cornmon core" of the criminal process 
identifïed by Herbert Packer. "Themis-Blindfolded" stands at the gateposts of that process. 
Admissible evidence, that is what will inform the trier of fact of the social context of crime, 
not the marticulated and unlaiowable background of the judge or the parties to the dispute. lS8 
The principle of judicial impartiality, like that of judicial independence, is critical to 
the constitutional guarantee of a fair tnal under S. 1 l(d) of the Charter. The perception of 
irnpartiality is crucial to the integrity of the criminal trial. Thus, in ~estray,'~~ the majority 
found that the trial judge's actions in telephoning senior Crown personnel during the course 
'8.supru note 3 at 364-365. 
' I f ,  as in S. @ D.), a social context issue of significance to the disposition of the case 
arises independent of the evidence before the Court, the presiding judge ought to give 
counsel an opportunity to be heard, and to cal1 evidence, on that issue. 
'8gSupra note 14. 
of the trial 'kas sunicient in itseif to raise the issue of apprehension of bias."'" The 
majoriîy reasons did not delve M e r  into the facts of the case in the interests of faimess: 
It is important that a new trial be held, and as a result as Iittie as 
possible should be said regarding the issues that may arise or the evidence. 
... Particdarly, the trial judge shouid not be inhibited either by our 
colleagues' view of the evidence and issues or ours, which could well be 
different. At the new trial, both the Crown and the defence cari take whatever 
steps and raise whatever issues they consider appropriate. The trial of ihese 
accused like al2 who face criminal charges should be fair and be perceived 
to be fair. To achieve this goal the issues raised at the new trial and the fucts 
upon which they rest muît be detennined by a judge who is not on& impur tial 
but is seen by all to be impartial. m i s  is clearly in the best interests of the 
aceused and the c~rnrnunity.~~' 
[Emphasis added] 
Thus, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and of the Court's adjudicative process 
depends upon an independent impartial judiciary capable of deciding cases on the bais  of 
legal principles and admissible evidence. Anything less would seriously erode the criminal 
law's legitimacy and be a disservice to the rule of law in society. 
V. Parliament and The Supreme Court of Canada-Ailies or Adversaries? Defhing 
the Boundaries of Criminal Liability 
Thus far, the major ideological influences operathg on the justices of the Supreme 
Court of Canada as they M I  their adjudicative role have been canvassed. The resulting 
ideological mix comprises the concepts of parliamentary and constitutional supremacy, 
democratic and liberal traditions and values, due process and crime control considerations, 
and challenges to the foundationai principles of judicial independence and impartiality. This 
post-Charter ideologicai blend has transfomed the law of homicide. The Charter and the 
Constitution Act, 1982 are the catalysts in the mix: the Supreme Court of Canada's 
increasing activism under a system of constitutional supremacyln is the primary source of 
the legal metamorphosis this area of the law has undergone. 
The concept of constitutionai supremacy under S. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
and the concomitant responsibility of the Supreme Court of Canada to measure criminal 
legislation against coIlStitutional imperatives and standards, has facilitated the Court's 
activist leanings. Lamer J. in Vaillancourt Ig3 ( Dickson C.J.C. concmhg) identifies the 
operating tension between a constitution-wielding judiciary and an elected Parliament 
responsible for defining criminal behaviour. Conceming proof of the mens reu of an offence, 
he stated unequivocally: 
As a result, while Parliament retains the power to define the elements of a 
crime, the courts now have the jurisdiction and, more important, the duty, 
when called upon to do so, to review that definition to ensure that it is in 
accordance with the principles of hdamental j ~ s t i c e . ' ~  
Substantive review, under a Charter analysis, will engage the Supreme Court in the deiicate 
task of balancing its new constitutional directive'95 against the diminished, but d l  powemil, 
'"See "Keynote Address", supra note 67 at 4. nie  then Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, speaking of the Charter's impact upon the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy, stated: "Thus, in Canada, legislative supremacy is subordinate to Constitutional 
supremacy, except to the limited extent that it is preserved by S. 33 of the Charter ..." For 
a discussion of the concept of legislative supremacy as that term is understood in the 
Canadian context see supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
193Supra note 1 00. 
Ig5see Strayer, supra note 46 at 32 where he writes: 
Now we need look no f d e r  that s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 for the 
principle of parliamentary supremacy in the interests of criminal justice. 
in the Provincial Court Judges Case, Larner C.J.C., speaking specincally of the 
principle of judicial independence, articulates the Link between our founding constitutional 
documenî, the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Charter: 
The preamble identifies the organizing principles of the Constitution Act, 
1867, and invites the courts to turn those principles into the prernises of a 
constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express 
tenns of the constitutionai texî. 
As 1 said earlier, the express provisions of the Constitution should be 
understood as elaborations of the underlying, &tten, and organizing 
p ~ c i p l e s  found in the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867. Even though 
S. 1 1 (d) is found in the newer part of our Constitution, the Charter, it can be 
understood in this way, since the Constitution is to be read as a unified 
whole. '" 
Constitutional litigation rooted in the Charter is, therefore, not a legal exercise isolated fiom 
Canada's constitutionai past; rather, it is an extension of that past into the ongoing evolution 
of our legd and political institutions. Canadians inhented a "Constitution similar in 
Principle to that of the United ~ingdom".'" Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
principle of supremacy of the constitution, for a partial definition of the 
constitution covering the core statutes, and for the intended consequence of 
supremacy: that is, the invalidity of inconsistent laws. While the section does 
not specifically provide for judicial review to determine if there is 
inconsistency, its adoption after 1 15 years of such judicial review under the 
constitution implies that the courts are to continue to exercise such a role. 
'%Supra note 63 at 242-243. 
'"~ee Strayer, supra note 46 at 38-39 where the author States: "As noted above, 
Canada m u t  in some way have inhented the concept of parliamentary supremacy since the 
preamble to the B.N.A. Act says we are to have a 'constitution similar in principle to that of 
the United Kingdom'. Yet judicial review of legislative action has thrived in Canada while 
in the United Kingdom its legitimacy is still very questionable." Strayer compares (at 42) 
the grundnom of the British constitution/that the laws of the United Kingdom Parliament 
are supreme and must be followed by the courts"-to that of the Canadian constitution, where, 
in addition %e laws of the United Kingdom Parliament are supreme" [emphasis in original]. 
He concludes (at 43): 
In short, we have had a modification in our grundnom. We stiI l  
maintains that the constitution is the supreme law of the land, and insofar as the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy enjoys constitutionai  statu^'^^ through the preamble to the 
recognize that the constitutional laws as enacted by Westminister for Canada, 
including the Ca& Act, 1982 and its schedule, the Constitution Act, 1982. 
are the supreme law of Canada, but we now aiso recognize that in the future 
the supreme law-making authority ..mil1 belong to those Canadian legislative 
bodies prescribed in the new constitutional amending formula ... 
Thus while Parliament and Legislatures have legislative authority 
Limiteci now by both the distribution of powers and the Charter guarantees of 
individual rights and fieedoms, within the areas of authority left to each they 
enjoy parliamentary supremacy. This means that, like Westminister, they 
make laws which, if otherwise valid, the courts must respect. 
See also Henri Brun in Beckton and MacKay, supra note 62 at 6, who writes: 
The supremacy of Parliament has been weakened in the sense that the 
laws of Parliament may now be challenged in the courts by virtue of specific 
criteria set forth in the Charter. It remains unweakened, however, in the 
sense that the parliarnents are still the bodies authorized to express the 
uItimate standards of the state in accordance with the Constitution. And 
dynamic law, the body of law that a society gradually creates for itself as its 
needs evolve, continues to flow, at the very highest level, from parliamentary 
legislation. . . . 
The Charter of Rights has in no sense deprived the legislative bodies 
of their responsibility to act as the primary agents in the continuous evolution 
and refonn of the law. 
"'In the Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63, Chief Justice Lamer (at 237) 
wrote: "In my opinion, the existence of many of the unwritten d e s  of the Canadian 
Constitution can be explained by reference to the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867." 
He added: '4t [the preamble] recognizes and afnmis the basic principles which are the very 
source of the substantive provisions of the Constitution Act. 1867. ... It [the preamble] is the 
means by which the underlying logic of the Act can be given the force of Iaw." The Chief 
Justice found (at 238) that the preamble's "reference to 'a Constitution similar in Principle 
to that of the United Kingdom', ... indicates that the legal and institutional structure of 
constitutional democracy in Canada should be similar to that of the legal regime out of which 
the Canadian Constitution emerged." Lamer C.J.C. found (at 240-241) that the preamble, 
in recognizing and af3rming Parliamentary democracy "speaks to the kind of constitutional 
democracy that our Constitution comprehends." See also Southam Inc. v. Canada (Attorney 
General), infra note 202 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Iacobucci's (as he then was) 
discussion of the significance of the reference to "a Constitution similar in Principle to that 
of the United Kingdom" in the preamble to the Comtitution Act. 1867 was cited with 
approval by Lamer C.J.C. in Provincial Court Judges Case at 24 1. See also "Keynote 
Constihrtion Act, 1867, it remains a powemil influence on the '"nature of the legal order that 
envelops and sustains Canadian society."'" 
How ought the Court to approach its task of recognizing constitutional supremacy 
in the context of a Parliamentary democracy where, untill982, the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy was the primary restraint on judicial activity? In keeping with Chief Justice 
Lamer's comrnents in the Provincial Court Judges Case, the Coordinate Model of the 
Charter expounded by Brian Slattery offers an altemative to the portrayai of constitutional 
and parliamentary mpremacy as  opposing rather than complementary principles: 
Generally the Coordinate Model holds that the Charter allows for a 
continuhg dialogue between the courts and legislatures as to the tnie nature 
of Charter rights and the reasonableness of limits on them. But this dialogue 
can occur ody if it is accepted that the roles of the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches under the charter are reciprocal and not co&o&ional and 
that their attitudes to one another should be flexible and founded on mutual 
respect 
Viewed thusly the Charter may be perceived "as the development and extension of the best 
Address", supra note 67 at 2 where he States: 
The preamble of the Constitution Act. 
North America Act, 1867, speaks 
1867, fonnerly hown  as the Brirish 
of Canada functioning under "a 
Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom". The British 
Constitution involves the interplay of three unwritten principles, namely: (1) 
the sovereignty of the Crown; (2) the Rule of Law protected by an 
independent judiciary; and (3) the supremacy ofParliament. 
pmphasis 
added] 
And see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Procedure: Control of the Process, 
Working Paper 15 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 23 where the commissiones write: 
"Our d e n  constitution, the British North America Acts, and, to a lesser extent, the Bill of 
Rights, place restrictions on the powers of our legislative bodies. Subject to these 
limitations, parliamentary sovereignty remains a fcundamental constitutional doctrine." 
199Provinciul Cowt Judges Case, supra note 63 at 23 9. 
2w'Theory of the Charter", supra note 64 at 71 0. 
of Canadian constitutional  tradition^."^"' This cannot be accomplished without growing 
pains. Striking the baiance between old collstitutional traditions and new constitutional 
mandates is a challenge, not a recipe for decoIlStNcting the legal system, especially if the 
detractors have no viable substitutes? This is particularly the case in the area of criminal 
Law where the values embodied in the criminal justice system, and reflected in sections of 
the Churter, do and must continue to underlie the decisions which result fiom litigation 
arising fiom the criminal justice process. 
2 m ~ e e  Southam Inc. v. Canada (Attorney-Genercrl), [1990] 3 F.C. 465, 73 D.L.R. 
(4th) 289,114 N.R. 255 (C.A.) at 305-306 where Iacobucci C.J. (as he then was), delivering 
the judgment of the Court, stated: 
Strayer J. was of the opinion that courts had such a juxisdiction [to 
apply constitutional restraints to the exercise of privileges by the Senate or 
one of its committees] and found, in particular, that the adoption of the 
Charter fundamentally aitered the nature of the Canadian Constitution such 
that it is no longer "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom" as is 
stated in the preambie to the Constitutim Act, 1867. Accepting as we m u t  
thal the adoption ofthe Churter transformed tu a considerable extent our 
former system of purIiamentary supremacy into our nvrent one of 
constitutional supremacy, as f m e r  Chef Jusrice Dichon described it, the 
sweep Sttayer J.  's comment that our Constitution is no longer similm in 
principle to that ofthe United KNlgdom is rather wide. Granted, much has 
changed in the new coIlStitutional world of the Charter. But just as purists of 
federalism have learned to live with the fededist Constitution that Canada 
adopted in 1867 based on principles of parliamentary governent in a unitary 
state such that the United Kingdom was and continues to be, so it seems to 
me that the British system of constitutional government will continue to CO- 
exist alongside the Ch- ifnot entireïy, which it never di4 but certainly 
in many important respects. B e  nature and scope of this CO-existence will 
dependnaturally on the jurisprudence t h  resultsfiom the questions brolrght 
before the courts. 
pmphasis added] [Footnotes omitted] 
This passage was cited with approval by Chief Justice Lamer writing on behalf of the 
majority in the Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63 at 24 1. 
78 
Questions arising during constitutioBal adjudication do not always involve judicial 
review of impugned legislation. Sta~ory  provisions otherwise within Parliament's 
legislative cornpetence often are subjected to interpretive techniques which impact upon the 
operational eEect of the provision. The Criminal Code is obviously a key statute in that its 
provisions are subjected to this process on a daily bais. As well, common law des-judicial 
creations-may be r e f o d a t e d  subject only to the discretion of the Court and such doctrines 
as stare decisis. Reforrnulating common law d e s  in the post-Charter context underscores 
the impact of Charter values upon the law's evolution. This, too, is very important in the 
criminal law context where S. 8(3)'03 of the Criminal Code ensures the continuing relevance 
and importance of the common law to the criminal process. The impact is more subtle, yet 
equally as forceful, when the Court engages in statutory or common law interpretation where 
the challenged section or d e  otherwise meets constitutional requirements. The case law 
analyses undertaken in Chapter 3 will illuminate the subtleties of statutory interpretation and 
reformulation of the cornmon law. Again, the issue of criminal liability is central to the 
resolution of these cases. 
VI. Summary 
The Supreme Court of Canada is at the apex of the Canadian legal system, its justices 
'03section 8(3) states: 
Every d e  and principle of the common law that renders any circunstance a 
justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force 
and appiies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any 
other Act of Parliament except in so far as they are altered by or are 
inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of Parliament. 
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rendering decisions that have repercussions for the very fabric of Canadian society. The 
Coint has gone from a position of relative obscurity to one of much-scnmnized visibility. 
Originally created by federal statute in 1875, the Court bas been thrust fkom its largely 
s u p e ~ s o r y  role under the auspices of parliamentary or legislative supremacy, into a more 
active one under the Charter, a document rooted in the principle of constitutional 
supremacy. The challenge ahead for the Court is to strike an acceptable balance between its 
historical roots in a tradition of parliamentary supremacy and its new role as constitutional 
arbiter under the Chmer. The impact of these respective doctrines on judicial decision- 
making at the Supreme Court of Canada level will be assessed in the law of homicide 
analysis which foilows. S a c e  it to Say at this point that there is considerable tension 
between the historical tradition of deference to legislative pronouncements and the fledgling 
concept of constitutionai primacy. 
But other influences are at work. The tenets of Iiberalism, with their roots in the 
protection of individual rights fkom unreasonable or unwarranted interference by the State, 
have been diluted in the Canadian context by a communalist or collectivist principle which 
accepts the legitimacy of group interests and nghts. The Court must grapple with these 
realities in fashioning a t d y  Canadian legal jurisprudence in our post-Charter liberal 
democratic society. Superimposed on these philosophical underpinnings are the values 
inherent in our ciiminal process, values vacillating between concem about crime control and 
respect for due process. The Court has the unenviable task, in its role as adjudicator, to strike 
a workable balance. 
It is in its adjudicatory role that the Supreme Court of Canada faces the wrath of the 
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academc community's radical wing as that august body patrols the policy-making 
implications of the Court's new mandate under the 1982 constitutional initiatives. 
Subjectivity is portrayed as a destructive weakness penneating the judicial fûnction. Tirne- 
honoured principles of judicial independence and impartiality are under attack as being no 
more than convenient shields for the political agenda of the individual justices. However, 
as decisions like S. (RD.) illustrate, basic theoretical concepts, such as the presumption of 
judicial integrity, the principle of judicial impartiality, and the overarching principle of 
judicial independence, are the mainstays of fairness in the criminal process. The content of 
those principles may be contested, but reliance on the intangibility of subjectivity as 
justification for their irrelevance is unconvincing. If the approach of the radical realists is 
taken to its extreme, the contention that subjectivity-that inescapable dimension of any 
human activity- cannot be harnessed, itself, is a subjective opinion to be accorded no more 
weight than an opinion to the contrary. Legal dialogue becomes peripheral and circular, a 
screen behind which the real questions, such as the extent and scope of discretionary justice 
as a legitimate exercise of subjectivity, are never addressed. 
The principles ofjudicial impartiality and independence mould subjective influences 
in the adjudicatory process. In the interests of fairness and justice, these principles are open 
to refutation, a recognition that the human aspect of the judicial function, if not channelled 
appropriately, threatens the truth- and fact-finding process. The d e s  of evidence have 
become increasingly responsive to the multi-cultural and diverse nature of o u  society, to the 
need to get at the truth through evidence that meets the tests of reliability and 
trustworthiness. Evidence duly adduced and admitted into the record-this is the guarantee 
of diversilied impartiaüty, this is the means of infonning the Bench of the cultural, racial and 
gender dimensions of crime. Al1 of these institutional and normative concerns are brought 
to bear in the criminai context, a detailed examination of which is the subject of the next 
chapter of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 
From S a d  Sta Mark to Feeney: 
FoiIowing the Ebb and Flow of Legd Libemlism in the Law of Homicide 
1. Criminai Liabiiity and its Pre-Charter Constitutional Context 
Parliament's definition of criminal activity and the Supreme Court's review of the 
adequacy and content of that definition in detennining criminal responsibility is at the 
forefiont of the Court's struggle to synchronize its tradition of deference to Parliament with 
its new mandate to measure Iegislation against Charter values. Over and above this 
potentiaily codrontational aspect of judicial review of legislation, the Court's adjudication 
of the constitutional validity of Criminal Code provisions, and its reformulation of comrnon 
law principles in the light of the Charter, have had an appreciable impact on the issue of 
criminal liability. 
The detennination of criminal responsibility is of fiindamental concem to any person 
who is or may be in conflict with the criminal law. More so for persons charged with 
homicide offences where the pend consequences upon conviction almost invariably involve 
a period of Ilicarcerati~n.~~ The Supreme Court of Canada, buttressed by the Charter's 
ovenvhelmingly liberal character as an individual ~ g h t s  document, has undertaken a 
reconsideration of the requisite mental elements of the homicide offences.fo5 most notably 
'"‘'Sec Isabel Grant, Dorothy Chunn and Christine Boyle, The L m  of Homicide 
(Ontario: Carswell, 1994) at 4-7 where they write: "The distinction between the three 
offences [murder, maoslaughter and infanticide] is very important because they are subject 
to vastiy different penalties." 
2051bid at 4-1 where the authors write: 
Section 222(4) provides that ail culpable homicides are murder, 
murder and manslaughter. Chief Justice Lamer's comments in the 1987 VailZancourt 
decision, concerning the offence of constructive murder, bear repeating: 
Prior to the enactment of the Chmter, Pmfiament hodfull legislative power 
with respect to the "The Criminal Law "(Constitution Act, 1867, S. 91 (2 7)), 
including the deteminution of the essential elements of uny @en crime. It 
codd prohibit any act and impose any pend consequences for infikgkg the 
prohibition, provided only that the prohibition served "a public purpose 
which can support it as k ing in relation to criminal law": Ref: re S. 5(a) of 
the Dairy Indm Act ... Once the legislation was found to have met this test, 
the courts had very litile power to review the substance of the legislation. For 
example, in R v. Sauit Ste. MMrr (City), ... Dichon J.  (ar he then war) held 
that, when an offence was criminal in the true seme, there was apresumption 
that the prosecution mustprove the mens rea. However, it was dways open 
to Parliament expressly to relieve the prosecution of its obligation to prove 
any part of the mens rea, as it is said to have done in S. 2 13 of the Criminal 
Code with respect to the foreseeability of the death of the victim. It is thus 
clear that. prior to the enactment of the Chmter, the validiv of S. 2213 could 
not have been successflly challenged '06 
Fmphasis added] 
The Chief Justice qualified his comments by stating: "However, federal and provincial 
legislatures have chosen to restrict through the Charter this power with respect to criminal 
manslaughter, or infanticide. ... The structure adopted in the Code presents 
difficulties. The foundation actus reus elements for al1 three homicide 
offences can be found in the underlying requirement that a death be caused, 
as well as in the list of ways of committing culpable homicide in subsection 
(5). n e  distinction among the crimes is primariiy based on the mental or 
fmlt elements required for each, rather than on the actus rem. Thus, the 
distinguishing fault elements for murder can be f o n d  in s.229, and the 
distinctive aspects of infanticide can be found in s.233. Manslaughter alone 
is left without any special section setting out its distinctive fadt features. 
They have to be found in the judicial interpretations of s.2U(S) and through 
a process of eliminating those culpable homicides which are murder or 
infanticide (s.234). 
[Ernphasis added] [Footnotes omitted] 
206Supra note 100 at 324. 
law ."2M 
These passages encapsulate the Charter's impact on the judicial consideration of 
criminal intent. Previously, the concept of parliamentary supremacy fostered a deferential 
attitude towards duly enacted legislation, even where an impugned provision, such as then 
s.213 of the Criminui Code,''' relieved the Crown of proving the mental elernent of the 
crime. Parliament was supreme within its jurisdiction as demarcated by  the Constitution Act, 
1867 and decisions rendered theremder. Federalism was the prirnary limitation on what 
Parliament could and could not do?' The Charter changed this, for the essential elements 
of dl offences now included 'hot only those set out by the legislature in the provision 
creating the offence but dso those requkd by S. 7 of the Charter.'"" Additionally, the 
Court became more activist in overhauling common law principles impacthg on the fault 
andysis and in interpreting duly enacted criminal legislation such that both the cornmon law 
and the statutory provisions as interpreted were consistent with Chmter values. 
'09See Provincial CourtJudges Case, supra ote 63 at 250 where Lamer C.J.C., in 
referring to Beauregad and recounting the sources of the judiciary 's independence, stated: 
The institutional independence of the courts emerges fiom the logic of 
federalism, which requires an impartiul urbiter to settle jwisdictional 
disputes between the fideral and provincial orders of government. 
Institutional independence also adheres in adjudication under the Chmter, 
because the rights protected by that document are rights against the state. As 
well, ... the preamble and the judicature provisions of the Constitution Act, 
1867, [are] additional sources of judicial independence. 
[Emphasis added] 
'O V~ilZancourt, supra note 1 O0 at 326. 
It is significant to note that the majority in Vaillancourt did not prioritize the dual 
impact of criminal legislation and the Charter on its deliberations. Indeed, it may be argued 
that the wording of the statutory provision and the relevant constitutional principle will 
assume different weight depending on the context of the case. In the articulation of the 
requisite mental element for murder, for instance, the Charter was a~cendant;~'' however, 
in upholding the murder classification provision of the Code, Parliament's exclusive 
jurisdiction in matters of criminal policy was the determinative factor.'12 But there were 
significant legal precedents pre-dating VailZancourt bearing on the criminal fault analysis 
that warrant discussion, particularly the pre-Charter case of R v. SauIt Ste. Mmie. 2" 
The 1978 judgmert in Sauli Ste. Marie set the stage for post-Charter developments 
in the law of murder. Dickson I. writing for a unanimous Court, including Chief Justice 
Laskin, canvassed the issue of mens rea relative to criminai and absolute liability offences214 
preparatory to introducing into Canadian law a third category of o f f e n c e d c t  liability 
offences-to which the defence of due diligence would apply. Justice Dickson (as he then 
was) stated: 
The doctrine of the guilty mind expressed in tenns of intention or 
*IISee Vaillancourt, supra note 100; Martineau, supra note 124; and Sir, in& note 
298. 
'12See Paré, supra note 1 14; Luxion, s u p  note 302; and Arkell, supra note 302. 
213Supru, note 103. In this case the city of Sault Ste. Marie had been charged with an 
absolute Iiability offence under Ontario pollution-control legislation. 
214"6[~]bsolute liability' entails conviction on proof merely that the defendant 
cornmitted the prohibited act constituting the achis reus of the offence.": Supra note 103 at 
40. 
recklessness, but not negligence, is at the fomdation of the law of crimes. In 
the case of tme crimes there is a presumprion that aperson should not be 
held liable for the wron&lness of his act ifthat act is without mens rea ...2's 
[Emphasis added] 
The mental element for a true criminal offence, thmefore, consisted not in negligence, but 
in the intentional or reckless commission of the impugned act coupled with knowledge of or 
wilfid blindness towards the facts constituting the offence? The Smlt Ste. Marie decision 
reflected the Court's abhorrence in convicting an accused who, although causally responsible 
for the offending conduct, might be 'hiorally innocent in every sense" given that his mental 
state had been immaterial to the issue of legal guiitt2" This decision was one of the 
highwater marks of the subjectivist approach to the issue of mens rea in Canadian criminal 
law." * Crimjnai guilt in the absence of moral turpitude was an abhorrent prospect given the 
punitive consequences following a conviction for murder. Proportiondity between legal 
g d t  and mord blameworthiness was deemed mandatory albeit in this pre-Charter context 
the principle of subjective fadt was not accorded constitutionai status. David Paciocco, in 
exploring the subjectivist tenor of the Sault Ste. Marie decision, explains the relationship 
between the requisite mental element of an offence and moral fadt: 
The paradigm criminal intends the consequences of his acts and knows the 
circumstances in which he is acting. "Recklessness" and 'kilful blindness" 
demand less, but they are still subjective States. A "reckless" actor does not 
215Supra note 103 at 34. 
218See David M. Paciocco "Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offences 
and Defences" (1995) 59 Sask. L. R. 271 at 274. 
intend the prohibited consequence but sees the risk that it will occur and 
unjustifiably goes ahead despite that risk. The subjective fadt emerges fiom 
the deliberate and knowing decision to take that nsk. An accused will be 
''wilfùlly blind" when that person "àeliberately choose[s] not to know 
sornethiag when given reason to believe inquiry is necessary". Not wanting 
to know the tnith, the accused chooses to remain in ignorance. Moral fadt 
emerges fiom the conscious decision not to confirm the existence of a fact 
that the accused knows is almost certain to exist, so that ignorance can be 
 lea ad?^ 
It appeared that absent a subjective mental state, be it "intent", ''wilful blindness", or 
bbrecklessness", presumptively, criminal liability couid not be established. Of necessity, the 
parameters of subjective and objective fauit for criminal offences "lies at the very heart of 
the debate about what we want criminal law to be?' In tuni, the demarcation of those 
parameters involves the interplay between Parliament, through its criminal legislation, and 
the Supreme Court of Canada through its decision-making in its constitutional, interpretative 
and cornmon law capacities. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in deciding Sa& Ste. Marie, was not operating under 
the auspices of the Charter when it introduced the defence of due diligence in respect of 
public welfare offences. It was not measufing statutory content a g a k t  constitutional values. 
Mead, the Court premised its decisioo on the basic principle that liability should not be 
divorced fkom the issue of fault?' The Court felt fiee to pursue its articulation of the strict 
liability category of offences because "a jural category of public welfare offences [was] the 
- 
*191bid 
nofiid at 272. 
*'Supra note 103 at 54. 
product of the judiciary and not of the legislat~re.''~ Deference to Parliament, therefore, 
was not an impediment to judicial activism in the area of judge-made law." 
Nine years later when the Supreme Court of Canada heard the Vaillancowt case, the 
legal lamiscape had changed immeasurably with the advent of constitutional supremacy as 
a w o r b g  premise for judicial decision-making. Distinctions between statutory and judge- 
made law no longer were a prerequisite to judicial consideration of the substantive nature of 
the disputed legislative provision. The Court reformulated common law d e s  deemed 
outdated in the post-Chmter context, and interpreted vaiid criminal legislation in keeping 
with the values and n o m  of a post-Chmter Canada. During and d e r  that nine-year interval, 
the Court continued to build upon its legal guilt-moral fault criteria for detennining the 
requisite mental elements of the homicide offences." An analysis of the case law decided 
between Sault Ste. Marie and Feeney " will reveal the impact of both constitutional 
supremacy and Parliamentary supremacy, as foundational constitutional principles, upon the 
"In the pst-Charter context see Swain. supra note 3 at 286 where Lamer C.J.C., 
speaking of the common law d e  permitting the Crown to raise evidence of the accused's 
insanity despite the accused's wishes to the con-, stated: "If a new common law nile 
could be enunciated ... 1 can see no conceptuai problem with the Court's sirnply enunciating 
such a d e  to take the place of the old d e  ... Given that the common law rule was fashioned 
by judges and not by Parliament or a Legislature, judicial deference to elected bodies is not 
an issue." 
U 4 ~ e e  Alan Mewitt and Morris Manning, Mewitt And Manning On Criminal Law, 3d 
ed. (Ontario: Buttemorths, 1994) at 58 where they *te: T h e  principle of fundamental 
justice propounded in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Refrence was that of the requirement of 
mens rea, of the need that criminal offences contain some mental element that ensures that 
the 'morally innocent' are not brought within its ambit." Footnotes omitted]. 
UI~nf ia  note 373. 
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Supreme Court of Canada's restnicturing of the homicide provisions and the determination 
of criminal liability thereunder. Undercurrents of liberalism and of due process and crime 
control values have greatly influenced the restruchiring process. 
II. Ancio, Logan and Hibberl: 
Attempted Murder-Principal and Party Liabiiity 
In the 1984 case of R v. ~ n c i o . ~ ~  the Supreme Court of Canada considered the 
requisite mental element for attempted murder. The specinc intent to kill was held by the 
Court to be the requisite mental element, proof of which could found a conviction. The 
following passage fiom Mchtyre J . 3  majority decisionm foreshadowed subsequent 
developments in the law governing the offence of m~rder:~' 
It was argued and it hm been suggested in some of the cases and 
academic writings on the question, that it is iilogical to insist upon a higher 
degree of mens rea for attempted murder, while accepting a lower degree 
amounting to reckiessness for murder. 1 see no ment in this argument. The 
intent to kill is the highest intent in rnurder and there is no reason in logic 
why an attempt to murder, aimed at the completion of the full crime of 
rnurder, should have any lesser intent. Ifhere is ony illogic in this matter, 
"6[1984] 1 S.C.R. 225, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 385,39 C.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter Ancio cited 
to C.R.]. The accwed had k e n  convicted of attempted murder through the combination of 
S. 24(l )-the bbAttempts" section-and S. 213(d) [subsequently S. 230 (d), repeaied , S.C. 199 1, 
c. 4, S. 11 of the Code, the constructive murder provision. 
ZZ'Laskin, C.J.C. took no part in this judgment. Both Justices Lamer and Dickson 
concurred in the majority decision. 
228See Don Stuart "Annotation" (1984) 39 C.R. (3d) 2 at 3 where, in reference to 
Justice McIntyre's remark concerning the illogic of characterizhg an unintentional kii1ing 
as murder, the author alludes to "[tlhis hint of an attack on the legitimacy of foms of murder 
short of intentional killing ..." 
if is in the statutory charucterizotion of unintentional killing as murder. zw 
[Emphasis added] 
Responding to the illogical statutory characterization, itself a product of Parliament, the 
Ancio case compeiled the seven-member majority to ove- its previous decision in Lajoie 
v. R" where the phrase "intent to commit an offence" under S. 24(1) of the Criminal Code 
231 was held to mean, in relation to the offence of murder, an intention to conunit that 
offence in any of the ways provided in the Code.*2 The Charter was stiil in its infmcy, but 
the Court was flexing its muscle in the post-Charter criminal law context albeit as an 
exercise in statutory interpretation. A subjectivist ideology compatible with liberaiism's 
emphasis on the autonomy and liberty of the individual began to emerge, facilitated, in part, 
229S~pra note 226 at 25. But see the pre-Charter case of Fmant,  supra note 102 
where Dickson J. for the majority (which included Mchtyre J.) held (at 291) that the court 
could not consider the policy of legislation validly enacted. In Farrant the Court upheld the 
accused's second degree murder conviction under the constructive murder provisions of the 
Criminal Code. 
='(1973), [1974] S.C.R. 399,20 C.R.N.S. 360, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 313. 
=' R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. This section retains the same numbering and content under 
the curent Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Section 24(1) states: 
Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do 
anything for the purpose of carrying out his intention is guilty of an attempt 
to commit the offience whether or not it was possible under the circumstances 
to commit the offence. 
"See Grant, Chunn and Boyle, supra note 204 at 4-34: 
Before the Supreme Court of Canada began to tinker with the 
Crimiml Code's murder provisions in 1987, S. 229 and S. 230 included a 
gradation of definitions of murder based largely on the level of mens rea 
involved fiom intentional, reckless, and negligent murder in S. 229 to 
constructive murder in S. 230, where there was no mental element required 
with respect to causing deatb. AU of these definitions constituted murder and 
were subject to the same penalty. 
by the Court's hcreasing detachment fiom a tradition of parliamentary deference in its 
adjudicative fhction. 
Six years later in R v. Logan, the Court constitutionalized the Ancio niling requking 
a specifk intent to kill as the requisite mens rea for attempted murder?' At issue was the 
constitutionality of S. 2 1(2) of the C'mina1 Code. That section states: 
Where h ~ o  r more persons fom an intention in common to carry out an 
unlawfid purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of hem, in 
carrying out the comrnon purpose, cormnits an offence, each of them who 
knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence wotdd be 
a probable consequence of carrying out the cornmon purpose is a party to that 
offence." 
Lamer C.J.C. subjected S. 21(2) to a s.7 anaiysis under the Chmter: ''If an offence is one of 
the few for which s.7 requires a minimum degree of mens rea, Vaillancourt dues preclude 
Parliament from providing for the conviction of a party to that offence on the basis of a 
degree of mens rea below the constitutionally-required He concluded: "Given 
that a minimum degree of mens rea (subjective foresight) is codtutionally required to 
convict a principal of the offence of attempted murder' the restriction of s.7 in this case is in 
U3[1990] 2 S.C.R. 73 1, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 391, 79 C.R. (3d) 169 at 177 [hereinafler 
Logan cited to C.R.]. The accused had been convicted of attempted murder through the 
operation of S. 21(2) of the Criminal Code. Lamer C.J.C. on behalf of the majority which 
included retiring Chief Justice Dickson stated (at 177): "Ancio, supra, established that a 
specific intent to kill is the mens rea required for a principal on the charge of attempted 
murder. However, as the constitutional question was not raised or argued in that case, it did 
not decide whether that requisite mens rea was a constitutional requirement. The case simply 
interpreted the offence as currently legislated." [Emphasis in original]. ui Logan, the Ancio 
ding,  which was restricted to principals, was extended to include non-principals. 
m ~ S . C .  1970, c. C-34, S. 2 1. The section maintains the same content and numbering 
under R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
Ussupra note 233 at 177. 
convicting, through the operation of S. 2 1(2), a non-principal who does not have that same 
degree of mens rea"u6 In the subsequent S. l analysis, the Court struck a balance between 
the legitimate legislative objective underiying s.2 1 (2), and the constitutional requirement for 
a minimum degree of mens rea before finding a non-p~cipai charged with attempted 
murder guilty of the offence through the operation of s.2 l(2): 
This differentid treatment of parties and principals charged with attempted 
murder is the restriction which must undergo the S. 1 test. 
h this case, the objective of such a differentiation is to deter joint 
criminal enterprises and to encourage persons who do participate to ensure 
that their accomplices do not commit offences beyond the planned unlawful 
purpose. This is a legislative objective of sufncient importance to justify 
ovemding the nghts of an accused under s.7 of the Charter?' 
[Emphasis in original] 
Although the Court dtimately determined that the legislative objective could not justify the 
objective portion of s.2 l(2) contained in the phrase "or ought to have k n o ~ n " , ~ '  it restricted 
its ruling to that small class of offences where "it is a constitutional requirement for a 
conviction that foresight of consequences be s~bject ive~ ' ,~~ such as murder, attempted 
murder, and theft. "Because of the importance of the Iegislative purpose, the objective 
=%ee Isabel Grant "Developments In Criminal Law: The 1993-94 Term" (1 995) 6 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 209 at 2 12 where the author, commenthg on Logan stated: "In the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the high point in terms of a cdpability analysis came in 1990 with R v. 
Logan, where the Court equated the stigma of attempted murder with that of murder, 
characterizing an attempted murderer as a 'lucky murderer'." Footnotes omitted]. The 
author explained (at 212) that a culpability analysis cYocuses on the mental state of the 
accused and on the blameworthiness we attach to that mental state". 
239~upra note 233 at 1 8 1. 
component of s.2 l(2) can be justified with respect to most [other] off en ce^."^^ The Supreme 
Court used the language of coIlSfitutional adjudicatiowot staMory interpretation-in 
rendering the objective portion of the impugned provision inoperative vis-a-vis those 
offences requiring subjective foresight of consequences. Logun is an illustration of the Court 
bdancing, quite effectively, the foundational principle of parliamentary primacy with that 
of constitutional nipremacy. 
Section 21 (2) again came before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. ~ i b b e r t . ~ ~ '  
In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "intention in common", Chief Justice Lamer for a 
unanimous Court stated: "[Wlhen Parliament drafts a statute in language that, on its face, 
supports more than one meaning, it is appropriate for a court to consider which of the 
alternative interpretations that are available best accords with Parliament's intention ... ,3242 
One of the guide's used by Lamer C.J.C. in detennining Parliament's intention was the 
common law governing party liabilit~?'~ Mer reviewing the relevant common law 
"1[1995] 2 S.C.R. 973,99 C.C.C. (3d) 193,40 C.R. (4th) 141 mereinder Hibbert 
cited to C.R.]. The accused had been charged with attempted murder through the operation 
of S. 21 (2) of the Code. The Crown alleged that he had been a party to the shooting of the 
victim, Cohen. At trial the accused was acquitted of the main charge, but convicted of the 
included offence of aggravated assault. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the accused's 
appeal fiom conviction. On M e r  appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the conviction 
was set aside and a new triai ordered. 
243hid at 160. Lamer C.J.C. stated: "Although S. 21 of the Code was intended to 
simpli@ the law governing parties by eliminating the old distinctions drawn at common law 
between principals in the first and second degree, accessories before and d e r  the facf etc., 
there is no indication, in the section or elsewhere, of any intention by Parliament to radically 
alter the basic principles of party liability, including its mental element." 
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authorities, he concluded : "These English cases reveal that the mens rea for party liability 
at common law is not of the sort that is capable of being 'negated' by duress. Put another 
way, it is not a precondition for party liability at common law that an accused actively desire 
that the underlying criminal offence be successfbliy completed."" Chief Justice Lamer 
applied this reasoning in determinhg the meaning of both S. 2 1 ( l )(b) and S. 2 1 (2).245 
Speaking speciiicaily of S. 21(2) he concluded: "Lnterpreting the expression 
'intention in common' as  connoting a mutuality of motives and desires between the party and 
the principal would restrict the scope of this section in a manner that is difEcult to just* on 
*'%id at 161. Emphasis in original. 
2451bid at 164- 167. See also Kenneth Campbell "Party Liability In Homicide Cases" 
in Frank Armstrong, ed., Crown's Newdetter, vol. 3, 50th Anniversary Issue (Ontario: 
Ontario Crown Attorneys' Association, 1996) 3 1 at 3 1-32. The author writes: 
In R. v. Hibbert, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the context of considering 
whether the defence of duress negated the mental element for "party" 
liability, considered the general mens rea requirements of S. 2 1 of the Code. 
In the course of his analysis of the provisions of S. 21, Larner C.J.C., on 
behaif of a unanimous Court, enunciated the following two important legal 
propositions: 
(1) The mental element for "aidiog", reflected in the phrase in S. 
21(1)@) of the Code, which bases criminal liability of an alleged "aider" on 
whether or not the act or omission was done 'Tor the purpose of aiding" 
another person to commit the offence, means only that the alleged "aider" 
must have "intende#' the act. It does not relate to the "desire" or ''ultimate 
object" of the accused in performing the act. 
(2)Sunilarly, the mental element in S. 21(2) of the Code, which 
requires that a number of persons form an "intention in common'' to carry out 
some unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein, means no more than 
that the two or more persons "must have in mihd the same unlawfui 
purpose." It does not require that the individuais share the same motives or 
subjective views with respect to the desirability of the c'uniawfÙl purpose". 
[Bold-face italics in original] Footnotes omitted] 
the basis of Parliamentary In reaching this conclusion, the comments of 
Martland J. in previous case law to the contrary were held not to reflect the law in Canada 
on the relation between duress and mens rea under S. 2 l(2) of the Code. 247 Of signifïcance 
to this paper, were the Supreme Court of Canada's efforts in Hibbert to conduct its exercise 
in statutory interpretation with due regard to Parliament's decision to broaden the reach of 
criminal culpability under the party-liability provisions of the C~de.~~%uentheticalIy, the 
Court qualïfied its deference to Parliament by noting that Parliament's ability to do so is 
limited by the restrictions imposed by the Charter? Logan was cited as a case in point.z0 
III. B.C. Motor Veliicle Act Reference, Vailiancourt, Par&, Mafiineau and Cooper: 
The Requisite Mentai Element for Murder 
The pre-Charter Suult Ste. Marie decision was revisited by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the 1984 case of Reference Re M. KA. (B.C.)?' At issue was the constitutionality 
of the absolute liability offence of dnving while prohibited contrary to provincial motor 
vehicle legislation. Speaking for the majority, which included Chief Justice Dickson, Lamer 
J. stated: 
2 4 S ~ a  note 241 at 166. 
"'fiid. at 166- 167. 
2481;bid at 165- 166. 
2491bid. at 165. 
Uolbid. at 165- 166. 
U'Supra note 107. 
Indeed, as 1 said, in pend law, absolute liabiliîy always offendr the 
principles offyndamenntol justice irrespective of the nature onhe offence; it 
offends s.7 of the Charter if, as a resdt, anyone is deprived of their life, 
liberty or security of the person, irrespective of the requirement of public 
interest. In such cases it rnight only be salvaged for reasons of public interest 
d e r  S. 1 .252 
[Emphasis added] 
The impugned provision was found to be inconsistent with the Chorrer. Professor Stuart 
noted that the case estabiished that "a due diligence defence was the minimum standard of 
fault required by the Charter for any type of offence threatening the liberty interest ..."ZS3 
Penneating the entire decision was the legal guiltfmoral fault dilemma evidenced by Lamer 
I's comment that "[ilt has from t h e  immernorial been part of our systern of laws that the 
innocent not be p~nished ."~  Challenges to the sufficiency of the fault standards for Criminal 
Code offences were imminent.u5 
According to the majority in Refereren Re M. KA. (B. C.), the administration of the 
justice system is "founded upon a belief in 'the dignity and woah of the human 
personY@reamble to the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C.. 1970, App. III) and on 'the d e  of 
z3Churter Justice, supra note 10 at 67. And see Rosemary Cairns Way "The 
Charter, The Supreme Court And The Invisible Politics of Fault" (1 992) 1 2 Windsor Y .B. 
Access Just. 128 at 134. 
WSupra note 1 O7 at 3 1 8. 
2SsSee Don Stuarî, Canadm Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) 
[hereinafter Canadian Criminal L m ]  at 1 82 where he writes: 
Once the Supreme Court decided in Motor Vehicle Act Reference that 
a due diligence defence was a minimum standard of fadt required by the 
Charter for any type of offence threatening the liberty interest, it was only a 
matter of time before the Supreme Court wouid have to decide whether that 
standard was sufficient for Criminal Code offences. 
Iaw' (preamble to the C d a n  Charter of Rights and F r e e d o ~ ~ l ~ ) . " ~  The phrase 'cprincpIes 
of fiindamental justice" was subjected to a purposive analysisZn and was held to be "a 
qualifier of the right not to be deprived of the ri@ to life, liberty and security of the 
As a quaiifîer, the phrase serves to establish the parameters of the interest but 
it cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to nustnite or stultifjr them. For the 
narrower the meuning given to "principies offindamental justice" the 
greater will be the possibility ?bar individids may be deprived of these most 
basic rights. ThThis latter resull is to be avoided m e n  that the rights involved 
are as fundamentai as those which pertain tu the life, liberty andsecurity of 
the person, the deprivation ofwhich 'haF the most severe consequences upon 
an individual" .. . z9 
pmphasis added] 
The individual-the darling of liberal ideology-had become the focus of S. 7 rights, and 'Wie 
task of the court [was] ... to secure for persons 'the full benefit of the Charter's 
protection'...'7260 In fulfilling its task, the Court refused to limit the scope of review under 
U6Supra note 1 07 at 309. See also Swain, supra note 3 at 280 where Lamer C. J.C., 
refers to, inter alia, Reference Re M. KA. (B. c) as iilustrative of the fact that the Supreme 
Court of Canada has "on numerous occasions, acknowledged that the basic principles 
underlying our legai system are built on respect for the autonomy and intrinsic value of al1 
individuais." 
U 7 ~ o r  a discussion of the purposive approach to C?zarter ùiterpretation see R v. Big 
M h g  M m ,  [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295,18 D.L.R. (4th) 321,18 C.C.C. (3d) 385 and Hunter v. 
Southam, supra note 105. 
?hipra note 1 O7 at 308. 
260fiid at 306. See aiso Eric Colvin, Principles of C r i m i d  Law, 2d ed. (Canada: 
Carswell, 199 1) at 1 8- 19. The author states (at18): 
"In Reference re S. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Supreme Court was 
faced with an issue about the relationship between punishment and 
culpability . . . . . 
98 
S. 7 to alleged procedural breaches, but widened that scope to include substantive ma- 
as well. Lamer J. found that substantive review of the content of legislation was not new 
to Canadian law.6' rather, the scope of constitutional adjudication, itself, had merely 
expanded beyond the histoncal distribution-of-powers analysis to encompass individual 
rights. However, Larner J. took great pains to demarcate judicial encroachment on 
Parliament's criminal law power under its expanded review jurisdiction: "In neither case, be 
it before or after the Charter, have the courts been enabled to decide upon the appropriateness 
of policies underlying legislative e ~ t m e n t s . " ~ ~ ~  
They [Refrence re 94(2) of the Motor Vehide Act, VailZancourt, and 
Marlineau] have, however, put into question much existing law on the scope 
and level of culpability for criminal offences. Legislative prescriptions 
respecting cuipability me no longer of paramount authority. ïkey are 
subject to judicial reviav in Iight of the constitutional requirement thot the 
principres offindamentaI justice be o b s e d  [Emphasis added] 
*%ipra note 107 at 303-304. 
262 IbM at 304. And see Patrick Monahan and Andrew Petter c'Developments In 
Constitutionai Law: The 1985-86 Tem" (1987) 9 S.C.L.R. 69 at 74-75. The authors Mite: 
"mhe Supreme Court itself has repeatedly acknowledged that its role under the Charter is 
a limited one. The Court believes that it is confined to applying the text of the Constitution 
objectively and is not permitted to assess the wisdom of legislation." M e r  a discussion 
(at75) of the underlying liberal tenet that "the state's power is uot absolute; individuals 
retain for themselves some residual elernents of their original liberty", the authoa conclude: 
"This is why Mr. Justice Lamer in the Motor Vehicle Reference was so quick to dismiss the 
argument that the courts have been asked to review the 'wisdom' of emctments According 
to Larner J., the Charter issue is not whether the legislative policy is desirable but rather 
whether the state possesses the power to interfixe with individual liberty, a Werent matter 
entirely ." 
The Supreme Court of Canada favoured a liberal approach to the Churter, with-as 
we shall seôconsequences for the law of homicide.263 As well, the Court continued to 
espouse its guardianship role while verbaiiy acknowledging the supremacy of Parliament in 
matters of criminal p o l i ~ y . ~ ~  However, the impending overhaul of homicide law under the 
auspices of S. 7 of the Charter catapulted the Court into a confiontational role with 
Parliament whatever its pronouncements or protestations to the ~ontrary.~~' 
263See John D. White "Annotation" (1 986) 48 C.R. (3d) 29 1 at 292 who &tes: 
"mhe h e  between the administration of legal n o m  and general political supervision by 
the courts has grown dimmer by this decision." 
2m'SUpa note 107 at 304-305 where Justice Lamer responded to the argument that 
expanding the scope of review under S. 7 wodd "inexorably lead the courts to 'question the 
wisdom of enactments', to adjudicate upon the merits of public policy", by reminding 
detractors "that the historie decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution was taken 
not by the courts but by the elected representativcs of the people of Canada." He added (at 
305): "It was those representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication and 
entnisted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility. Adjudication under the 
Charter must be approached fiee of any lingering doubts as to its legitimacy." 
265See, for example, R v. Jobidon [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714,7 C.R. (4th) 233,66 C.C.C. 
(3d) 454 [hereinafter Jobidon cited to C.R.] where, one year after the decision in Reference 
Re A4. KA. (B. C.), the common law defence of consent, under the umbrella of unlawful act 
manslaughter, came before the Supreme Court of Canada. The accused and the deceased 
were involved in a fight in the parking lot of a hotel. The deceased suffered severe trauma 
to the head and died as a result. The accused had been acquitted of the manslaughter charge 
at trial when the judge found that the defence of consent negated the underlying unlawful act 
of assault. The trial judge was overtumed on appeal and a guilty verdict on the charge of 
manslaughter entered. The Ontario Court of Appeai was upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Canada following its conclusion that the unlawfui act of assault, on the facts in Jobidon, was 
not subject to the defence of consent. 
Gorîthier J. for the majority &amer C.J.C. did not take part in this decision] identified 
(at 242) the main question to be decided as foilows: "The principal issue is whether absence 
of consent is a material element which m u t  be proved by the Crown in all  cases of assault, 
or whether there are common law limitations which restrict or negate the legal effectiveness 
of consent in certain types of cases." He held that the defence of consent to a charge of 
assault under S. 265 of the Criminai Code was subject to common law lirnits despite the 
unqualified statutory wording to the contrary. Section 265 (I)(a) states: "A person commits 
In the 1987 Vailluncourt decision, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the 
constitutionality of S. 2 1 3(d)266 of the Crimimi Code." The accused was convicted at trial 
of second degree murder. The culpable homicide had occurred during the armed robbery of 
a pool hall. To begin his d y s i s ,  Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, explicated the 
mental state to be proven under S. 21 3 (d), as weil as its nature and scope, by analyzing that 
provision in the context of the other murder sections? The requisite mentai element for 
an assault when without the consent of anotherperson, he applies force intentionaiiy to that 
other person, dîrectly or indirectly." [Ernphasis added]. in effect, a person cannot consent 
to bodily h m .  
Canadian Criminal Law, supra note 255 at 18 notes: "[Tlhe effect of the majority 
interpretation was to create a new crime ... and to read the words 'without the consent of 
another person' out of the assault definition in section 265 of the Cnminal Code." And see 
S.J.U@ch c6Ann~tationy' (1 992) 7 C.R (4th) 235 at 236: "Surely a construction that 
jenisons 'the plain words of S. 265' goes beyond interpretation." And see also Clayton C. 
Ruby and Suzanne Jarvie "Developrnents In Criminal Law And Procedure: From Seaboyer 
to Stinchcombe: A Review of the Major Decisions of the 1991-92 Temi" (1993) 4 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 379 at 396. 
266Section 2 1 3(d), repeaied by S .C. 1 99 1, c. 4, S. 1, stated: 
Culpable homicide is murder where a person causes the death of a human being while 
committing or attempting to commit high treason or treason or an offence mentioned in 
section 52 (sabotage), 76.1 (hijackhg an aircraft), 132 or subsection 13 3(l) or sections 134 
to 136 (escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody), 143 or 145 (rape or atternpt to 
commit rape), 149 or 156 (indecent assault), subsection 246(2) (resisting arrest), 247 
(kidnapping and forcible confinement), 302 (robbery), 306 (breaicing and entering) or 389 
or 390 (arson), whether or not the person means to cause death to any human being and 
whether or not he knows that death is likely to be caused to any human being, if 
.*. 
(d) he uses a weapon or has it upon his person 
(i) during or at the thne he commits or attempts to commit the offence; or 
(ii) during or at the tirne of his flight after cornmitting or attempting to commit a 
offence, 
and death ensues as a consequence. 
2 6 8 S ~ P r ~  note 100 at 3 18-320. 
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murder under the CFhimZ Code provisions ranged h m  subjective foresight of death on the 
part of the perpetrator to objective foreseeability or negligence? Lamer J. then turned to 
the Charter and isolated two principles of fiindamentai justice under S. 7 pertinent to his 
analysis. First, in keeping with the hdings in Sait Ste. Marie and Reference Re M KA. 
(B.C.), he found mens rea to be an essential elernent of any offence where the penalty, 
following conviction, constituted a restriction on the accused's liberty." "[Refeence Re 
M. KA. (B. thus elevated mens rea fiom a presumed element in Saulr Ste. Mmie, supra, 
to a constitutionality-required element.'"' However, those two cases left undecided the 
furthet question concerning what "level of mens rea was constitutionally required for each 
type of offence"." Vailancourt was the first opportunity the Court had to consider the 
secondary question of the level of mens rea constitutionaily required for the offence of 
murder. Thus begins the controversy over whether an offence calls for a constitutionally- 
mandated subjective or objective level of mental intent. 
To assist hixn in the determination of the requisite level of mens rea for murder, 
Justice Lamer introduced the concept of stigma into the Iegal guilthoral fault equation. 
26%~t see Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 103 at 40 where Dickson J. says that 
negligence has no place in the criminal Iaw. The issue of negligence and an objective 
standard of intent came before the court in the Creighron quartet, infi note 391. 
270Supra note 100 at 324. 
But, whatever the minimum mens rea for the act or the result may be, there 
are, though few in number, certain crimes where, because of the speciai 
nature of the stigma attached to a conviction therefor or the available 
penalties, the principles of fiindamental justice requUe 3 mens rea reflecting 
the particdar nature of that crime. Such is the& where, in my view, a 
conviction requires proof of some dishonest.. Murder is another such 
offence. The punishment for murder is the most severe in our society, and 
the stigma that attaches to a conviction for murder is similarly extreme. in 
addition, murder is distinguished fiom manslaughter only by the mental 
element with respect to the death. It is thus clear that there must be some 
special mental element with respect to the death before a culpable homicide 
can be treated as a murder. That special mental element gives rise to the 
moral blumavorthiness which justzFes the stigma and sentence uttached to 
a murder conviction " 
[Emphasis added] 
He concluded by hd ing  that "it is a principle of fundamentai justice that a conviction for 
murder cannot rest on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective 
Stigma, as an analytical comtruct in defking the collstitutionally-required fadt 
element for criminal offences, was linked by Justice Lamer to both social opprobrium and 
pend conseq~ences .~~~ In effect, the moral fadt of the accused should justify both the 
penalty and the stigrna consequent upon conviction.276 Stigma as social opprobrium is a 
'"Sec Alan Brudner "Proportionality. Stigma and Discretion" (1 996 ) 38 C.L.Q. 302 
at 303-304. See also OM CrimiMI L m ,  supra note 95 at 22 where the commissioners, 
under the caption "The Meaning of Guilt" stated: "Real crimes consist of seriously won@ 
acts, and anyone sent to prison or otherwise punished for a real crime is being stigmatized 
[emphasis added] for wrongdoing. Justice, therefore, demands that he should have meunt 
to do the act forbidden ..." [Emphasis in the original]. 
problematic concept given that there is no criminal fault-public opprobrium scale matching 
the two in a principled way for the purposes of sentencing where ciifferences in moral fault 
potentially could be compensated? Further, in the absence of this criminal fault-social 
opprobrium scale, it wouid be left to the appellate courts, in the interests of justice and 
faïmess, to fetîer judicial sentencing discretion by setting up a hierarchy of offences 
prioritized according to their level of fault. In effect, the courts would be c'ususurping the 
constitutional fiinction of Parliament to enact criminal l a ~ s . " ~ ~  Again, the Supreme Court 
of Canada appears to be walking a fine line between its own jurisdiction and that of 
Parliament, a line that must be respected if the two branches of government are to CO-exist 
effectively ? 
2"fiid at 306-308. See also Don Stuart "Continuhg hconsistency But Also Now 
insensitivity That Won't Work" (1 993) 23 C.R. (4th) 240 at 245 where the author, referring 
to the Creighton decision, writes: 
The court seems to require that the ciifference between deliberate and 
negligent conduct be addressed in sentencing. This suggests, for example, 
that Parliament's new scheme for sexual assadt, which pedizes in the same 
prohibition but subject to a flexible penalty, one who is deliberately aware of 
a risk of nonconsent and one who did not take reasonable steps to ascertain 
whether there was consent, will survive Charter scrutiny. However, if the 
Supreme Court is consistent, it will insist that upon conviction a deliberate 
accused rnust receive a higher sentence than one who acted without taking 
reasonable steps. Even ifthis is the outcorne of Charter challenges to the 
substantive semal assault r e fom,  there wiii still be much to be said on the 
busis of fair Iabelling and jusrice and also for eme of administration, for 
separate c@kencs with separate penalties. This is now the case with murder 
and maoslaughter, and intentional and negligent arson. 
[Emphasis added] Footnotes omitted] 
278~rudner, supra note 275 at 303. 
27% Logan, supra note 233 at 178-179, Lamer C.J.C. again considered the stigma 
criterion. He stated (at 178): 
It should be noted that, as a basis for a constitutionally-required minimum 
Stigma as a reflection of blame, on the other han& would "require that the accused 
exhibit the level of blameworthiness that defines the criminal category under which he is 
subsumeci ...'"m DEerences in relative levels of fault would be refiected linguisticaily in 
such terms as murderer, manslayer, thief, rapist, and so The "stigma-as-blame 
version of the proportionality principle in relation to ~tigma"~* offers, through the principle 
of imputability, a more just interpretation of the stigma criterion: 
The blameworthiness that incurs stigma in the notional sense is not 
simply a characteristic of an act, outcome, or mental disposition that public 
opinion happens to blame. Rather, it is detennined independently of 
empirical opinion both by the importance to h m  well-king of the interest 
harmed by the wrongdoer and by the degree to which the harm is imputable 
to his agency as distinct fiom chance. Whatever public opinion might be, the 
negligent actor is less blameworthy for an uniawfùl outcome than someone 
who produces the same outcome intentionally, for the outcome belongs less 
to the former's agency than it does to the latter's. . .. In assessing someone's 
blameworihiness for a deed or outcome, the crimllial law focuses narrowly 
on the degree to which the deed and its consequences are imputable to his 
moral agency so as to render him legally answerable for them. An outcome 
negligently caused, however, is comected to agency more loosely than one 
intentionaily produced, for in that outcome we see not only a refiection of the 
degree of mens rea, the social stigma associated with a conviction is the most 
important consideration, not the sentence. ... The sentencing range available 
to the judge is not conclusive of the level of mens rea coI1Sfitutionally 
required. Instead, the crucial consideration is whether there is a continuing 
senous bocial stigma which will be imposed on the accused upon conviction. 
This passage does not clarifL the use of the term "stigrna", for continuing social stigrna can 
be ascribed both to the moral blameworthiness of the offender as well as societal repugnaace 
for the act. However, based on the majonty reasons of Lamer C.J.C. in Mmtineau, social 
stigma as a determinative factor in the criminal fault analysis, attaches more to moral 
blameworthiness than to social opprobrium. 
2%rudner, supra note 275 at 305. 
agent's prnposes but also the effect of independent causes, whereas in the 
outcome intentionally pmduced we see only the agent? 
Wphasis in original] 
Crimes undifferentatecl as to fault, therefore, offend the principle enunciated in SmZt Ste. 
Mmie that " [i]n the case of tnie criminal crimes ... a person should not be held iiable for the 
wrongfulness of his act if that act is without mens rea 
The reasons for decision of Justice Lamer (as he then was) in VaiZlancourt support 
the argument that proportionality between stigma and moral blame is the determinative 
element infonaing the content of the mental element of a crime. His analysis of the murder 
provisions of the Criminal Code,2" beginning with S. 212(a)(i)2" [now S. 229(a)(i)], 
focussed on the relative degrees of moral fault distinguishing each provision He observed 
that then S. 2 12(a)(i) defined culpable homicide as murder where the accused both caused, 
and meant to cause, the other peaon's death. "This is the most morally blameworthy state 
of mind in our ~ystern."~" Under S. 2 1 2(a)(ii)2" [now S. 229(a)(ii)] there was a "slight 
284S~pru note I O3 at 34. 
286Section 2 1 2 (a)(i) stated: 
Culpable homicide is murder 
(a) where the person who causes the death of a human being 
(i) means to cause his death ... 
2mS~pra note 1 00 at 3 1 9. 
"'section 2 1 2 (a)(i) stated: 
Culpable homicide is murder 
(a) Where the person who causes the death of a human king 
relaxation" of the subjective foresight of death mandated as the requisite mental element for 
murder in the previous section." To be guilty of murder under then S. 2 12(a)(ii) the accused 
need only intend to cause bodily harrn to the other person albeit he must subjectively have 
foreseen the likelihood of death arising from bis actions. Subjective foreseeability, however, 
proven on the standard of reckles~ness.~~~ Section 2 l 2 ( ~ ) ~ ~ '  [now S. 229(c)] imported both 
a subjective and an objective element. Culpable homicide under this section was deemed to 
be murder where, fkom a subjective perspective, the accused, for an unlawfid object, "does 
anyrhng ... he h o w s  ... is likely to cause death''2n, or, fiom an objective perspective, "does 
anything that he ... ought to h o w  is likely to cause death"F3 and thereby causes death to 
a human being. The accused's desire to carry out the unlawful object without causing death 
or bodily harm to the victim was irrelevant to the i n q ~ i r y . ~ ~ ~  The objective component of S. 
2 12(c) "eliminate[d] the requirement of actual subjective foresight and replace[d] it with 
(ii) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, and 
is reckless whether death ensues of not; ... 
2mSupra note 100 at 3 19. 
2g'Section 2 12(c) stated: 
Culpable homicide is murder 
m. 
(c) where a person, for an unlawfûl object, does anything that he knows or ought to 
know is Likely to cause death, and thereby causes death to a human being, notwithstailding 
that he desires his object without causing death or bodily harm to any human being. 
2*Supra note 1 O0 at 3 19. Emphasis in original. 
2931bid Emphasis in original. 
objective foreseeability or negligen~e."~~ The final section analyzed was S. 2 13* [now S. 
2301, the felony murder or constructive murder provision of the Code. 
Under this provision, it is murder if the accused c a w s  the victim's death 
while committing or atternpting to commit one of the enumerated offences 
if he perfonns one of the acts in subss. (a) to (d). Proof that the accused 
perfrmed one of the acts in subss. (a) to (4 is substituted for proof of any 
subjective foresight, or even objective foreseeability. of the Iikelihood of 
de&. 297 
[Emphasis added ] 
296The content of S. 2 13 was as follows: 
Culpable homicide is murder where a person causes the death of a hurnan being while 
committing or attempting to commit high treason or treason or an offence mentioned in 
section 52 (sabotage), 76.1 (hijacking an aircraft), 1 32 or subsection 133(l) or sections 134 
to 136 (escape or rescue fiom prison or lawful custody), 143 or 145 (rape or attempt to 
commit rape), 149 or 156 (indecent assault), subsection 246(2) (resisting arrest), 247 
(kidnapping and forcible confinement), 302 (robbery), 306 (breaking and entering) or 389 
or 390 (arson), whether or not the person means to cause death to any human being and 
whether or not he knows that death is likely to be caused to any human being, if 
(a) he means to cause bodily harm for the purpose of 
(i) facilitating the commission of the offence; or 
(ii) facilitating his flight after c o d t t i n g  or attempting to commit the offence, 
and death e m e s  fiom the bodily harm; 
(b) he administers a stupefling or overpowering thing for a purpose mentioned in 
paragraph (a), and death ensues therefiom; 
(c) he wilfidly stops, by any means, the breath of a hurnan being for a purpose 
mentioned in paragmph (a), and death ensues therefiom; or 
(d) he uses a weapon or has it upon his person 
(i) during or at the time he cornmits or attempts to commit the offence; or 
(ü) during or at the time of his flight after committing or attempting to commit 
a offence, 
and death ensues as a consequence. 
297Supra note 100 at 320. 
Justice Lamer fiather noted that S. 2 l(2) of the Code, which provided for cTiminal liability 
on a party basis, was "a f i d e r  relaxation of the mentai state" for murder."' On the 
question of proving an essential element of an offence, such as mens m, by proof of a 
substituted element, Lamer J. held that Parliament's constitutional authority to do so was 
restricted: "If the trier of fact may have a reasonable doubt as to the essential element 
notwithstanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the substituted element, then the 
substitution infinnges ss. 7 and 1 ~(d) ." '~~  Since the constructive murder provision could not 
pass the "substitution" standard, it was struck down. 
The majority in Vaillancouri, through Justice Lamer, made a mastefi  attempt at 
articulating its position on the offence of constructive murder without offending notions of 
legislative supremacy on mattes relating to public policy. However, it was not unanimous. 
Justice McIntyre's dissent sounded a warning peal for the increasingly activist Court: 
It must be recognized at the outset that Parliament has decided that the 
possession and use of weapons, particdarly firearms, in the course of the 
commission of offences is a gravely aggravahg factor. Experience has 
show that the presence of fïrearms leads to personal injury and loss of Me. 
Parliament has chosen to term a killing arising in the circurnstances described 
here as "murder". ... 
.,.. 
As hm been note4 the appellunt's conviction is based on a 
combination of S. 2u2) and S. 213(d) of the Criminal Code. There was in this 
case evidence of active participation in the commission of the robbery, the 
underlying offence, and the tems of S. 21(2) were fully met. Zt must be 
accepted thut the section @es expression to a principle ofjoint criminal 
liabiiity long accepted and appZied in the criminal law. I am unable fo say 
2981bid The issue of party iiability was considered by the Court in Logan, supra note 
233 andR v.Sit, [1991] 3 S.C.R 124,66C.C.C. (3d)449. 
299~upr~ note 1 O0 at 327. 
upon what b& one could exempt conduet which attracts criminal liabiiity, 
under S. 213 of the Criminai Code.fiom the appiicution of thatprinciple. '00 
Fmphasis added] 
McIntyre J. concluded: "ln my view, Martin J.A. [in R v. Mmroe] has stated the policy 
considerations which have motivated Parliament in this connection, and 1 would not interfere 
with the Parliamentary decision?" The majonty and dissenting decisions highlight the 
potentid ambiguity in distinguishing judicial decisions impacting on matters of legislative 
policy and those articdated w i t b  the boundaries of the Court's constitutionai adjudicatory 
The VailZancourt decision appears to have favoured a subjectivist approach to the 
homicide-related provisions. Yet, two weeks prior to that case, the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the ~ar8" case saw no incongmity in validating the murder classification provisiod03 
which mirrored the soon to be struck-dom constructive murder section of the Criminal 
Code. For purposes of classifying the substantive offence of murder, no fault element was 
''*Supra note 1 14. The constitutionality of the murder classification provision of the 
Criminal Code was upheld in the post-Charter cases of R v. Luxton, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 71 1, 
58 C.C.C. (3d) 449,79 C.R. (3d) 193 and R. v. Arkeil, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695,59 C.C.C. (3d) 
65,79 C.R (3d) 207 (S.C.C.). In Canadimi Criminal Law, supra note 255 at 1 86, Stuart 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Pare decision and the subsequent survival of the impugned 
section under Charter scrutiny. Concerning Justice Wilson's contention in Paré that the 
organizing principle of then S. 2 M(5) was the unlawfid domination of the victim, he wrote: 
"How c m  it possibly be said that the list of murders under section 23 1 [previously S. 2 14(5)] 
includes al1 murders involving udawfùl domination over the person? Doesn't any murder 
involve such domination? ... The ckissification was and is irrational and should have been 
declared unconstitutional." [Footnotes omitted]. 
required? Murder committed in the commission of one of the enumerated offences under 
then S. 2 l4(S)in the Paré case, indecent assadt-was classified as first degree murder. 
Wilson J., for a unanimous Bench which included Chief Justice Dickson, observed that the 
enumerated offences involved "the unlawful domination of people by other people."3o5 Here, 
a harm analysis focussing on the consequences of crime tnunped the doctrine of strict 
construction of pend statutes which required an interpretation most favourable to the 
accused. The most favourable interpretation, from an accused's perspective, of the phrase 
'While committing" in S. 2 14(5) [now S. 23 l(5) ] would require contemporaneity between the 
murder and the enumerated underlying offence. Wilson J. rejected this argument in favour 
of a "continuing transaction" approach. 
This approach, it seems to me, best expresses the policy 
considerations that underlie the provision. Section 214, as we have seen, 
classifies murder as either first or second degree murder. Al1 murders are 
senous crimes. Some murders, however, are so threatening to the public that 
Parliament has chosen to impose exceptional penalties on the perpetrators. 
One such class of murders is that found in S. 214(5), murders done while 
committing a hijacking, a kidnapping and forcible confinement, a rape, or an 
indecent a s ~ a u l t . ~ ~  
M e r  rejecting the Law Reform Commission of Canada's criticisrn of a lack of organizing 
3w See Don Shiart "Annotation" (1987) 60 C.R (3d) 346 at 347 where he States: 'Tt 
is curious that a Supreme Court which has, both before and after the enactment of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, striven to assert subjective mens rea as the fault 
requirement for serious offences, ... has chosen to ignore it in deciding whether a particular 
murder falls within the most serious penalty category of nrst degree murder." 
305Supra note 1 14 at 370. 
principle to S. 21 4(5), she stated: 
The offences Listed in S. 214(5) are ail offences involving the unlawful 
domination of people by other people. 'Ihus an organizing principIe for S. 
2 M(S) can be found. This principle is thaî, where a murder is committed by 
someone already abusing his power by iIlegaily dominating another, the 
murder shouid be treated as an exceptionally serious crime. Parliament has 
chosen to treat these murders as murders in thefirsl degree. 
Refining, then, the concept of the "single transaction" referred to by 
Martin LA. in Stevens, supra, it is the continuhg iilegal domination of the 
victirn which gives continuity to the sequence of events cirlminating in the 
murder. The murder represents an exploitation of the position of power 
created by the underlying crime and makes the entire course of conduct a 
"single transaction". This approach, in my view, best @es effect to the 
philosophy underlying S. 214(5) . '07 
Fmphasis added] 
Both Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Larner sat on the Paré bench. Their approach to the 
issue of classifying murder for the piirposes of sentencing is intelligible from a criminal 
liability perspective: the substantive offence of murder already would have been proven in 
keeping with subjectivist prin~iples.'~~ Sentencing foilows conviction-legal guilt 
cornmensurate with moral fault already has been established thereby preserving a 
proportionality between stigma and blarne. The policy considerations expressed by 
Parliament, relative to the constructive murder sections, are deferred to the sentencing stage 
after legal guilt has been established?' 
'"Sec Canadian Criminal L m ,  supra note 255 at 186 where Stuart writes: 
"According to the Court [in Parel, the relationship between the sentence classification and 
the moral blamewoahiness of the offender clearly existed. The section ody  came into play 
where murder had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
'*Sec also R v. Hmbottle, 119931 3 S.C.R. 306,84 C.C.C. (3d) 1,24 C.R. (4th) 137 
where the phrase %ben death is caused by that person" in S. 2 14(5) [now S. 23 1(5)] was 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada. Cory J. for a unanimous Court which included 
112 
The murder classification provisions under S. 214 [now S. 23 11 simpiy retain the 
constructive murder principle deemed unconstitutional in Vai l lanco~ under a fault anal y sis. 
The decision also reflects a crime control perspective in that murderers who commit the 
crime while committïng one of the enumerated offences, WU be stigmatized as first-degree 
murderers. Nor is there anything to prevent Parliament from broadening the list in now S. 
23 l(5) given that the section's judicial interpretation reflects not only victim interests, but 
also a reliance on Parliamentary policy to treat murderers who abuse their power over others 
as f k t  degree murderers. One might speculate that the Supreme Court of Canada, 
anticipating its decision in Vaillancourt, delivered a judgment suitably deferential to 
Parliament's exclusive criminai poiicy jurisdiction. 
Chief Justice Lamer observed (at 148) that the issue before the Court was one of causation. 
In determining (at 149) that the test for causation under the section must be a strict one, he 
linked his analysis to the issue of moral blameworthiness: 
At the outset, it is important to remernber that when S. 2 14(5) cornes 
into play it is in essence a sentencing provision. First degree murder is an 
aggravated form of murder and not a distinctive substantive offence. ... It is 
only to be considered Mer the jury has concluded that the accused is guilty 
of murder by causing the death of the victim. An accused found guilty of 
second degree murder will receive a mandatory life sentence. What the jury 
must then determine is whether such aggravating circumstances exist that 
they just@ ineligibility for parole for a quarfer of a century. It is at this point 
that the requirement of causation set out in S. 214(5) comes into play. The 
gravity of the crime and the severity of the sentence both indicate that a 
substmtial and high degree of blamewoahiness, above and beyond that for 
murder, must be established in order to convict an accused of first degree 
murder." 
[Emphasis in original] 
See also Allan Manson "Rethinking Causation: The Implications of Harbottle" (1994) 24 
CR (4th) 153 at 155. 
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The substantive content of S. 2 13 [now S. 2301, the constructive murder provision 
of the Crimincd Codep3Io was re-visited in ~mtineau."' Between the tïme of hearing and 
the time of judgment, Justice Lamer had succeeded Justice Dickson as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of C m &  although Dickson J. participated in the decision. A h m  analysis 
focussing on the consequences of the crimllial act was not central to the majority decision 
delivered by Lamer C.J.C. who began his reasons for judgment as  follows: ''The facts of this 
case are not central to the disposition of this appeal, and therefore, may be briefly 
surnmarized as foll~ws.'"'~ In tmth, the facts were quite brutal as explicitly related in 
L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s dissenting reasons where victim interests figured prominently in the 
requisite-fault for murder analysis. Specifically, she situated her dissenting reasons in the 
context ofhomicide ~ ta t i s t i cs~ '~  the corresponding duty of Parliament to respond to "a matter 
of cntical public ~oncern"~" and the Court's ill-advised usurping of Parliament's role in 
protecting the citizenry through the manipulation of legi~lation."~ 'T'he criminal Iaw must 
31'Supra note 124. The accused in this case, dong with another person, broke into 
a trailer, tied up the two occupants, robbed them and their home, and then the accused's 
niend shot the two homeowners. The accused was convicted of second degree murder. The 
Crown's appeal fiom a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal ordering a new trial was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
reconcile two 'competing claims' as well. Social protection must be measured against justice 
to the individual a~cused.""~ 
Striking down the legislation simply because sorne other scheme may 
be preferable would be an unwarranted intrusion into Parliament's 
prerogative, and would undermine the means it has chosen to protect its 
citizenry. The Churter is not designed to aliow this court to substitzite 
preferuble provisions for those already in place in the absence of a clecir 
constitutionai violation Such a task shodd be reserved for the Law Refonn 
Commission or other advisory bodies. This court's province is to pronounce 
upon the constitutionality of those provisions properiy before it. The Charter 
does not infilre the courts with the power to declme legisiation tu be of no 
force or effecr on the b a i s  that they believe the statute to be undesirable as 
a matter of criminul lm policy. For the aforementioned reasons, I do not 
believe that S. 213(a) offends the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedorndl7 
[Emphasis added] 
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé thus relied on "significant policy consideration in favour of 
upholding the existhg Iegi~Iation"~~~ even though in Refirence Re M. KA. (B. C.) the Court 
held that policy considerations were best lefi to arguments of justification under S. 1 .3'9 
319~wra note 1 O7 at 32 1. Chief Justice Lamer, discussing the idea of the ''public 
interest", stated: 
m f the public interest is there referred to ... as a possible justification under 
S. 1 of a limitation to the rights protected at S. 7, then 1 do agree. 
Indeed, as 1 said, in pend law, absolute Iiability always offends the 
principles of hdamentd justice irrespective of the nature of the offence; it 
offends S. 7 of the Charter if, as a r e d t ,  anyone is deprived of their Me, 
liberty or security of the person, irrespective of the requirement of public 
interest. In such cases it might oniy be sulvuged for reusons ofpublic interest 
under S. I .  
Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority, undertook an abstract legal analysis retuming 
again to the concept of stigma, and the proportionality between stigma, punishment and 
moral blameworthiness, as a means of constitutionality-mandathg a subjective standard of 
fault for murder, namely: subjective foreseeability of death. 
The effect of S. 213 is to violate the principle that punishment must be 
proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender, or as Professor 
Hart puts it in Punishrnent and Responsibility (1968), at p. 162, the 
f'undsimental principle of a morally based system of law that those causing 
harm intentiody be punished more severely than those causing harm 
unintentionally . ... In my view, in crfiee and democratic society that values 
the autonomy andfiee wiZ2 of the individual, the stigma and punishment 
attaching to the most serious of crimes, murder, should be reserved for those 
who choose to intentionalij cause death or who choose to inflict bodily h m  
that they know is likely to cause death. The essential role of requiring 
subjective foresight of death in the context of murder is tu maintain the 
proportionaiity beîween the stigma and punishment attached to a murder 
conviction and the moral bZameworlhiness of the offender. Murder hm long 
been recognized as the "worst " und most heinous ofpeace tirne crimes. It 
is, therefore, essentid that to satisfj. the principles offindamenta2 justice, the 
stigma andpunishrnent atrachingto a murder conviction rnwt be reservedfor 
those who either intend to cause death or who intend to cause bodiiy hmm 
thal they know wiil likzly cause deatJiZO 
[Emphasis added] 
The liberal emphasis on individual autonomy and liberty as against the State was the context 
for Lamer C.J.C.'s analysis; the repercussions associated with the exercise of free wil1 had 
been secondary to maintaining the proportionality between stigma, punishment and moral 
blameworthiness?' L'Heureux-Dubé J. rejected the paramountcy of stigma as an analytical 
320Supra note 124 at 138- 139. 
32'See also Sit, supra note 298. Lamer CJ.C , again delivering the judgment of the 
Court, confhed  (at 452) the ratio in Mmtineau "that proof of subjective foresight of death 
is necessary in order to mstain a conviction for murder ..." He also confirmed (at 452) the 
ratio in Logan requiring the same minimum degree of mens rea for a conviction under the 
party section of the Criminal Code if that minimum degree is requ&ed before the principal 
too13? chwsing instead to focus on the question of choice and the concomitant responsibility 
that follows upon the accused's exercise of his or her free will: 
Section 213(a) deals with one who has already proven to be a "hijackei', a 
"kidnapper", a 'kapist", or an "arsonist". Furthexmore, this person has 
already proven willing to cause bodily harm to commit the offence or to 
enable himself to escape after having cornmitted the offence. In these 
ciramstances, if is certainl'y appropriate for Parliament to put this person 
on notice, thut ij'these purposeful acts result in de& you will be charged as 
a "murderer " as well. 323 
[Emphasis added] 
Both approaches refiect libeml influences, but the ciifferhg emphases account for the 
disparate r ed t .  Thus the controversy between Chief Justice Lamer and L'Heureux-Dube in 
Martineau typifies subsequent decisions in the law of homicide. 
Section 212(a)(ii)324 [now S. 229 (a)(ii)] of the Criminal Code was subjected to 
statutory analysis in R. v. C o o p e ~ . ' ~  
c m  be convicted of the main offence, 
And see Grant, supra note 238 
The requisite intent necessary to found a murder 
at 21 2 where the author, reviewing the 1993-1994 
term, States: ''In the Supreme Court of Canada, the hi& point in tenns of a culpability 
analysis came in 1990 with R v. Logan, where the Court equated the stigma of attempted 
murder with that of murder, characterizing an attempted murderer as  a 'lucky murderer'. ... 
This terni's decisions [including the Creighion quartet] reflect a greater emphasis on the need 
to punish the causing of hannful consequences and show a move away fiom pinciples of 
subjective fault. ... mhere is a clear rnove away fiom subjective culpability." Footnotes 
omitted]. 
'%upra note 124 at 163. 
324Supra note 
325[1993] 1S.C.R 146,18 C.R (4th) 1,78 C.C.C. (3d) 289 [hereinafter Cooper cited 
to C.R.]. The accused in Cooper was charged with the first-degree murder of a former 
girlfriend by strangulation. He maintained that he blacked-out after grabbing the girl by the 
neck, then awoke to find her dead beside hirn in the back seat. The accused then pushed the 
conviction under the impugned section was at issue. Cory J. delivered the rnajority decision 
and held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that there were two dimensions to the intent 
component of S. 2 1 2(a)(ii): 
The intent that must be demonstrated in order to convict under S. 
212(a)(ii) has two aspects. There must be (a) subjective intent to cause 
bodily h m ;  (b) subjective knowledge that the bodily harm is of such a 
nature that it is likely to resdt in death. It is only when those two elements 
of intent are established that a conviction can properly f o l l o ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Lamer C.J.C., Sitting in lone dissent, agreed. The majonty and dissenting opinions diverge 
on the question of when the subjective intent to cause bodily harm coincides with the 
subjective knowledge that the bodily hann is likely to cause death." Lamer C.J.C. stated: 
Cooper intended to choke the deceased and cause her bodily h m .  
Under S. 212(a)(i), it was open to the jury to infer fiom his conduct and on al1 
of the evidence that in doing so he intended to kill her. To be found guilty 
under S. 212(a)(ii), however, he must have k e n  aware of the fact that he 
penisted in choking her long enough for it to become likely that death would 
e n s ~ e . ~ ~ *  
deceased's body out of the vehicle and &ove away. 
327~his is referred to as the simultaneous principle. In Canadian Criminal L m ,  
supra note 255 at 327, Stuart introduces the principle and writes: "It is well established that 
the act and mens rea must occur at the same time (be concurrent, be contemporaneous). ... 
The essence of the justification for the simdtaneous principle is one of the need to use the 
criminal law sanction fairly and with restraint." However, Stuart observes (at 329) that the 
generd principle is not inflexible: "Courts have recognized techniques or exceptions to 
avoid the full rigour of the principle." One such technique, as illustrated by the Cooper 
decision, is superposing intent on an act. "In Cooper ... Cory J. for the Supreme Court 
adopted the Fagun approach and M e r  held that it was not always necessary for the 
requisite mens rea to conthe  throughout the commission of the wrongful act. ... It was 
suficient tbat the intent and act of strangulation coincided at some poinf and it was not 
necessary that the intent continue throughout the entire two minutes." 
328Supra note 325 at 16. 
It appears as if the accused couid have been convicted of an intentional killing under S. 
2 12(a)(i) but th&, absent awareness of the continuing act of choking, he may have had no 
more than subjective foresight of bodily hami under S. 2 12(a)(ii)! Since awareness of the 
ongoing conduct leading to foresight of bodily h m  is a pre-requisite to the foresight of the 
Iikelihood of death, Lamer C.J.C. held that the jury aiso ought to have been instnicted to 
consider the impact of evidence of cirunkenness upon the accused's awareness in the 
cucumstances of the Cooper case?2g Lamer C.J.C.3 dissenting reasons in Cooper highlight 
his ongoing cornmitment to a culpability analysis of the law of homicide be it in the context 
of statutory hterpretation or constitutional anaiysis. 
IV. Hill and Luvaffee: 
Criminal Defences and The Objective Standard 
The liberal subjective approach influencing the detennination of criminal fault also 
impacted upon the Supreme Court of Canada's statutory interpretation of the reasonable 
person standard in the defence of provocation. In R v. Hill " the Court considered the 
ordinary penon test in S. 21 5 [now S. 2321 of the Crimiml code.')' That test injects an 
objective standard into the three-part test for prov~cation,~" a standard "clearly envisaged 
"0[1986] 1 S.C.R. 313,25 C.C.C. (3d) 322,51 C.R. (3d) 97 bereinafter Hill cited 
to C.R.]. 
332Supra note 330 at 108. The objective test is the threshold test directed to the 
question of whether or not an ordinary person would be deprived of the power of self-control 
because of the provoking act or insult. Then, the trier of fact must consider if the accused 
by the Criminal Code as a harsh first hurdle,"" a standard deemed necessary by Parliament 
in the exercise of its responsibility for the criminal law. Dickson C.I.C., delivering the 
majority judgment, stated: "It is society ' s concern that reasonable and non-violent behaviour 
be encouraged that prompts the law to endorse the objective standard. The criminal law is 
concemed, among other things, with fixing standards of human beha~iour."~~~ From this 
perspective, he articuiated the content of the ordinary person standard for the purposes of the 
provocation defence: 
1 think it is clear that there is widespread agreement that the ordinary or 
reasonable person has a nomal temperament and level of ~ e ~ c o n t r o l .  It 
follows that the ordinary person is not exceptionally excitable, pugnacious or 
in a state of ~i runkemess .~~~ 
In addition to not being exceptioaally excitable, pugnacious or drunk, the ordinary person 
may possess other traits that are neither 'bpeculiar" nor "idiosyncratic" to the accused? 
With these preconditions in min& the determination of the content of the ordinary person 
standard, in a given case, would depend on the 'kelevance of the particular feature to the 
provocation in question.'"" Race, for instance, rnight be relevant where the alleged 
actuaily had been provoked. A subjective test is applicable at this stage. Fuially, the trier 
of fact must detennine if the accused acted on the sudden before his passions cooled. 
')'Don Stuart "Annotation" (1 985) 5 1 C.R. (3d) 99. The author traces the movement 
of the Court away fiom previous decisions in which no subjective factors could idorm the 
reasonable person test. 
'USqru note 330 at 108-109. 
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provoking hui t  was a tacial slur; but irrelevant where the alleged provoking Wt 
concerned the accused's physical disability?' While rejecting personai or subjective 
considerations peculiar to the such as dninkemess, the objective standard test 
nevertheless is paaially contexhialized to reflect the facts of the case and the circiunstiuices 
of the accused?' Su, in Hill, the orduiary person was found to be someone of the same age 
and sex of the a~cused.~~'  
This partial contextuaiization of the ordinary penon standard, through the process of 
statutory interpretation, served the Court's liberal leanings in favour of individual autonomy 
and, indirectly, the a- of due process over crime control. It also furthered the Court's 
subjective approach to criminal liability by personalizing the reasonable person standard, 
albeit minimally, when analyzing criminal fault But the persodization of the reasonable 
33-'% do otherwise would be to defeat the purpose of the objective standard which is 
to effect minimum standards of conduct. Dickson C.J.C. stated (ibid at 108): 
We seek to encourage conduct that complies with certain societai standards 
of reasonableness and responsibility. In doing this, the law quite logically 
employs the objective standard of the reasonable person. 
See also Mewitt and Manning, supra note 224 at 739-741. 
540See Mewitt and Manning, supra note 224 at 741 where the authors write: 
The test is, therefore, that of the ordinmy person with these 
characteristics of the accused that do not prevent him being, himself, a person 
of ordinary tempenunent-his sex, his age, his colour, his education, his 
physical condition and so on, but not those characteristics which make his 
temperament, at the time, extraordlliary. Fu11hentally, this must refer to 
his mental ability and his intoxication ..." [Emphasis in original]. 
note 3 30 at 1 1 7. 
person standard was co&ed by Parliament's detennination that the objective aspect of 
the provocation defence would be a "harsh fkst hurdle". 
Progress in Hill made on the secondary fionts-expanded Iiberalism through the 
incorporation of the accused's chanicteristics into the reasonable person standard and the 
implicit preference for due process values-was offset by Justice Dickson's hding that a 
trial judge is not required, in each and every case, to tell the jury the specific attributes 
inforrning the ordinary person standard for the purposes of their deliberations. He stated: 
The trial judge did not en in f&g to specify that the ordinary person, for the 
purposes of the objective test of provocation, is to be deemed to be of the 
same age and sex as the accused. Aithough this type of insîruction may be 
hehfil in clmifiing the application of the ordinmyperson standmd, Ido not 
think it wise or necessary to make rhis a mandatory component of ail jury 
charges on 
[Emphasis added] 
It seems illogicai to leave an accused person's fate to the common sense of a jury which, 
most inconvenientiy, is not subject to judicial review on appeal. Such judicial 
pronouncements attenuate the S. 7 right to Me, liberty and secinity of the person siven that 
the trial judge's direction on the objective standard is discretionary, not mandatory. Does it 
matter if the age, sex, race or religion of the accused rnight be pertinent to the ord- 
person test, and therefore to the issue of criminal liability, if not articulated in a clear fashon 
to the trier of factp3 
343See also Stuart, supra note 333. He contends (at 100) that the Supreme Court of 
Canada could have adopted the full niling in R v. Camplin, [1978] A.C. 705 (H.L.) requiring 
a mandatory direction on the reasonable person standard. See also Mewett and Manning, 
supra note 224 at 74 1-742. But see Grant, Chunn & Boyle, supra note 204 at 6- 14 to6- 1 7 
where the authors observe (at 6- 16) that the "HilllCamplin approach appears to expect the 
Lamer J.'s agreement in dissent that the trial judge was not required to give an 
instruction on the content of the ordinary person standard blurred the issue m e r  still: 
But 1 should like to add that there will, in my view, be cases where failure to 
do so, given the paticuiar circumSfances of the case, would be unfitir and 
constitute reversible error, but not because of a special rule applicable to 
charges on provocation, but rather under the general d e  that the judge's 
charge to the jury must always be fair?' 
Who defines fairness? This perspective may be an extension of the S a l t  Ste. Marie 
reasoniag that judicial creations, such as the category of public wellare offences and the 
'kasonable person", will be creatures of judiciai discretion. 
jury to adopt a praiseworthy attitude of racial and religious tolerance, to try to see what 
happened fiom the perspective of a person sharing the relevant charsicteristics of the 
accused." They go on to caution, however, "that Camplin might require, and Hill assume, 
that jurors would 'suspend commitments to fiuidamental liberal values such as racial and 
religious tolerance and endorse moral agnosticism or cultural relativism."' Footnotes 
omitted] . 
w ~ u p  note 33 0 at 1 19. See also the majority reasons for decision of Lamer C .J.C. 
in R. v. Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 4 C.R. (5th) 280 bereinafter 
Jacquard cited to C.C.C.]. Chief Justice Lamer took a functional approach to jury 
instructions holding that a judge was not compelled to give specinc jury directions linking 
the mental disorder evidence to the question of intent provided his overall charge made it 
clear, at l e m  to the appellate court, that it did so apply. The accused in Jacquard had been 
convicted of first degree murder in the shwting death of his stepfather; and of the attempted 
murder of his stepmother. In dismisshg the accused's appeal fiom conviction, Lamer C.J.C. 
stated (at 10-1 1): 
In many cases, a trial judge need only review relevant evidence once and has 
no duty to review the evidence in a case in relation to every essential issue. 
... As long as an appellate court, when looking at the trial judge's charge to 
the jury as a whole, concludes that the jury was left with a sufficient 
understanding of the factsp they relate to the relevant issues, the charge is 
proper. 
He concluded (at 27): "[A]ppellate courts must adopt a functional approach to reviewing jury 
charges. The purpose of such review is to ensure that juries are properly-not 
perfectiy-instnic ted." 
The subjectivist impact on criminal defences arose again in the 1990 judgment of R 
v. LovalleeYs, a decision of Wilson J. in which Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. concurred. At 
issue was the evidentiary foundation for a female accused's plea of sekiefence to a murder 
charge in the context of domestic violence. The accused built her defence around S. 34(2) 
of the Criminal Code. That section States: 
(2) Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous 
bodily harm in repelihg the assault is justified if 
(a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous 
bodily h m  fkom the violence with whîch the assault was originally made or 
with which the assailant purnies his purposes; and 
(b) he believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise 
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily hann. 
"The feature cornmon to both S. 34(2)(a) and S. 34(2)@) is the imposition of an objective 
standard of reasonableness on the apprehension of death and the need to repel the assault 
with deadly f o r ~ e . " ~  As in the case of the reasonable person test under the provocation 
provision of the Criminal  ode,^' the Lavallee decision focussed on the content of the 
reasonable person standard. Specificaliy, could it be informed by expert testimony, and, if 
"S[1990] 1 S.C.R. 852,55 C.C.C. (3d) 97,76 C.R. (3d) 329 [hereinafter Lavallee 
cited to C.R.]. The female accused shot her cornmon law husband in the back of the head 
as he was leaving her room. He subsequently died. She was acquitted at trial. The Manitoba 
Court of Appeal reversed the accused's acquittal and ordered a new Inal. The Supreme 
Court of Canada subsequently restored the acquittal. 
"'See analysis of Hill decision supra at pp. 1 1 7- 12 1. 
so, what ought to be the fachial basis of that testimony and the appropriate jury direction if 
the factuai basis, either in whole or in part, comprises hearsayp8 
InLavallee the accused's deceased common law husband threatened to kiU her "when 
everyone else had g ~ n e . " ~ ~  In assessing whether the accused had a reasonable apprehension 
of death, Wilson J. considered expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to be 
invaluable to a consideration of the reasonable person standard: 
Where evidence exists that an accused is in a battering relationship, 
expert testimony can assist the jury in determinhg whether the accused had 
a "reasonable" apprehension of death when she acted by explaining the 
heightened sensitivity of a battered woman to her partnefs acts. Without 
such testimony 1 am skeptical that the average fact-finder would be capable 
of appreciating why her subjective fear may have been reasonable in the 
context of the relationship. M e r  dl, the hypothetical "reasonable man" 
observing only the final incident may have been unlikely to recognize the 
batter's [sic] threat as potentially lethal. Using the case at bar as an example, 
the ''reasonable man" might have thought, as the majonty of the Court of 
Appeal seemed to, that it was unlikely that Rust would make good on his 
threat to kill the appellant that night because they had guests staying 
ovemight . 
The issue is not, however, what an outsider would have reasonably 
perceived but whor the ac~edreasonub~perceived given her situation and 
her experience. 3" 
@2mphasis added] 
Justice Wilson, in keeping with the subjectifkation of the reasonable person standard stated: 
348~or  a discussion of the evidentiary bais  of expert evidence and the impact of 
LmulZee, see R.J. Delisle "Lavallee: Expert Opinion Based On 'Some Admissible 
Evidence'-Abbey Revisited" (1 990) 76 C.R. (3d) 366. 
Mgsupra note 345 at 347. 
If, d e r  hearing the evidence (iicluding the expert testimony), the jury 
is satisfied that the accused had a reasonable apprehension of death or 
grievous bodily hami and felt incapable of escape, it must ask itself what the 
"reasonable person" wouid do in such a situation. The situation of the 
battered woman as described by Dr. Shane strikes me as somewhat analogous 
to that of a hostage. If the captor tells her that he will kill her in three days 
time, is it potentially reasonable for her to seize an opportunity presented on 
the first day to kili her captor or must she wait until he makes the attempt on 
the third &y? I think the question the jury mtLFl ask itselfis whether. @en 
the history, circumstances and perceptions of the appellant, her belkfthut 
she could not preserve herselffiorn being M e d  by Rurr thar night except by 
Ming himfirst was reasonuble. To the extent thut expert evidence can assist 
the jury in muking thut determination. I wouldfind such testimony to be both 
relevant and necessary. "' 
[Emphasis added] 
As the above quote indicates, Wilson J. discounted the temporal connection which 
traditionally had linked the reasonable apprehension of death or reasonable bodily harm held 
by the accused to the defensive act? In effect, Justice Wilson contextudized the concept 
of "imminence" through the use of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome such 
that what rnight not be perceived as imminent to the reasonable man may be imminent to the 
battered woman "given her situation and her e~perience".'~~ 
353fiid at 352. See David Watt "The Battered Woman Syndrome: Should She Or 
Shouldn't She" (Paper presented to the National Crimioat Law Program, Victoria, British 
Columbia, July 13-17 1998) at Section 2.8. Justice Watt (at 1-2) states emphatically: "The 
battered woman syndrome is not a defence, justification or excuse for what would otherwise 
be crimioal conduct It is not recognized as a defence, justification or excuse by statute, or 
the cornmon Iaw. It is, rather, a condition that provides a context for a statutory defence 
which, if successful, warrants a complete acquittai, even in cases where the batterer has been 
killed. in the result, battered wornan syndrome is superimposed upon, or forced into, the 
technical requirements of existing law, rather than king accorded a separate and discrete 
place as a justification.'' [Emphasis in onginal][Footnotes omitted]. 
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Wilson J.'s analysis in LavalZee potentiaiiy opens the door for accused female 
persons with a syndrome to have their s.34(2) defence contextuaiized: "The definition of 
what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the 
world inhabited by the hypothetical 'reasonable man.'"3" Jury instructions conceming the 
cogency of expert evidence would be particularly important given its significance to the 
defence of sekiefence, and to the deliberations of the jury on the battering relationship 
which, Wilson J. held, was beyond the jury's ken? Whether Justice Wilson's decision can 
properly be said to reflect a victim anaiysis focussing on the harmful comequences of crime 
is doubtful. The case conveniently sidesteps the unpalatable reality that the deceased 
comrnon law husband was no less a victim, at least in the end result, than his surviving 
abused spouse. 
'%upra note 345 at 346. See aiso L'Heureux-Dubé's sepatate but concurring 
judgment in R. v. MaZott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123,21 C.C.C. (3d) 456,12 C.R. (5th) 207 where 
(at 470) she states: "The expert evidence is admissible, and necessary, in order to understand 
the reasonableness of a battered woman's perceptions ... Accordingly, the utility of such 
evidence in criminai cases is not limited to instances where a battered woman is pleading 
seWefence, but is potentially relevant to other situations where the reasonableness of a 
battered woman's actions or perceptions is at issue (e.g. provocation, duress or necessity)." 
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé posits (at 473) that whether battered men should be accorded the 
same approach cannot be determined ''without the benefit of research and expert opinion 
evidence wbich has infonned the courts of the existence and details of 'battered woman 
syndrome' . . ." 
But see R v. McConnell, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1075,48 C.R (4th) 199.42 Alta. L.R. (3d) 
225 where the pre-emptive d e  reasoning underlying the battered woman syndrome was 
deemed relevant to legitimizing the "prison environment syndrome'' raised by the accused 
male offender in the selfkiefence context. 
3S5Supra note 345 at 345. 
V. Hanter, Slillmon and Feeney: 
Characterization of the State in the Adversarial Context 
The subjectivist approach to judicial consideration of the mental element of offences 
such as attempted murder and of criminai defences such as provocation is a rdection not 
only of iiberaiism's focus on the individual as  a repository of rights, entitied to liberty and 
autonomy, but of the Court's characterization of the "State7'-the Goveniment-as an 
oppositional entity. The predominiuitly legal liberai influences acting upon the Supreme 
Court of Canada necessitates an appreciation of the Statedlhdividual relationship as defined 
by our court of final apped, the Supreme Court of Canada 
In the 1984 case of H ~ e r  v. So~tharn?~~ the Court, speaking of a constitution, 
stated: "Its function is to provide a continuingfiamework for the legïtimaie exercise of 
governmental power mi4 when joined by a Bill or Charter of rights, for the unremitting 
protection of individual rights and liberties" [Ernphasis added].'" Justice Dickson thus 
viewed '?he legitimate exercise of govenimental powei' and ''the unremithg protection of 
individual rights and liberties" as the major innuences guiding the Court in its adjudicative 
fun~tion?~ in Hunter v. Sourham the constitutional document was the Charter: 
The Canadian Chmter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document. Its 
purpose is to guarantee and to protect. within Iimits of reason, the enjoyment 
of the rights and fieedoms it enïhrines. It is intended to constrain 
3s6 Supra note 105. Chief Justice Laskin did not take part in this judgment. In this 
case the issue was whether the Combines Imestigation Act, RS.C. 1970, c. C-23, S. 10 
violated S. 8 of the Charter. Lamer and Dickson J J. were meinbers of the unanimous 
bench. 
govemmental action inconsistent with those rights andfieedoms; it is not in 
itselfan Ûuthorization for govemmentaI action 359 
pmphasis added] 
Liberalism's influence can be seen in the Charter's description as a co&t on 
govemment action in respect of the rights and fieedoms guaninteed therein; as a limitation 
on the existing powers of federal and provincial governments to engage in search and 
seizure activities; and as focussing primarily on the consequences of govemment action for 
the individual effected rather than upon the effect of the impugned action in M e r i n g  
legitimate government goals.3a The Supreme Court of Canada presented itselfas a buffer 
between a Goliath and his unsuspecting prey albeit in decicihg the constitutionality of a 
provision under the Combines Imestigation Act, not the law of homicide. Nevertheless, the 
decision had subsequent repercussions for the question of criminal liability in the homicide 
context. 
The majority decision in Hunter v. Southam establishes that the purpose of S. 8 36' of 
the Charter is '90 protect hdividuals fkom unjustified State intrusions upon their pri~acy.'"'~~ 
'?3ee dso Monahan and Petter, supra note 262 where the authors cnticized the 
Supreme Court's increasing liberai activisrn. They stated (at 70): T h e  popular and elite 
rhetoric surroundhg the Charter has emphasized that the document should receive a 'large 
and liberal' interpretation. The Supreme Court in particular has embraced this rhetonc ..." 
M e r  referring to the Hunter v. Southam case as illustrative of this "rhetonc", the authors 
stated (at 77): ''Assuming that the h c t i o n  of Charter review is to control state intervention, 
the Court has equated a large and liberal interpretation of the Charter with an expansion of 
rights and f?eedoms." 
36'Section 8 of the Charter states: "Everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure." 
362~upra note 1 05 at 1 09. 
Justice Dickson concluded that this purpose codd not be sewed uoless unwarranted 
searches were prevented before they occurred: "This, in my view, can only be accomplished 
by a system of prior dorizution,  not one of subsequent ~alidation."'~~ Dickson J. 
Such a requirement puts the onus on the State to demonstrate the superiority 
of its interests to that of the individuai. As such it accords with the apparent 
intention of the Charter to prefr, wherejkzsible, the right of the individual 
to befieefiom State interference to the interests ofthe State in a h c i n g  its 
purposes through such inteMerence. ... m h e r e  it is feasible to O btain pnor 
authorîzation, 1 would hold that such authorization is a pre-condition for a 
valid search and seinue?' 
pmphasis added] 
Individual interests will d e  the &y unless the State can persuade the Court that its interem 
outweigh those of the indi~idual.'~' The Court's approval of the qualifjhg phrase " w k e  
feasible" in discussing its championship of individual rights reflects, in part, a crime control 
perspective of the search and seinire powers of the State. Specifically, at the arrest or 
detention stage, the State may not be similarly constrained. Justice Cory for the majority in 
3631bid (Emphasis in original). 
365See ibid at 1 O8 where Dickson J.(as he then was) wrote: 
The guarantee of security f?om unremonable search and seinire only protects 
a reasombze expectation. This limitation on the right guaranteed by s.8, 
whether it is expressed negatively as fieedom fiom 'breasonable" search 
and seizure, or positively as an entitlement to a "reasonable" expectation of 
privacy, indicates that an assessrnent must be made as to whether in a 
particular situation the public's interest in king lefi alone by govemment 
must give way to the govemment's interest in intruding on the individual's 
privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement. 
[Emphasis in original] 
the 1997 case of R v. ~tillrnad~~ observed: " In [Hunter] v. Southam Inc., ... it was held that 
a search conducted without prior authorization is presumptively uareasonable. However, the 
long-standing power of search incident to arrest is an exception to this general d e  ..."=' 
The majority judgment in St i lma~ limited the scope of that exception by perpetuating 
the perception of the State as a negative force with which to be reckoned. 
In the case at bar to proceed in the face of a specific refusat to compel 
the accused to submit to the lengthy and intrusive dentai process, to force the 
accused to provide the pubic hairs and to forcibly take the scalp hain and 
buccal swabs was, to Say the least, unacceptable behaviour that contravened 
both s.7 and s.8 of the Charter. It was a signifcant invsion of bodily 
3 6 6 ~  V. Stillnzan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, 5 C.R (5th) 1, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 
bereinafter Stillman cited to C.R.].The accused was charged with the murder of a 14-year 
old girl. She had died nom blows to the head. Her body had been recovered f?om a river. 
Semen was found in her vagina and a human bite mark was located on her abdomen. At issue 
in Stillman was the admissibility of evidence taken fiom the accused during his detention at 
the police station. The evidence comprised samples of hair, dental impressions, buccal 
swabs and a tissue containing mucous. The latter was obtained when the accused went to 
the washroom, biew his nose, and discarded the tissue in a wastebasket. In the final resuit, 
al1 evidence was excluded but the tissue containing the mucous. A powemil piece of 
evidence which put the accused at the scene. Although the accused's S. 8 Charter right had 
been violated, the majority, which included Chief Justice Lamer, held that the administration 
of justice was not brought into disrepute by admitting the tissue into evidence. The Court 
found that the tissue's seizure did not interfere with the accused's bodily integrity, even 
though the Corn held that the arrest was illegal and that the police had (at 29) "obtained 
surreptitiously that which the appellant had refused to provide them vol~~1tanly: namely a 
sample fiom which his DNA profile could be obtained." 
The Stillman decision provides a synthesis of the law goveming the exclusion of 
evidence under S. 24 of the Charter. Although it is not king cited in this paper for the S. 24 
andysis, readers may consult the following sources on that point: Paul L. Moreau ccExclusion 
of evidence-section 24(2) of the Charter" (1998) 40 C.L.Q. 148; Hogg, supra note 36 at 38- 
15 to 38-17,45-8,4522 to 45-23; Tom Goddard "Stillman: The Majority Could Not Have 
Intended to Exclude Altemative Conscriptive Means fiom Consideration under the 
"Discoverability" Principle" (1 997) 5 C.R. (5th) 1 10; Don Stuart ccStillman: Limiting Search 
Incident to Arrest, Consent Searches and Refinhg the Section 24(2) Test" (1 997) 5 C.R. 
(5th) 99. 
367Stilhtan, supra note 366 at 23. 
integrity. Zt wus an example of the use of mental adphysicall action by 
agents of the state to overcome the refus2 to consent to the procedures. It 
serves us a powerful reminder of the powers of the police and how 
fiighteningly broad they would be in a police state. If there is not respect for 
the dignity of the individual and integrîty of the body then it is but a very 
short step to juswing the exercise of any physical force by police if it is 
undertaken with the aim of solving crimes. No doubt the rack rind other 
stock in lrode of the torturer operated to quickly and eflciently obtain 
evidence for a conviction. Yet repugnance for such acts and a sense of a 
need for fuirness in criminal proceedings did oway with those evil practices. 
There mwt alw~ys be a reasonable control over police actions f a  civilized 
and democratic socieiy is to be n~aintuined~~' 
[Emphasis added] 
Not surprisingly, the pubic hairs, scalp hairs and buccal swabs were deemed inadmissible for 
the purposes of the new trial ordered by the Court. The common law power of search 
incidental to arrest was deemed not to extend to the unlawful seinire of bodily substances. 
"[Sltate interference with a person's bodily integrity is a breach of a person's privacy and an 
f i o n t  to human dignity. The invasive nature of body searches demands higher standards 
To buttress its conclusion the rnajority in Stillman relied on Parliament's enactment 
of legislation authorizing the seizure of certain bodily substances for the purposes of D.N.A. 
It is certainly signüicant that Parliament has recently amended the 
Crimind Code ... so as to create a warrant procedure for the seizure of certain 
bodily substances for the purposes of DNA testing. This suggests that 
Parliament has recognized the intrusive nature of seizing bodiiy sarnples. The 
section requires that the police have reasonable and probable grounds, as well 
36916id. at 26. In the subsequent 1997 Feeney decision, »fia note 373, the Court 
extended the "higher standards ofjustEcationy' to the warrantless search of a dwelling house. 
as authorization h m  a judicial o5cer. before they can make such seizures. 
If this type of invasive search and s e h  to arrest came within the common 
law power of search incident to arrest, it would not have been necessary for 
the governrnent to mate  a parallel procedm for the police to follow. In my 
view, it would be contrary to authority to say that this is no more than a 
codification of the common law? 
[Emphasis added] 
Fuaher, "[tlhe common law power of search incidental to arrest cannot be so broad as  to 
encompass the seizure without valid statutory authority of bodily samples in the face of a 
refusal to provide them. Ifit is, then the common lm rule itselfis urue~~sonab~e. since it is 
too broad and fails to properly balance the competing righls imt~lved"~" The Co~rt's 
decision was an amdgarn of common law and statutory considerations aimed at preserving 
the autonomy and dignity of the individual fiorn the investigatory arm of the State. The 
Court grounded its conclusion as to the inadrnissibility of the evidence in Parliament's 
statutory restriction on the right of law enforcement personnel to invade the bodily integrity 
of accused persons for investigatory purposes. 
n i e  Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam had applied an objective 
standard in balancing the interests of the individuai and those of the state. This, again, 
reflects the influence not only of liberai philosophy but of a Court operating on the principle 
of constitutional supremacy: 
The location of the constitutional balance between a jusfifiable expectation 
of pnvacy and the legitimate needs of the State cannot depend on the 
subjective appreciation of individuai adjudicators. Some objective standard 
must be established. . .. 
Here again it is useful, in my view, to adopt a piirposive approach. The 
purpose of a .  objective critenon for granting prior authorization to conduct 
a search or seizure is to provide a consistent standard for identifying the point 
at which the interests of the State in such intrusions corne to prevail over the 
interests of the individual in resisting them. To associate it with an 
applicant's reasonable belief that relevant evidence may be uncovered by the 
search, wouid be to define the proper standard at the possibility of finding 
evidence. ... It would tip the balance strongly in favour of the State and limit 
the right 
of the individual to resist to ody  the most egregious intrusions? 
[Emphasis in original] 
The objective standard for evaluating prior authorization of search and seizures under the 
Combines Imestigation Act was seen by the Court as a means of Limiting state intrusion into 
the individual's privacy. As well, it was perceived as a tool for the Court to use in guarding 
the fluctuating boundary between the State and the individual. 
The Hmter v. S o u t h  analysis of the individudstate relationship had even furthet 
impact on the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1997 case of R v. Feeney'". At issue was 
the common law d e  concerning warrantless arrests following forcible entry into a dwelling- 
"%upra note 105 at 114. 
3n[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13,115 C.C.C. (3d) 129,7 C.R. (5th) 101 [hereinafter Feeney to 
C.C.C.]. The accused appealed his second degree murder conviction claiming violations of 
his ss. 8 and 1 O@) Charter rights. While investigating the vicious beating death of an 85 
year old man, the police, acting upon a local resident's suggestion that they speak to the 
accused, proceeded to his home. They knocked on the door, announced themselves, and, 
receiving no answer, went inside the accused's trailer. The accused who was in bed, was 
told to get up and step into the Iight. Obsenring blood stains on his clothes, the officer had 
his partner read the accused his rights. The accused's blood-stained shirt was seized. Later, 
after eight hours of in te~ews ,  the police obtained a warrant to seize the accused's shoes, 
Sportman cigarettes, and money hidden under his mattress. The accused did not see a lawyer 
until two days later between fingerprinting sessions. Sopinka J. delivered the majority 
opinion. Chief Justice Lamer dissented stating (at 138): "My reasons and conclusion are not 
to be taken as disagreeing in any way with the principles of R v. StiZZmm ...as expressed in 
the reasons of Sopinka J. I agree with those principles as stated therein. My disagreement 
is with their application on the facts of this case." 
house. The majority r e f o d a t e d  the previous judicial exposition of the test, for, the pre- 
Chmter context in which earlier cases had been decided, placed insufficient emphasis on the 
primacy of the individual's privacy interest: 
The analysis in LoMby was based on a baiance between the individuai's 
privacy interest in the dwelling-house and society 's interest in effective police 
protection. This Court heldthat the latter interestpratoiled and warrantless 
m e s t s  in dwelling-homes were pennissible in certain circumstances. While 
such a conclusion was debatable at the time, in my view, the increased 
protection of the privacy of the home in the era ofthe Charter changes the 
analysis in favour of the former interest: in general, the privacy interest 
outweighs the interest of the police rmd wmantless mes t s  in hueiling- 
houses are pr~hibited"~ 
[Emphasis added] 
The Court concluded that, in addition to the L a d y  formulation of the common Iaw d e  
goveming warrantless arrests in private dwellings, the law enforcement authorities also must 
have prior judicial authorization to enter the dwelling: 
To summarize, in general, the following requirements must be met 
before an arrest for an indictable offence in a private dwelling is Iegal: a 
warrant must be obtaùied on the basis of reasomble and probable grounds to 
arrest and to believe the person sought is within the premises in question.; 
and proper announcement must be made before entering. 375 
Chief Justice Lamer did not agree wîth the reasoning of either Sopinka J. or L'Heureux- 
Dubé J. although he agreed with the result reached, in dissent, by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé. 
He preferred the reasoning of Lambert LA. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal who 
favoured a crime control analysis, charactehg the situation faced by the police in Feeney 
as one of exigent circumstances. 
The fiuidamental point in relation to the police conduct in this case 
was that there had ken a savage attack on an elderly man in a mal1 
commmity which suggested a kifler out of control in the community and that 
the police had a duty to protect the community. They also had a duty to try 
to locate and neutralize the killer and if possible to gather evidence that 
would satisQ them then and there that the killer had been apprehended, and 
that would later tend to establish that the correct person had been 
apprehended and made to stand triai. 
In those circumstances it is rny opinion that the police were facing a 
situation which could be classified as an emergency, or as exigent 
circumstances which wouid require immediate action, and that in addition 
they were facing circumstances where the possibility of the destruction of 
evidence, particularly evidence in relation to bloodstains, was a real one and 
had to be a~idressed?~~ 
Contrarily, the majority in Feeney did not agree with Lambert J.A.'s characterization of the 
situation and added that "even ifthey [exigent circumstances] existed, safety concerns could 
not justify the warrantless entry into the tmiler in the present case.'"" Sopinka I. explained 
that "[t]o d e h e  these as exigent circumstances is to invite such a characterization of every 
penod after a senous crime.'"' 1s this, in reality, not the case? The Feeney decision is a 
classic example of the confluence of disparate ideological influences on judicial decision- 
making: liberalism in the portrayai of the state, and crime control and due process values in 
dividing the Court on the correct application of legal principles to the facts of the case.'" 
v. Feeney (1995) 54 B.C.A.C. 228, 88 W.A.C. 228 [hereinafter Feeney 
(B.C.C.A.) cited to B.C.A.C.] at 234. 
"See Don Stuart "Feeney: New C W e r  Standards for Arrest and Undesirable 
Uncertaintyy' (1 997) 7 C.R. (5th) 175. The author notes (at 177): 
Sopinka J. makes a cornpeiling case for the majority that, since prior judicial 
authorization is the fiuidamental Chmrer requirement for searches under 
Canada (Director of Investigation & Resemch, Combines Ihesiigution 
Responding to the Supreme Court of Canada's reformulation ofthe common law d e  
governing arrest in a d w e h g  house, Parliament enacted ss. 529 to 529.S3" of the Criminal 
Code. The new provisions aim "to ensure that peace officers are able to effeîtively discharge 
powers of arrest, and secure protection of the public, while, at the same time, respecthg 
privacy interests in residential dwehgs. The net effect of the ... is to legislate and c l a e  
the procedures which must be foilowed in the post-Feeney era.''3a' 
M. Creighton : 
Manslaughter, Pend Negligence and Criminal Liabüity 
The common law definition of unlawful act manslaughter was the subject ofjudicial 
scrutiny in R. v. Creighlon.'" McLachlin J., on behaif of a slim majority, confirmed the 
histoncal common law test for determinhg the requisite mens rea of unlawful act 
Branch) v. Southum Inc.. so too should there be a general constitutional 
requirement of warrant before entry into a dwelling house to arrest. 
The problem with the majority judgment lies in its refusa1 to 
recogaize a general exigent circumstances exception. 
Stuart contends (at 178) that the Court's failure to recognhe such an exception has negative 
repercussions for law enforcement: 
In the absence of the recognition of a general exigent circumstances 
exception, the police have been placed in an unenviable position. Even in the 
presence of clear exigent circum~fances of danger or destruction of evidence, 
they might well be reluctant to move lest the case be jeopardized. The 
Supreme Court has been insufnciently attentive to the practical consequences 
of their judgment. 
" '~enee M. Pomerance "Entcy And Arrest in Dwelling Houses" (Paper presented to 
the National Criminal Law Program, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Juiy, 
1998) at Section 5.2, p. 4. vnderlining in original] pnpublished]. 
'*[i993] 3 S.C.R. 3,23 C.R. (4th) 189,83 C.C.C. (3d) 346 [hereinafter Creighton 
cited to C.R.] 
manslaughter+bjective foreseeabilty of bodily harm.'" The Creighton decision introduces 
into the fault analysis vocabulary of the law of homicide the concept of penal negligence. 
It will be recded that in S a l t  Ste. Mmie Dickson J .  (as he then was) noted that "[wlithin 
the context of a criminal prosecution a person who fails to make such inquiries as a 
reasonable and prudent would make, or who fails to know facts he should have known, is 
innocent in the eyes of the law.'"" Pend negligence is not tantamount to simple negligence. 
It connotes a marked deparhm h m  the standard of a reasonable person.''' Lamer J., for a 
substantial minority, agreed on the objective standard but would have changed it to provide 
for objective foreseeability of death, not simply bodily harm. Further, he wouid have 
injected the objective standard for fault-the reasonable person-with "any human hülties 
which might have rendered the accused incapable of having foreseen what the reasonable 
person would have foreseen."-'" Under Lamer C.J.C.'s objective test "the accused's 
3aïhid. at 208. The 5:4 majority rested on LaForest J., who in separate reasons, 
expressed difficulty in agreeing with either the Chief Justice or McLachlin J. He stated (at 
237): "This case c a w d  me difficuity because both sets of reasons take a view of the law that 
1 have in the past resisted." But see Grant, supra note 238 at 2 18 where she writes: 
By a narrow 5:4 split, the Court held that, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, only bodily harm need be foreseeable and that this standard is 
constitutionally adequate. Although McLachlin J . 3  judgment attracted a 
majority, it was written largely as a response to the muiority judgment of 
Lamer C.J. One can only assume that Lamer C.J. thought he was writing for 
a majority of the Court and that some members defected at the last moment 
..." Footnotes omitted] 
3u~upra note 1 O3 at 40. 
"%ee also R v. Hu?~iùl~ [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867, 19 C.R. (4th) 169,79 C.C.C. (3d) 
97. 
386~upra note 382 at 229. 
behaviour is still measured against the standard of the reasonable person, but the reasonable 
person is constnicted to account for the accused's particular capacities and resulting inability 
to perceive and address certain ~ i s k s . " ~ ~  
McLachlin J. rejected the minority position outright ln so doing, she did a victim 
analysis of the required symmetry between fault and consequences through the application 
of the ''thia skuli" d e  which 'kquires aggressors, once embarked on their dangerous course 
of conduct which may foreseeability injure others, to take responsibility for all the 
consequences that ensue, even to deatt~"~" As well, she applied a victim analysis to the 
ordinary person test concluding: 
In summary, I c m  find no support in criminal theory for the 
conclusion that protection of the morally innocent requires a generai 
consideration of individual excusing conditions. The principle cornes into 
play only at the point where the person is show to lack the capacity to 
appreciate the nature and quality or the consequences of his or her acts. 
Apart fiom this, we are dl, rich and poor, wise and naive, held to the 
minimum standards of conduct prescribed by the criminai law.'" 
'%id. at 23 1. The Chief Justice relied on the liberal writings of H.L.A. Hart and 
Don Stuart (at 229) in justwing his position. 
388fiid at 204-205. Grant, supra note 238 argues at 209 that the Creighton decision 
represents a movement away fiom liberaikm in substantive criminal law: "In general we are 
witnessing a move away fiom a focus on individual fault towards more concem with the 
hamiful consequences of crime. This may be a hc t i on  of a broader trend withui the Court 
witnessed over the past decade in constitutional law and only recently in criminal law: a shift 
away fiom a liberal conception of the state." See also Patrick Healy "The Creighton Quartet: 
Enigma Variations In A Lower Key" (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 265: "As for the fïrst point, these 
cases mark a hi& point in the c o u .  trend toward restriction of substantive review of the 
criminal law." 
3S9Supra note 3 82 at 2 1 1-2 12. This position was criticized by Don Stuart in 
"Continuing Inconsistency But Also Now Insensitivity That Won't Work" (1993) 23 C.R. 
(4th) 240. 
Despite their ciifferences, both the majority and minority decisions agree that manslaughter 
is not a crime of stigma necessitating a subjective standard of fault? 
The Creighton established that the objective standard of fault is alive and 
Arguably, this represents a retreat nom the judicial activism seen in such cases as 
Vadiancouri. M a e a u ,  and Logan where a subjective anaiysis of fault govemed the 
outcorne. One author notes that this retreat is reflective of a new policy k ing  pumed by the 
Court: 
3g0Zbid at 200-202 (reasons of McLachlin J.); at 224-225 (reasons of Lamer C. J.C.). 
However, the Chief Justice (at 227) found that the stigma attached to the offence of 
manslaughter requires, at a minimum, objective foreseeability of the risk of death in order 
to satisq S. 7 of the Churter. 
39 I Creighton, supra note 382 (unlawful act manslaughter); R. v. NagIik, [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 122 (fdure to provide necessaries of life); R v. Finlay, [1993] 3 S.C.R 103 (mreless 
storage of a f i rem);  and R v. Gosset, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76 (unlawfùl act manslaughter). Of 
significance to this thesis is the fact that the Court, applying the stigrna benchmark, held that 
none of these crimes merited a subjective standard of fault. 
3'?See Bruce P. Archibald "Fauit, Penalty and Proportionality : Comecting Sentencing 
to Subjective and Objective Standards of Criminal Liability (with Ruminations on 
Restorative Justice) (1998) 40 C.L.Q. 263 at 278 where he writes: 
The Supreme Court of Canada has been concemed, particularly in the light 
of the concept of "principles of fundamental justice" in Charter s.7, not to 
countenance the imposition of criminai liability on the "morally innocent". 
However, the court no longer equates the moral imposition of criminal 
sanctions with subjective fault in al1 circumstances. Those who fail to 
comply with the behavioural standards of the reasonable person, at l e s t  in so 
far as they depart fiom such standards to the extent of a marked and 
substantial degree, are now thought worthy of criminal punishment. It is now 
deemed moral to punish the grossly negligent. ... Subjective fault is 
constitutionally required for murder, attempt murder, theft and other 
unspecified offences of high penalty and stigma But Parliament may 
constitutiodly adopt mixed fault and objective fadt standards in other areas, 
within the outer limits of the prohibited combination of absolute Liability and 
impnsonment. 
Footnotes omitted] 
In Reference re S. 94(2) ofthe Motor Vehicie Act (British Colornbia) and R 
v. VailZancourt, fbelled by a purposive approach to interpretation of the 
Chmter, a majority held that S. 7 implied a broad jurisdiction for reform of 
the criminal law. Since then the court has unanimously resiled fiom this 
view. A new majority has assertetdm even narrower view of ifs jurisdiction 
under S. 7, based in part on o desire to show greater deference to the 
legislatwe and settZedjzuispmdence, and in part on a belief that the purposes 
of the Charter have to be interpreted fiexibly by the court with regard to the 
specific legal context and questions of poiicy put in issue before it. ... In 
short, the path fiom VaiiZmcourt to the current position is a paîh in retreat?" 
[Emphasis added] pootnotes omitted] 
Whereas the Creighton majority position on the constitutionality of the mens rea for 
unlawful act manslaughter appears to be based on the histoncal longevity of the offence as 
definec% a similar argument was not persuasive when the Court found the constructive 
murder provisions of the Criminal Code to be uncon~tihrtional.'~' The tide was tuming in 
393~ealy, supra note 388 at 266. 
3%pra note 382 at 200. Justice McLachlin writes: "We are here concemed with a 
common law offence Wtually as  old as our system of criminal law." 
"%ee VuiiZuncourt, supra note 100 at 320 where Lamer L observed: "Although the 
concept of felony murder has a long history at cornmon law, a bnef review of the historical 
development of S. 213 indicates that its legitimacy is questionable." The majority, led by 
Lamer J., struck down that portion of the constructive murder Criminal Code provisions 
which attnbuted criminal responsibility to an accused who caused the victim's death while 
committing or attempting to commit one of the enumerated offences and used a weapon or 
carried a weapon on his person. See also Alan Gold "Constructive Manslaughter Shodd Not 
Have Survived" (1993) 23 C.R (4th) 262. The author maintained (at 262); 
The judgment of McLachh J. ... is based almost entirely upon a historical 
argument, revisited in various f o m  but al1 the same argument at bottom, that 
''the offence of dawfùl act manslaughter, as dehed by our courts and t'ose 
in other jurisdictions for many centuries, is entirely consistent with the 
principles of funciamental justice." What is troubling about this judgment is 
that almost every word of it could have been written about the felony-murder 
mie and used to j u s t e  the continuation of that doctrine of constructive 
liability ." [Emphasis in the original] 
favour of stabiiïty in the legal system and against ongoing social refom through judicial 
decision-making?% 
The Charter had been in effect approximately 1 1 years when Creighton was decided. 
Over the course of those 11 years the Supreme Court of Canada initially had articulated a 
burgeoning subjective approach to legd guilt reflected in its statutory and constitutional 
analysis of the requisite mental element for murder and attempted murder, in it's partial 
subjectifkation of the reasonable person test in the provocation defence to murder, and in 
its characterization of the state as a negative entity at Ieast in the area of criminal Iaw. By 
irnbuing the State with a negative persona, the Court constructed a justificatory premise for 
its subjective approach to matters affecthg the determination of criminal liability in an 
adversaid " State v. Individual" scenario. In so doing, the Court continued to shed its pre- 
Charter attitude of legislative deference in favour of a more activist approach to its 
adjudicative bction. The Creighton decision marked a shift in the balance with 
repercussions for the subjectivist approach to criminal liability . In Saulr Ste. Marie the Court 
had rejected negligence as a basis for criminal liability; in Creighton the marked-departure- 
fiom-the-nom standard underpinning penai negligence "partiy reconcile[d] the recently 
'%A similar approach favouring stability in the law was aaiculated in Hibbert. supra 
note 241 at 156 where Lamer C.J.C. for the majority stated: 
Since the sole aspect of S. 21 left with the jury in the appeilant's triai was S. 
2 1 (l)(b), the analysis could strictly speaking, be restricted to that subsection. 
... In my view. in order to avoid creating undue conMion and uncertointy in 
the l m ,  it is appropriate tkzt we adress the issue on the continued validity 
of Paquette 's statements on the relation between duress and mens rea under 
S. 21 ('2) head on. I will thus extend my analysis beyonù what is sîrictly 
necessary for the resolution of the present appeal by, cortsidering S. 21 (2) in 
addition to S. 21 (1) 0. [Emphasis added] 
neglected dicta in Smit Ste. Mmie ... that a negiigent person is innocent in the eyes of the 
criminad law ..."3" 
The Creighton decision represents the other side of liberal thought-the individual, 
provided he or she is not mentally incapacitated-is responsible for the harm he or she does 
to another person. It is not a matter of the Court protecting one set of interests or values at 
the expense of another, but of fincihg the balance between the two in the context of the 
particular crime. "The criminal law must reflect not only the concems of the accused, but the 
concems of the victim and, where the victim is kiiled, the concems of society for the victim's 
fate. Both go into the eq~ation.'"~' 
W. R v. Daviauik The Charter and the Adjudicative Function at Common Law 
Reformdating comrnon law d e s  in the post-Charter context underscores the impact 
of Charter values upon the law's evolution. For example, in the sexual assault case of R 
v. ~ m i a u l t ~ ~  the common law principle limiting the defence of intoxication to crimes of 
specific intent was re-examined under the auspices of the Charter and the Court's reasoning 
in Vailhcourt. 
397Chmter Justice, supra note 1 O at 80. 
3ggSupra note 382 at 207-208. 
'*[1994] 3 S.C.R. 63, 93 C.C.C. (3d) 21,33 C.R. (4th) 165 [hereinaiter DmiauIt 
cited to CR.]. Although he would have taken the majority position in Daviauit even M e r ,  
Chief Justice Lamer (at 176) agreed with Cory J.'s position on the law and supported the 
creation of an exception to the L e m  d e  that self-induced intoxication c m  not be used as 
a defence to a gened intent offence. He finther agreed that the accuseci's appeal fiom 
conviction should be ailowed and a new trial ordered. 
Cory J. for the majority adopted the approach to common iaw principles that offend 
the C h e r  articulated by Lamer C.J.C. in Swain: 
In R v. Swain, [l Wl]  1 S.C.R. 933, Lamer C.J.C. ... wrote on this issue. At 
p. 978 he stated: 
Before tuming to S. 1, however, I wish to point out that 
because this appeal involves a Chmler challenge to a 
common law, judge-made d e ,  the Chmter analysis involves 
somewhat different considerations than would apply to a 
challenge to a legislative provision. For example, having 
found that the existing common law d e  limits an accused's 
rights under S. 7 of the Charter, it may not be strictly 
necessary to go on to consider the application of S. 1. HaWig 
corne to the conclusion that the common law d e  enunciated 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal lirnits an accused's right to 
liberty in a manner which does not accord with the principles 
of fundamental justice, it could, in my view, be appropriate to 
consider at this stage whether an alternative common law ruie 
could be fashioned which would not be contrary to the 
principles of fundamental justice. 
If a new comrnon law ruie could be enunciated which 
would not interfere with an accused person's right to have 
control over the conduct of his or her defence, 1 c m  see no 
conceptuai problem with the Court's simply enunciating such 
a rule to take the place of the old d e ,  without considering 
whether the old rule could nonetheless be upheld under S. 1 of 
the Charter. Given that the common law rule was fashioned 
by judges and not by Parliament or a legislahire, judicial 
deference to elected bodies is not an issue. If it is possible to 
reformulate a common law d e  so that it will not conflict 
with the principles of fiindamental justice, such a 
reformdation shodd be undertaken. 
This then is the approach that should be adopted when a common law 
principle is found to hfkhge the Charter." 
At issue was the cornmon law principle established in R v. ~eary*'  that self-induced 
intoxication couid not form the basis of an acquittal for a generai intent offence, even in the 
case of extreme intoxication where a reasonable doubt exists as to the accused's capacity to 
form the requisite intent for the crime deged. 'In such a situation, self-induced intoxication 
is substituted for the mental element of the crime.'*<f- The Court had grappled with the issue 
of a substituted mental element in VailZancourt and applied the same reasoning in Daviad: 
m h e  substituted mens rea nile has the effect of elirninating the minimal 
mental element required for sexual assault. Furthermore, mens rea for a crime 
is so well recognized that to eliminate that mentai element, an integrai part 
of the crime, would be to deprive an accused of fiindamental justice. See R 
v. VailZancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636. 
h that same case it was found that S. I l(d) would be &ged in 
those situations where an accused could be convicted despite the existence 
of reasonable doubt pertaining to one of the essential elements of the offence; 
see VailZancourt, supra, at pp. 654-56. n u t  would be the result ifthe Leary 
rule wm to be strict& applieda3 [Emphasis added] 
In canring out an exception to the Lemy principle, Cory J. was troubled by the d e ' s  
indiscriminate application in light of other fiuidamental principles of criminal liability: 
In my view, the strict application of the Leuv nile offends both ss. 7 
and 1 l(d) of the Charter for a nurnber of reasons. The mental aspect of an 
offence, or mens rea, has long been recognized as an integral part of crime. 
The concept is fundamentai to our crllninal law. That element may be 
minimal in general intent offences; nonetheless, it e ~ i s t s . ~  
40'[1 9781 1 S.C.R 29'74 D.L.R. (3d) lO3,37 C.R.N.S. 60 [hereinafter Leay  cited 
to C.R.N.S.]. 
402~upra note 399 at 187. 
4031bid at 190. 
404fiid at 189. 
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However, giving credence to self-induced intoxication as a defence to "general intent" crimes 
such as  sexual assault was problematic. It appeared as if the accused was to be rewarded 
both for his or her irresponsible drlliking and for any criminal acts which occurred while 
under the influence of alcohol. Not a value choice widely endorsed in society. 
The majonty Bench in Daviarlt was not blind to the downside of its decision 
however tme to criminal principle it may have ben. Justice Cory was quick to observe that 
"it is only those who can demonstrate that they were in such an extreme degree of 
intoxication that they were in a state akin to automatism or insanity that might expect to raise 
a reasonable doubt as to their ability to form the minimal elernent required for a general 
intent o f f e n ~ e . ' ~ ~  He added that "it will only be on rare occasions that evidence of such an 
exireme state of intoxication can be advanced and perhaps only on still mer occasions is it 
Iikely to succeed.'* Almost as if in anticipation of public outrage at the decision, Cory J. 
rounded out his comments by observing %at it is always open to Parliament to fashion a 
remedy which wodd make it a crime to commit a prohibited act while dnink?'" Which is 
exactiy what Parliament did shortly thereafter. 
Section 33.1 "8 of the Code, captioned "Self-induced Intoxication", was Parliament's 
response to the Daviault decision. That section States: 
"'~nacted by An Act to amend the Criminal Code (self-induced intoxication), S C .  
1995, c. 32, S. 1. 
(1)It is not a defence to aa offence refend to in subsection (3) that the 
accused, by reason of self-induced intoxication, lacked the general intent or 
the voluntariness required to commit the offence, where the accused departed 
markedly the standard of care as required in subsection (2). 
(2)For the purposes of this section, a person departs markedly nom the 
standard of reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian society and is 
thereby criminally at fault where the person, while in a state of self-induced 
intoxication that renders the person wware of, or incapable of consciously 
controlling, their behaviour, voluntarily or involuntarily interferes or 
threatens to interfere with the bodily integrity of another person. 
(3)This section applies in respect of an offence under this Act or any other 
Act of Parliament that includes as an element an assault or any other 
interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrïty of 
another person. 
Parliament exercised its criminai law power in the interest of the Canadian polity. This 
legislative response sends the message that the bodily integrity of the individual t m p s  even 
fiindamental notions of criminal Iiability where a person, voluntarily consuming alco hol, 
"departs markedly fiom the standard of reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian 
society". Given the post-Creighlon timing of the Daviault decision and Parliament's 
response thereto, a " marked departwe from the norrn" would appear to be a plausible 
objective standard by which to measure the accused's level of intoxication. 
Richard Wolson captures the social and legal ramifications of the pre- and post- 
Daviault response, both judicial and legislative, to the defence of intoxication: 
Ln the final analysis, it appears that the law of plea of intoxication has corne 
full circle: the common law developed, over the course of 70 years, a judicial 
response to a perceived social problem, namely, punishing those who 
voluntarily become impaired and commit acts of violence against fellow 
citizens. To maintain the common law, Courts needed to create the legal 
fiction of the specific/general intent dichotomy. Intellechial honesty, in the 
end, prevaiis, largely due to the expanding role of the Charter analysis. The 
logic of the common law is then reconciled. However, the reconciliation is 
done at the expense of the perceiveci social policy. One of the underpinnings 
of the change in judicial opinion was the social science evidence that there 
is no correlation between alcohol and violence. The public hue and cry, 
informed, no doubt, by particular lobby groups, compelled Parliament to 
enact legislation to take us back, more or less, to the siutus quo mte. Quaere 
whether anythùig has changed? 
A constitutional challenge has been launched against S. 33.1 in R. v. Vi~kberg~'~ It will be 
interesthg to see the Supreme Court of Canada's response to this challenge given its 
invitation to Parliament in Daviaulr to develop a legislative response to its judgment. 
Like Feeney, the Duviauft decision is illustrative of the interplay between Parliament 
and the Supreme Court of Canada in fashioning our criminal justice system by detennining 
the underlying principles or values goveming the criminal process. Similarly, in R v. 
Seaboyer,"" the Supreme Court of Canada m c k  down the then existing ccrape-shield" 
provisions of the Criminal Code because of over breadth. Acknowledging that the Code 
provisions aimed to balance the interests of complainants, McLachlin I., on behalf of the 
majority which included Chief Justice Lamer, maintained that "the Courts must seek a 
middle way that offers the maximum protection to the cornplainant compatible with the 
maintenance of the accused's iündamental right to a fair triai.'"12 The blanket application 
"(%ichard J. Wolson "Quelling The Spirits: The Evolution Of The Plea of 
Intoxication" (Paper presented to the National Criminal Law Program, University of Victoria, 
Victona, British Columbia, July 1998) at Section 2.3, p. 8. pnpublished]. 
4'0[1 9981 B.C.J. 1034. 
"' [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577,66 C.C.C. (3d) 321,7 C.R. (4th) 1 17 [hereinafler Seaboyer 
cited to C.R.]. 
of the provisions in question served to exclude both irrelevant and relevant evidence thereby 
increasing the possibility of a conviction of an innocent accused. 
To summarize, S. 276 has the potential to exclude otherwise 
admissible evidence which rnay in certain cases be relevant to the defence. 
Such evidence is excluded absolutely, without any means of evaiuating 
whether in the circumstances of the case the integrity of the trial process 
would be better served by receiving it than by exclucihg it. Accepting that 
the rejection of relevant evidence may sometimes be justified for policy 
reasons, the fact mains that S. 276 may operate to exclude evidence where 
the very policy which imbues the section-finding the tnah and arriving at the 
correct verdict-suggests the evidence shouid be received. GNen the primacy 
in our system of justice of the principle that the innocent should not be 
convicted the right tu present one's case should not be curtailed in the 
absence of an arsurunce ïhat the artailment is ciemly justifed by men 
stTonger contrmy conriderations. What is required is a law which protects 
the findamental right to a fuir trial while avoiding the illegitimute infrences 
P o m  other sexud conducl that the cornplainunt is more likei'y to have 
consented to the act or less likely to be telling the truth4" 
[Emphasis added] 
Even though the majority in Seaboyer struck down then S. 276 of the Code, it was not 
oblivious to the legitimate goal of Parliament in enacting the legislation in the first place. 
Nor were the old common law d e s  goveming the admissibility of evidence of the 
complainant's sexual conduct revived to fil1 the gap created by the unconstitutionality of the 
impugned provision. "Like other common law d e s  of evidence, they must be adapted to 
conform to curent reality .... mhe reality in 1991 is that evidence of semai conduct and 
reptation in itself cannot be regarded as logically probative of either the complainant's 
credibility or con~ent.'"'~ Justice McLachlin held "that the old niles wbich permitted 
evidence of sexual conduct and condoned invalid inférences fiom it solely for these purposes 
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have no place in our law.'"" Although guidelines were proposed for the introduction and 
use of sexual conduct evidence in the absence of both statutory and applicable common law 
principles, the Court noted that "[sluch guidelines should be seen for what they arean 
attempt to describe the consequences of the application of the generai d e s  of evidence 
governing relevance and the reception of e v i d e n c ~ n d  not as judicial legislation cast in 
stone."16 Parliament responded to Seaboyer by reenacting S. ~ 7 6 ~ "  of the Criminal Code. 
The constitutionality of the new provisions recently has been chalienged, unsuccessfully, in 
R. v. ~ a r r a c h . ~ ' ~  
This brief tour of the law of homicide, exclusive of the idanticide offence:Ig is 
meant to highlight the tensions that operate on the justices at the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the exercise of their adjudicative fiuiction. Specifically considered was the approach 
pursued by the Court in deciding issues of criminal liability in the law of homicide. 
Questions arising during constitutional adjudication do not always involve judicial review 
of impugned legislation. Statutory provisions otherwise within Parliament's legislative 
4'8(1998), 38 0.R (3d) 1, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 13 C.R. (5th) 283 (0nt.C.A.) leave 
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada grantecl June 4,1998 at [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 184. 
"gThis offence is defined under S. 233 of the Criminal Code. For a detailed 
review of the offence see Grant, Chunn & Boyle, supra note 204 at 4-8 1 to 4-1 03. 
cornpetence ofien are subjected to interpretive techniques which effect the operational impact 
of the provision. Such was the case in the Hill and Hibbert decisions. As well, common law 
des-judicial creationsaiay be reformulated subject oniy to the discretion of the Court and 
such doctrines as stare de~isis.4~~ 
""The Court's adherence to its previous decisions-stare decisis-was addressed in R 
v. C h e  [1990] 3 S.C.R. l303,62 C.C.C. (3d) 193,2 C.R. (4th) 1 bereinafter Chalk cited 
to C.R.]. There the Court considered, inter aliu, the meaning of the word 'kong" in then 
S. 16(2) of the Criminal Code. The Court already had detennined the meaning of that word 
in the 1977 case of R. v. Schwurtz, [1977l 1 S.C.R. 673. In Schwartz, a majority of the Court 
held that the word ''wrong" meant contrary to law. Dickson J.'s dissenting opinion in 
Schwartz-Laskin C. J.C. concinring-was revisited in Chaulk Lamer C. J-C., in ovemuning 
the Schwartz niling to find that the word wrong meant morally wrong, stated (at 41-42): 
With respect for contrary views, it is my opinion that Schwartz was wrongly 
decided by this Court and that the dissenting opinion of Dickson I. 
(concurred in by Laskin C.J.C., Spence and Beetz, JJ.) is to be preferred. The 
majority judgrnent fails, in my respecthl view, to appreciate the manner in 
which insanity renders our nomal principles of criminal responsibility 
inapplicable to an individuai as well as the particular objectives of S. 16 of the 
Code. 
I do noi dispute the principle that this Court should not e d y  
overrule ifs prior judgments. In this regard I refr to the worh of Dichon 
C.J. C., in which I conmred, in R. v. Bernard .. .: 
"Let me say immediately that, even if a case were wrongly 
decided, certainty in the law remains an important 
consideration. There must be compelling circumstances to 
justify departure fiom a prior decision. On the other han& it 
is clear that this Court may o v e d e  its own decisions and 
indeed, it has exercised that discretion on a number of 
occasions ." 
In rny opinion, it is appropriate in this case to overtuie the majority 
decision in Schwartz with respect to the meaning of the word "wrong " in S. 
16(2). ... In my view, Schwartz had the effect of exponding the scope of 
criminal responsibility unucceptably to include persons who, by reason of 
disease of the mi& were incapable of knowing thot an act was wrong 
according to the normal and reasonable standards of society even though 
they were m a r e  that the act was formailj a crime. It is now necessaryfor 
this Court to reconsider ifs decision in Schwurtz in order to redepne the 
scope of criminal liability in a mmner thut will bring it into accordance with 
the basic principles of our criminal l m .  pmphasis added] 
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The case law analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 iliiuninates the subtleties of both 
statutory interpretation and of reformulating the common law. More importantly, the case 
law review reveais that the Supreme Court of Canada is more than a final arbiter of legal 
disputes; it is also an arbiter of values, particularly when not in a confrontational position vis- 
a-vis Parliament through its criminal legislation. 
DaviauIt, Seaboyer and Feeney are just three examples of the reciprocal impact of 
developments in the common law and in statutory law. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
been stnving to synchronize these developments through the articulation and application of 
Charter values. The extent to which this is accomplished will determine not only the type 
of criminal process in Canada, but also the stability of that process and the certainty of the 
law therein. Values change; it is the fluidity of values in our heterogenous society which 
may present the greatest challenge to the Supreme Court of Canada in facilitahg coherency 
in both the written and the common law governing the criminal law process. 
Coordination of the scope of criminal liability with basic principles of criminal law was used 
to ju- non-adherence to a pervious decision. 
Chapter 4 
Conciusion: 
Makhg Sense of the Changing Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Post-Charter Criminal Law 
In Chapter One the following question was posed: What are the operational limits 
of the judicial fûnction in post-Chmter criminal law as revealed through an analysis o f  case 
law emanating fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, particuiarly, but not exclusively, in the 
law o f  homicide? Chief Justice Dickson posed a similar question in Hmison v. Carswell, 
"' a pre-Charter case in which the Supreme Coint of Canada had to decide whether the 
respondent picketer committed a trespass on the appellant's shopping centre property: 
The submission that this Court shouid weigh and determine the 
respective values to society of the right to property and the nght to picket 
raises important and difficuit political and socio-economic issues, the 
resolution of  which must, by their very nature, be arbitrary and embody 
personal economic beliefs. It raises also@nàùmenral questionsas to the role 
of this Court under the Canadian constitution. The duty of this Court, ar I 
envisage it, is to proceed in the discharge of ifs a@udicativefunction in a 
reusoned wayfiom principleddecision undestablished concepts. I do not for 
a moment doubt the power of the Court to act creatively-it has done so on 
countless occasions; but manfestly one mtlrr mk-whut are the limits of the 
judicial function 
pmphasis added] 
Speakhg for a majority o f  the Court, Dickson C.LC. adopted a deferential position to the 
impugned legislation creating the picketing offence. "If there is to be any change in this 
statute law, if A is to be given the nght to enter and remain on the land of B against the will 
of B, it would seem to me that such a change must be made by the enacting institution, the 
"'[1976] 2 S.C.R 200,62 D.L.R. (3d) 68,25 C.C.C. (2d) 186 [hereinafter cited to 
S.C.R.]. 
Legislature, which is representative of the people and designed to manifest the political will, 
and not by the ~ o u r t . ' ~  Thisdeferential attîtude to legislative bodies was typical of pre- 
Charter law in Canada More specifically, in the criminal con- Dickson J. adopted the 
same reasoning in the 1983 Fumant decision, a pre-Churter constructive murder case: 
Section 2 13 embodies the concept that when a weapon is used in the course 
of certain specified criminal acts and de& results, the accused is treated as 
if the mens rea for murder existed and the homicide is murder. ... 
It might be observed that the constructive murder d e  has been the 
subject of protracted criticism ... A kilhg in the course of the specified 
offences may be murder even though the offender never intended that remit. 
Ml that is required is the mens rea for the lesser offence ... In England the 
Homicide Act, 1 957 .. did away with the d e .  The d e  may seem horsh but 
iî is noî thefunction of this court to consider the policy of legisation validly 
enacted So long as the section continues in our Criminal Code if musi be 
@en effect in accordonce with its t e rm~. '*~~  
[Emphasis added] 
The review of post-Chter developments in the law of homicide explored in Chapter 3 
underscores the extent to which such an approach to the judicial function no longer is 
sufficient. Again, the question must be asked: What are the operational limits of the judicial 
function in Canadian criminal law in the latter 20th century? An important question, for the 
criminal law reflects, in large m e m e ,  prevailhg community values. The extent of the 
congruity says something about the confidence of society in both the criminal justice system 
and the judiciary who stand as guardians thereto. 
Consistent with interpretive or middle-level theory, the actual practice of criminai law 
has been the starting point of adysis.  The adversarial nature of the Canadian legal system 
4Ulbid at 219. 
424S~pra note 102 at 290-29 1. 
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has been acknowledged a s  have the challenges to the bipartite nature of the criminal triai. 
However, whatever the criticisms about the b'underinclusiveness" of the adversarial system, 
the fact is that a trial proceeds as an adversarial contest between the accused and the State. 
This is the practical reality. Legal practitioners and acadernics ought not to loose sight of the 
trial as a forum in which the State tests the accused's innocence. At common law, under the 
Bill of Rights, and under the Charter, the presumption of innocence is paramount. A trial, 
therefore, is not about the accwd proving his innocence-it is about the Crown proving the 
allegation of wrongdoing according to law? The law of homicide has been the primary, 
albeit not the sole, focus of my anaiysis because death is the ultimate consequence of crime. 
How the Supreme Court of Canada decides criminal liability in the hardest of cases, is 
largely determinative of its overall approach to liability in the criminai justice system. 
Given the influence of the Supreme Court of Canada, through its decision-making, 
upon the criniinal law, an attempt has been made herein to highiight what may be considered 
the major forces impacting upon the judicial hc t i on  at the Supreme Court of Canada level. 
The wedth of criticism directed against our highest court, the apparent fluidity of the law, 
and my concem as a criminal practitioner for the apparent instability in the legal system 
prompted this modest investigation of the judicial bct ion.  Yet, the Court is an integral part 
of Canadian political, social and legal life. The inevitability of social change in a multi- 
"~everse onus provisions under the Code are an instance where the accused is called 
upon to prove his innocence. However, as in Laba, these provisions in the post-Charter ent 
are subject to strict judicial scmtiny to ensure that they impair minimaily the presumption of 
innocence. 
cultural, stratified Canada, and the legal response thereto is not, as Gunter Teubner points 
out, of the "stimulus-response" variety: 
For the neo-evolutionists, legal autonomy means that law 
changes in reaction only to its own impulses, for the legal 
o r d e r - n o r m s ,  d o c t r i n e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
organhtiom-reproduces itself. But in so doing, the legal 
system is not insulated fiom its environment. The key idea, 
central to the neo-evolutionary theories, is the ''~e~reference 
of legal structures." Legai structures so conceived reinterpret 
themselves. but in the Zighl of extemal needs and demondr. 
This means that extemal changes me neither ignored nor 
directly refected according to a "stimulus-respome scheme. " 
Rather, they are selectiveZy filtered into legal structures and 
adapted Ni accordance with a logic of normative 
development. Even the strongest social pressures influence 
legd development only insofar as they first shape "legal 
constructions of social reality . " Thus, broader social 
developments serve to "modulate" legal change as it obeys its 
own developmental l o g i ~ ? ~ ~  
Pmphasis added] [Footnotes omitted] 
Coordinathg the mutual readjustment between society and the criminal law has been the task 
for the Supreme Court of Canada in this unprecedented era of legal rights litigation. The 
Lavallee case, for example, reveais the Court's attempt to anchor social reality in basic 
criminal law principles. The question of criminal liability in the circumstances of that case 
was tempered by social justice concems. 
Liberal theory has played a dominant role in the adversarial legal tradition, but a 
constrained role in pre-Chmter Canadian criminal law where democratic values iaforming 
the concept of parliamentary suprernacy were ascendant. However, in the post-Charter era, 
the emphasis on individual rights often has been at the expense of State initiatives. The 
426~upra note 1 7 at 248-249. 
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Supreme Court of Canada's portrayal of the State as a negative entity is a theme running 
throughout the Chmrer case law on homicide. The Stillmm and Feeney decisions are 
illutrative of this fact. As a adt, there is a fluctuatirtg reliance on either crime control or 
due process values. In the case law analysed in this thesis, due process values appear to have 
the upper hand. 
Liberalism's championship of individual rights as against the State also has generated 
a redefjinition of basic principles of criminal liability in constitutional adjudication. Most 
sigiuficantly, the constructive murder provisions of the Code fell under the Charter's 
hammer as a subjective analysis of the fault requirement for murder trumped legislative 
prescriptions to the contrary. The unparalleled activism of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
this area of homicide law occurred in the nrst decade following the Chmter's entrenchment. 
The Court's record in civil liberties under the Bill of Rights had been unimpressive. The 
same would not be said of the Court under the Charter where the advent of constitutional 
supremacy liberated the Supreme Court of Canada fiom its histoncal obscurity. 
Section 52 of the Corntifution Act, 1982 has had a profound impact upon the judicial 
hc t ion .  Before 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada operated in a political and legal regirne 
where Parliamentary supremacy set the tone for judicial decision-making. Deference to 
legislative bodies was the nom; flashes of judicial activism, as in the Drybones case, few. 
Writing in the 1982 Special Edition of the Supreme Court Law Review, Alan Gold explored 
the potential impact of the Court's conservaiive past on the Charter's fuhue: 
Unfominately, the judicial utilization of the Charter's provisions, so 
optimistically contemplated by the Attorney General, has littk historicai 
support. It is fair to Say that "[h]istoncally in Canada, to the extent that we 
have relied on the judiciary as the instrument of definition and protection of 
our civiI liberties we have not ... been well serveci," and this is true both 
before and after the statutory enactment of the Conadicm Bill of Rights. ... 
Even the famous decision in R v. Drybones. whose initial Iight dimmed so 
swiftly, cm stiii evoke some pride in the decision itself, and regret and 
disappointment only as to its judicial aftermath. 
..-- 
The importance of the fact of entrenchment for dtimate judicial 
utilization cannot be overstated. The lack of entrenched character to the 
Cunadian Bill of Rights has had a pervading innuence on judicial 
hterprebtion throughout the Bill's case law. There was some slight 
movement, at least in the eyes of Chief Justice Laskin, whose description of 
the Cmadim Bill of Rights evolved fiom one of a mere "statutory 
jurisdiction" to that of cbquasi-constitutionai" instrument. But essentidy, the 
cases under the Canadan Bill of Righfs reflect an incessant gendection to 
parliamentary supremacy, producing what has been called a "widespread 
sense of illegitimacy" and an "explkit unwillingness" towards applying the 
Cunadian Bill of Righl~.'~' 
Expectations for the Supreme Court's performance were guarded. The Court's past 
deference to Parliament had to be shed in the aew dawn of the Charter where the Court's 
review fünction took on constitutional proportions. 
The juxtaposed principles of constitutional and parliamentary supremacy have 
provided the focal point for the restructunng of the judicial role. The CO-existence of these 
principles also has compelled the Court to grapple with its relationship with society at large. 
Previously, the Court's impact on the Canadian polity was latent: for the most part, division- 
of-powers cases did not have the immediate impact typical of Charter litigation. This 
coupled with the Supreme Court of Canada's restrained application of the Bill of Rights 
meant that its consciousness of social phenornenon was undeveloped. This would not do 
today . 
427~lan D. Gold "Legal Rights" (1982) 4 S.C.L.R. 107 at 107-108. 
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In Chapter One 1 suggested that Guather Teubner's idea of reflexive law might 
suggest a possible approach to the question of how the judiciary codd perceive itself in 
reference to social phenornenon. Seen as a seKadjustiag institution, whose decisions reflect 
a consciousness of the prevailing social values, the Court maintains its independence fkom 
extra-legal influences. The question of the requisite mens rea for murder, for instance, saw 
the triumph of a subjective approach to the question of crllninal Iiability. A person should 
not be comrnitted of an offence he did not intend to commit. Moral blameworthiness 
demanded subjective culpability. Yet, the apparent retreat in Creighton nom the subjective 
approach shodd be seen not as a retreat, but as a Court re-baiancing the cornpethg interests 
of complainants and accused persons against the background of prevailing societal n o m .  
Chief Justice Dickson's endorsement in H '  of the objective standard in applying the 
reasonable person test to the defence of provocation underscored the need for judicial 
sensitivity to prevaiiing social attitudes: "It is society's concern that reasonable and non- 
violent behaviour be encouraged that prompts the law to endone the objective standard. The 
criminal law is concemed, among other things, with fixing standards of human behavi~ur.'*~' 
McLachlin I. in Creighton used the same reasoning, citing Dickson C.J.C. in Hill, to justify 
the historieai objective test for determinhg the requisite mens rea for unlawful act 
manslaughter-objective foreseeability of non-trivial bodily ha.r~n>*~ Chief Justice Lamer, 
speaking in dissent in Creighton, conceded the objective standard although he would have 
modified the common law test to objective foreseeability of death. In the final analysis, 
428S~pra note 330 at 108-109. 
429Supra note 382 at 212-213. 
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Lamer C.J.C.'s tenacious advocacy for the subjective standard of faut, had to concede to the 
broader social and legal context. 
Like any undertaking, time wili perfect the judicial process inaugurated by Charter 
litigation. The Court is not immune fiom criticisrn. However, crïticism can be either 
instructive or destructive. Much of what 1 have read in preparing this thesis has been of the 
latter variety. Why is this so? During the Court's fïrst 100 years, legal literature attacking 
its essence was sparse. Today, the principles of judicial impartiality and judicial 
independence are subjected to much scmthy, particularly in academic circles. Yet, these are 
constitutional principles; they are part of the common core of values that inform both the 
expectations of society and the judicial function. As such, they should be respected. Any 
readjustment in their content will, as Gunther Teubner says of reflexive law, corne about 
through an evolutionary, not a revolutionary, process. 
This thesis attempts to meld the academic and the practicai by examining the impact 
of legal theory and principle upon the judiciai function as revealed in the achial practice and 
development of the criminal law. To do otherwise would yield an incomplete pichire of the 
dynamics of the adjudicatory function. The Supreme Court of Canada is not only 
expounding law, it is expounding values. Through its decision-making process, the Court 
shapes the criminal process with repercussions for al1 involved. A rudimentary appreciation 
of the Supreme Court of Canada's role in pre- and post-Charter Canada hopefully wil1 
enlighten critique of the Court's role in the criminal justice system. 
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